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Abstract
This dissertation addresses the increasingly important role visual media plays in the 
construction of human rights discourse in an attempt to denaturalise the idea of 
human rights in its western democratic context. This is a shift from other 
anthropological approaches which have focused on rights in ‘other’ contexts at the 
expense of naturalising and disguising the constructed nature of human rights in 
western democratic contexts. To research this I have followed selected images from  
campaign work of a major human rights organisation through their production, 
distribution and reception. I base my research on interviews with informants and 
participant observation as a volunteer with Amnesty UK and as a member of three 
local Amnesty groups. In doing so I develop an account of images that focusses on 
their place in social relations, rather than a textual analysis of their representational 
qualities. An approach that is increasingly prevalent in anthropological accounts of 
images, but that I believe to be unique as an approach to rights images.I put forward 
the argument over ten chapters that pictures are used by activists to facilitate a 
process of imaginative identification with distant others that staff at AIUK call 
'empathy'. I examine this process of imaginative relating from both the point of view 
of staff, and of those publics that encounter images to argue that images mediate 
imaginative relations in ways that suggest a rethink of both 'empathy' as a concept, 
and human rights as a practice. In doing this I hope to develop understandings of 
human rights and visual media, and also rethink anthropology’s role in studying 
transient phenomena.
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Introduction 
Figure 1a: Student demonstrators, New Inn Yard, 21 March 2009
London, near Liverpool street, and over fifty students and members of staff gather 
outside Amnesty's Human Rights Action Centre to peacefully protest the illegal 
detainment of prisoners of conscience in Burma's notorious prisons. The 
demonstration has been organised by Amnesty UK staff in collaboration with student 
groups from around the UK, and focusses on the '88 Generation Prisoners'- a group 
of students arrested and imprisoned since 1988 for organising peaceful protest, and 
'misusing media'. Participants hold placards bearing close up photographs of the 
faces of the different 88 Generation prisoners, as well as a short sentence about 
them. As the procession sets off it is fronted by a large banner depicting a map of 
South Asia, with illustrations of prisoner's faces and names, inside the outline of 
Burma. Next follow men holding up cage bars, looking downcast dressed in prison 
garb. They are surrounded by demonstrators in camouflage jackets with signs that 
read 'for your protection and safety: your conversation is now being monitored, we 
are policing your use of the internet. By order of the Burmese army'. Behind them 
snake the hundreds of students silently holding the placards of prisoners. 
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Figure 1b: Student Demonstrators, Liverpool St, 21 March 2009
On the short walk from New Inn Yard to Liverpool street station,  passersby stop, 
some take pictures with smartphones or cameras, some walk alongside the 
demonstration asking questions, while some walk on unmoved by the spectacle. A girl 
who has been standing watching for a minute or two approaches one of the 
demonstrators to my right, and asks who the people in the pictures are. His reply is 
that 'they could be you'. He points to her phone and tells her that using her phone is 
a misuse of media, and asks if she's a student. When she replies that she is, he tells 
her 'so were they, now they're prisoners'. He then asks her if she'll take action for 
Amnesty and hands her a leaflet. As we walk away I see her filling in the leaflet. As 
the group reach the rally spot outside the station some chants start up, before those 
with microphones take over to explain the demonstration. One of the chants is 
repeated more than others, and is revived on the walk back the New Inn Yard: 
'PRISONERS ARE,  PEOPLE TOO, 
PRISONERS ARE, PEOPLE TOO, 
PRISONERS ARE, PEOPLE TOO...'
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While a wide range of images are used in diverse ways in the broad field of rights, 
the idea of 'humanising' rights was one that was particularly prevalent in my 
fieldwork. The demonstration described and illustrated above suggests something of 
the importance to rights activists of this 'humanising' in their work- the pictures, 
names, and geographical locating of prisoners of conscience serve to remind the 
public that 'prisoners are people too'. My fieldwork took place over two years, 
working and conducting participant observation with those involved in rights 
campaigning for Amnesty International including members of staff, photographers 
and agencies, local groups and grass roots activists, as well as members of the public 
encountering campaigns. During this time I focussed my attention on following rights 
images, their use, and their actions. I charted images used by Amnesty from 
campaign design, through circulation, to public reception using participant 
observation and extensive interviews in Amnesty International UK, with local 
Amnesty groups, and at sites of encounter with the public. I was concerned with 
understanding how my informants approached images, and what they do with them. 
The idea that emerged most strongly in relation to images was what informants called 
'empathy'. One staff member summed it up particularly succinctly when she told me 
that Amnesty was 'the human face' of human rights. She went on to say that 'if people 
just had a little more empathy then the world would be a better place, I think here we 
can do that with pictures, they show this is a person, like me or you' (Interview, 
October 2010). For those involved with rights, a concept of empathy was a powerful 
motivator, and it was something intimately tied up with experiences of images. 
Throughout this thesis I elaborate on what empathy means to staff, and how it is 
expressed through campaign design. I ask what criteria and experiences staff draw 
upon in forging and constructing empathy, as well as examining how these ideas play 
out in practice when campaigns are encountered by the public. 
The word empathy is occurring with increasing regularity in the political and social 
spheres of Euro-American1 culture. US President Barack Obama's oft quoted speech 
1 The term Euro-American is used throughout the thesis to describe the broad geographic and 
cultural context that is often described as 'the West'. Euro-American more accurately describes the 
two areas in which AI have their largest offices and where the organisation originated.
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calling for empathy in the wake of Hurricane Katrina sums up an approach to 
empathy echoed in many recent publications, that sees empathy as the prerequisite 
for peace and global cooperation (for example Barry 2010; Rifkin 2009; Ehrlich & 
Ornstein 2012). Obama claimed that to empathise is to be more inclined to help 
others:
'You know, there's a lot of talk in this country about the federal deficit. 
But I think we should talk more about our empathy deficit - the ability to 
put ourselves in someone else's shoes; to see the world through the eyes 
of those who are different from us - the child who's hungry, the 
steelworker who's been laid-off, the family who lost the entire life they 
built together when the storm came to town. When you think like this - 
when you choose to broaden your ambit of concern and empathize with 
the plight of others, whether they are close friends or distant strangers - it 
becomes harder not to act; harder not to help.' (Obama 11th Aug 2006) 
The president of the United States here articulates something similar to the version of 
empathy that I encountered in fieldwork- one based on seeing the world through 
another's eyes (Moyn 2006:399). I argue that it is this relationship that staff designing 
campaigns hope to achieve, and believe that images can provide. This represents a 
departure from the model of rights campaigning as sought through compassionate 
sympathy (discussed in Chapters 3 &4), as well as the imagery generally expected by 
humanitarian organisations (See Benthall 1993 & Chapter 3). This thesis follows on 
from a recent revival in anthropological literature exploring what is meant by 
empathy, and what it might mean to care for others or take action on their behalf (e.g. 
Kelly 2012a; Wilson & Brown 2009).
Empathy is a term with shifting meaning, and a heavy baggage of theoretical and 
social expectations, which I will attempt to address in more detail later in this 
introduction. The relation that is described above, and that I argue is planned for and 
desired by campaigners, is more akin to that described by Kelly as 'imagined 
identification' (Kelly 2012:753), than the empathy rooted in pity and suffering 
described by Wilson & Brown (2009:23). Kelly describes imagined identification as 
'a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for compassion, sympathy, or empathy' 
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(ibid:755). I argue that when staff talk about empathy, it is this imagined 
identification that they describe, and in doing so offer a re-imagining of what 
empathy might mean for a rights campaign in the absence of pain, and sympathy, thus 
suggesting new possibilities for how we conceive of responsibility to distant others. 
My thesis brings out, through ethnographic description, both how campaigners plan 
for and implement this relation, and also how in practice relations mediated by 
images are undertaken by staff and local groups. A picture emerges of the process of 
imaginative identification that is at once a product of planned image use, and also a 
response to images themselves, as experienced by activists working in a surprisingly 
closed sphere. While this is infinitely more complex and nuanced than initially 
appears, there are many similarities in imaginative identification undertaken by 
informants. I show how through limiting networks of communication, and the 
formation of communities of practice, imaginative identification emerges as a social 
and learnt process taking place in activist contexts in relatively coherent ways.
What follows below is an account of the rationale for focussing a study of rights on 
campaign images. By examining the role of images in rights, and approaches taken in 
the past, a picture is built up of a field where rights images are instrumental, yet the 
study of them has been addressed largely only in the narrow sphere of 
representational analysis. I begin with a discussion about the various roles of images 
in rights, before going on to highlight some methodological advantages which image 
study can provide in the analysis of the unfixed and broad field of rights. I then 
sketch changes in academic approaches to images and objects, and how these pertain 
to the field of rights. This is followed by a detailed introduction to Amnesty as an 
organisation and the reasoning behind my choice in focussing attention on that 
particular organisation, and specific departments within it. I conclude with a 
discussion of how the thesis should be read, discussing terminology, and the structure 
of the thesis.
Images in Human Rights 
Amnesty International's symbol of the candle in barbed wire suggests something of 
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the importance of visibility for the process of human rights. Illuminating that which is 
hidden is crucial to the process of compliance: making visible the violations of 
human rights tolerated or committed in countries puts pressure on them to make 
changes. Keenan points to the importance of images in a transnational campaign 
whose main objective is to illuminate and expose violations as evidence that these 
abuses are taking place (Keenan 2004: 438). Visibility in this sense goes beyond the 
abstract sense of the term with its connotations of 'making known', to something quite 
concretely visual. Photographs and images of abuse are important in human rights 
processes as evidence. In the recent Office for the High Commissioner of Human 
Rights (OHCHR) fact finding report on Human Rights in Gaza and other occupied 
territories (2009), for example, over 30 videos and 1,200 photographs were analysed 
as evidence (A/HRC/12/48 p. 43), including but not limited to images of bodies after 
soldiers attacked a house (ibid:161), footage of the Al-Quds Hospital attack 
(ibid:141), and photographs of rockets being launched (ibid). These pictures are 
mentioned explicitly, and form an important part of the body of evidence. 
Photographs have a long history of providing impetus for change, through showing 
visually the conditions requiring this change. Early movements towards social justice, 
such as Barnardos photographs of boys 'before and after', and the documentary 
photography of Riis which exposed living conditions in New York, called for change 
through showing conditions requiring intervention2. Pictures therefore are both proof, 
and witness. More recently in the case of Abu Ghraib prison, the claims for change 
were not widely recognised until supported by visible evidence in the form of 
photographs. In human rights processes, where increasingly testimony is considered 
suspect or unreliable, legal practitioners look for the tangible and physical as proof of 
abuse (Ticktin 2006; Kelly 2009). This can take the form of physical scars as visible 
evidence of abuse, or photographs depicting physical evidence of abuse, conditions, 
or situations. The role of images as proof can be seen as part of a preference in 
human rights practice for recognition of the physical violation of rights, and physical 
suffering. 
2 This is discussed in depth in Chapter 3 where the relation between pictures and social activism is 
developed.
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Visibility is important in a different way for the public-facing side of human rights 
activism. For activists, this idea of making visible is the central point of their work. 
They want people to see them, and through that engage with their work and human 
rights. Utilising the media is often how this is achieved. Presentations to the UN, and 
direct government lobbying, are an important part of the work that human rights 
organisations do, although raising public awareness and shaping public opinion on 
human rights issues is arguably the larger part of their work. Certainly for Amnesty 
International there are many more staff employed to manage their public activism 
than there are in research departments. Activism work of this sort is a highly visual 
undertaking because, as McLagan points out, it ‘increasingly takes place in and 
through media’ (McLagan 2005:223), and in this arena visuality is a central 
communicative tool (ibid 223). Such is the importance of visuals in modern media 
communication that Levin describes modern life as 'hegemony of the visual' (Levin 
1993), stating that the mass media audience demands a visual presence (ibid:4).  
While visual takes many forms for activist activities, from demonstrations, to civil 
disobedience, flyers, and the increasing importance of web presence, all activities 
share a focus on being seen as a means to being heard. In Amnesty International UK's
Groups Media Handbook (Amnesty Media Unit 2005) local activists are encouraged 
to 'make it visual' to 'catch people's attention' (ibid: 16). While this suggests the visual 
as a means to an end, images are still a dominant form of communication for 
campaigns, and a first point of contact for many people in Euro-American settings 
when encountering human rights. In effect, images are crucial to the construction of 
human rights as a coherent field of activism through a focus on being seen, and rights 
organisations are the key source of images for members of the public.  
A 'Way In' to Rights
If visuals are a key element of how rights are imagined and constructed, they also 
offer something more- they offer a 'way in' to the study of rights that is at once 
situated, and also mobile. Whilst previous approaches to rights in anthropology have 
focussed on local distant appropriations of rights 'in context' (see Merry 1997; Wilson 
1997), increasingly, in the wake of debates about the nature of culture as unbounded 
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(Wolf 1997:387), and the instability of the ethnographic field in a globalised context 
that sees slippage and movement as an inherent feature of life (Hylland Eriksen 
2003:4), there are questions about how we study things that have aspirations and 
applications across the world. In these cases, it is not enough to compare isolated 
instances, because that would fail to take into account the way in which for many 
global phenomena it is not the things themselves, but rather, the links between them 
that make them meaningful, as recent studies on activist networks have shown (Keck 
and Sikkink; Ghils 1992). Rights are one feature of this modern situation that has 
been notoriously difficult to study (Goodale & Merry 2007:12). Rights are at once a 
body of legislation with impact transnationally, a set of philosophical and moral 
ideas, and a wide network of concrete locations, artefacts, organisations and 
individuals (ibid). Finding a way in to these different versions of what rights are, and 
mean, is no simple task. Recently, anthropology and the political sciences have seen 
novel and interesting approaches to the study of rights, through attention to networks 
themselves (Riles 2006), and focussing on various locations where rights are 
performed legally (Alston 2006; Provost 2005) to try and answer the question of 
where rights are situated3. Levitt & Merry suggest focussing on the circulation of 
rights ideas as a way into the 'vernacularised' nature of human rights (Levitt & Merry 
2009:448). They suggest that by looking at the circulation of global messages into 
local situations we can begin to understand why some messages are adopted and 
others not, thus illuminating both the global and the local (ibid:443). What I believe a 
study of campaign design and dissemination offers is not only a localised approach to 
rights, but also an insight into the process of creating local campaigns with 
transnational aspirations, making it a localised form of transnationalism. 
In her edited collection Documents: Artefacts of Modern Life Riles describes 
documents as 'paradigmatic artefacts of modern knowledge practices' (Riles 2006:2), 
and as such says that they provide a ready-made ground on which to experiment with 
how to 'apprehend modernity' (ibid). She goes on to detail the many ways in which 
documents influence and are present in modern life, and to argue that they play a 
central role in constituting modern life and that their ubiquity renders them 
emblematic of modernity itself (ibid:5). I would suggest that the same conditions can 
3 See chapter 3 for a discussion of anthropological approaches to rights.
13
be found in images. They too are ubiquitous: they transcend the rights process in their 
various guises as evidence, publicity, and illustration. As such they provide, as 
documents have for Riles, a 'way in' to something that is not characterised by a set 
place or space. While documents contain the ring of legality to them- as laws, and as 
the paperwork that supports the legal process, images suggest something different. 
Through images I hope to be able to access not only the legal version of the rights 
process, but also the ways in which rights are constructed, discussed, and supported 
outwith the legal process. Through the visual media that is produced not as evidence, 
but rather as marketing to persuade and support the idea of rights, images are more 
than documents of rights, they help to constitute rights themselves through 
campaigning (McLagan 2005:223). Like Riles' documents, images are overlooked, 
mobile, and ubiquitous, but unlike many documents, images are largely public. Public 
images are selected from a pool of equally interesting not-so-public rejected images, 
and their selection can give valuable insight into the processes of constructing rights 
as a coherent activist sphere. When public, they have the potential to circulate outside 
of the networks normally associated with rights, or to extend them. For this reason 
campaign images provide a 'way in' to rights that look at rights as a social 
phenomenon that exists outwith legal channels.
By this I do not mean to suggest that images are merely a means of structuring a 
methodology that allows access to the public flows and encounters of rights, although 
they are that too. Images are at once the structure and the focus of this study. Through 
their construction, deployment, and movement, a picture can be built up of the 
connections and movements of rights campaigning, as well as of the role that images 
have in the rights process, and what they mean to the people who encounter them. I 
follow images through these processes in a campaign context in order to grasp their 
movement, and their role in campaigns. Through interactions with images I hope to 
add to understandings of the role and scope of images in the field of rights, as well as 
developing new ideas about how images themselves can be approached. To do this, 
an approach to images is needed that looks not at what they show, but rather at what 
they do (Pinney 2004:8).
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What Images Do
There is a relatively large area of image critique in the related field of development 
and relief work, where images are interrogated for their use of disempowering visual 
tropes (see Benthall 1993:177). This criticism is centred on several key concerns: 
depiction of 'suffering others' as distancing (Perlmutter 1998), as othering and 
exploitative, both creating and reinforcing stereotypes (Campbell 2003; Campbell 
2002), the silencing of people presented in images (Malkki 1996), and their 
consequent reduction to 'bare life' (Agamben 1995:42). These studies tend to focus on 
humanitarian and development organisations' images, rather than those concerned 
with a human rights agenda. These approaches, while appearing to share many 
attributes, are not interchangeable (Moyn 2007:27), as will be discussed later in this 
chapter. This is coupled with an awareness of the inbuilt inequality in photography 
between those who make and those who are represented in images (Price 1997:58), 
and the potential of photographs to lie through framing by the photographer of what 
to shoot and what not to shoot (Jacobson 2002:10). Studies of these kinds are 
concerned with the representational aspect of NGO images, and highlight the use of 
certain tropes such as the well-known Oxfam Child of the 1960s. I would suggest that 
this does not pay enough attention to the ways in which visual activities form a 
narrative of their own through their use and context. 
There exists a gap in the study of this phenomenon. While studies of rights related 
images are relatively common (see Benthall 1993; Boltanski 1993; Dogra 2012), 
especially in sociology where there is a growing interest in the study of mediated 
rights (see Nash 2010; Philo & Berry 2004; Freedman & Thussu 2011), and there are 
some studies of NGOs themselves (see Fisher 1997; Keck & Sikkink 1998; Hopgood 
2006; Cottle & Nolan 2007), there are few studies which link these two things up 
meaningfully. By that I mean that there are few studies of rights images which 
examine the production of rights images (exceptions include Dogra 2012), and yet 
fewer which look beyond the images as visual representations to consider the images 
in social situations. It is this particularly anthropological approach that I propose to 
undertake in this thesis.
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Images have a central and instrumental role in a process of human rights that is 
designed around the principles of seeing and being seen. Yet studies have tended to 
focus on semiotic readings of pictures that are based largely on the opinions of the 
authors, and offer little in the way of discussion about how rights images are used and 
function among people. This is an approach to visuals that Pinney describes, as the 
'visual as language' (Pinney 2006:132). Pinney suggests four central approaches to 
the study of visuals, of which 'the visual as presence' (ibid:137) is most relevant to 
this project. This approach attempts to situate images in their material context. Pinney 
goes on to suggest that there is predisposition in much of visual culture to 
'dematerialise the image' (ibid:137), at the expense of appreciating the embodied 
nature of the encounters which people have with images (ibid:139). Anthropology, 
with its focus on unpicking the social, and an approach to methods which emphasises 
being there, is well placed to look at rights images anew, through their 'presence', that 
is their status as objects as well as representations, not only through what they show, 
but through what they do, and how people interact with them. 
Increasingly, art academics are looking at images in new ways intended to push past 
deconstructions of representations, in order to consider their activities in the world. 
Mitchell asks 'what they want?' of images (Mitchell 1996), while Elkins looks at the 
way images 'stare back' (Elkins 1999). Art is increasingly being considered for its 
social aspects (Bourriaud 2002), and images are considered as embroiled in human 
relations that determine their meaning. At the same time anthropologists are 
considering the increasing role which objects play in constructing and determining 
human social life, and are approaching the study of objects by viewing them 'less in 
themselves then for their place in an exchange or ritual that will have an effect’ 
(Miller 1994:400). Studies such as Appaduria's Social Life of Things turns the focus 
onto objects themselves, as he states: 
'...we have to follow the things themselves, for their meanings are 
inscribed in their forms, their uses, their trajectories. It is only through the 
analysis of these trajectories that we can interpret the human transactions 
and calculations that enliven things. Thus, even though from a theoretical 
point of view human actors encode things with significance, from a 
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methodological point of view it is the things-in-motion that illuminate 
their human and social context.' (Appadurai 1988:5). 
This effectively opens up the field to the consideration of the role which things play 
in determining human social life. Since Appadurai’s study, anthropologists have 
considered the role which objects have in determining the self (Munn 1983), 
asserting that objects can have gender (Strathern 1992), and thus further destabilising 
the divisions between people and objects. 
The outcome of this destabilisation is the extension of agency to include human and 
non-human actors alike. Theorists point to classical anthropology, and the re-
examining of Mauss’ essay on The Gift (Mauss 1989), where objects (in this case, 
shells) are seen acting as agents. In his analysis of the Kkula ring Mauss poses the 
notion that gifts are never really free, and that an object may in fact be doing more 
than simply facilitating social relations (Mauss 1989:xii). The gift itself takes 
meaning from the identity of the giver, and social expectations. Through this it 
creates action on the part of the receiver, to reciprocate the action of gift-giving. 
Shells therefore, are instrumental in provoking action. Munn points out that 
‘Although men appear agents in defining shell value, in fact without shells man 
cannot define their own value. In this respect men and shells are reciprocal agents of 
each other’s own value’ (Munn 1983:283). It is not helpful to think either that people 
affect objects’ meanings, or that objects affect people. Rather, people and objects 
exist in relations of reciprocity, through which meaning is made, as the shells suggest.
Gell's Art and Agency, and Latour's Actor Network Theory (ANT), have emerged as 
two of the dominant contemporary approaches to understanding the agency of objects 
in anthropology. Gell describes an approach to art in which agency is created through 
investment and intentionality by human actors (Gell 1998:99). In this theory, objects 
temporarily take on human agency (ibid). Gell argues that objects were ‘made to 
mediate social agency’ (Gell 1998:7). It is suggested by some thinkers, however, that 
Gell does not follow through enough with his argument to give objects their true 
recognition as independent agents (Leach 2007:167). Latour offers this recognition , 
for him agency is to be found not in Gell's human intention, but in systems of 
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relation, preferencing neither human nor object actors (Latour 2005:64). To treat 
objects in any other way is to make the 'mistake of starting with essences, those of 
subjects or those of objects.' (Latour 1999:108). By this he suggests, as others do, that 
there is no basis upon which to make the assumption that objects are inherently 
different from humans, and that to do so is an imposition of our own cultural 
expectations (Hearne, Holbraad & Wastell 2007:3). Therefore while both theorists 
may agree that objects can act as agents, they disagree on where this agency 
originates. Throughout this thesis I reflect on how these ideas of agency correspond 
to the visual material that I encounter. 
Strathern's fieldwork points to objects as being part of people in Melanesia (1992:14), 
therefore suggesting that the line between humans and objects is not as clear as we 
might think. Gell's conception of artworks as carriers of human agency in effect 
makes them extensions of humans themselves (Gell 1999). This has significance for 
images, as they have the added 'stigmata of personhood' (Mitchell 2005:30) in that 
they can show people, and in human rights often take the form of a photograph or 
image of a particular person. Indeed at times  a photograph may be more ‘real’ than 
the person it stands for. This is true of passport control where a person must match up 
to their picture to be allowed safe passage (Kumar 2000; Torpey 2002). In human 
rights it is true in the sense that a photograph or visual bruise is considered more 
‘proof’ and real than the testimony or claims of the person (Kelly 2009:779). The 
representational nature of images therefore renders them a different type of object, 
one which may not conform to the same patterns of agency that have been set out by 
other anthropological accounts. 
This reimagining of the relations between people and objects has important 
implications in the field of image study. Rather than seeing images as products of 
human intentionality, we can consider their meaning as coming out of social 
relations. This is a shift from the way in which images have been thought of as 
products of their creator's 'vision'. If images are not bound to their maker's intentions 
then a new approach is needed,one that considers ‘not a history of art, but a history 
made by art’ (Pinney 2004:iv). Rather than seeing images, then, as illustrations of 
ideas held elsewhere, we can consider images as in part changing and determining the
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world around them. Exciting new possibilities then emerge for the study of rights 
images, ones that does not ask what they show and do not show, but that looks at how 
they act to determine experiences of rights.
Therefore to study human rights images in a way that does not presume to 
deconstruct their representational meaning, one must also refrain from presuming the 
nature of the relations in which they exist with people. While I draw from the theories 
above by approaching human rights images through their involvement in social 
relations, I do not employ either a Gellian or Latourian model of agency, rather I 
reflect throughout the thesis on the types of agency at work in the field of human 
rights images. By keeping an open focus, I hope to avoid an essentialisation of 
images, and instead to let them emerge throughout the thesis in the terms in which 
they are understood by my informants, thus painting a picture of how human rights 
images work as productions of human rights in campaign context. I have suggested 
some of the limitations created by a study of representational properties of images 
alone, in terms of the imposition of subjective authorial readings,where it is important 
not to replace one subjective approach with another. I hope that by approaching rights 
images with a flexible take on the nature of their social engagement, I shall be able to 
account for their role in human rights as a social process without the imposition of 
expectations. The section below discusses the context of my study to explain the 
focus on Amnesty International for studying the production and consumption of 
human rights images, and the organisational structure in which the images are 
produced. 
Amnesty International and AIUK 
Organisations and the visuals that they produce play an important role in the process 
of human rights, and it is not one that can be understood simply by looking at the 
images. In order to account for images in social contexts, I based my study of human 
rights visuals on those used and created by Amnesty International. This is among the 
largest human rights organisations in the world, with over 3 million members, and 
representation in 200 countries. It is therefore influential in the arena of human rights, 
and produces the majority of rights campaign visuals in circulation. Below I describe 
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the structure of Amnesty and its sections in order to explain my choice of focus on 
the UK section. I use Amnesty's own published accounts of their history and 
structure, as well as written accounts of the organisation published by academics, and 
Hopgood's detailed ethnography of Amnesty's International Secretariat (Hopgood 
2006) to build up an account of an organisation with a complex structure. Facts stated 
about membership numbers and section organisation come from Amnesty's own 
accounts (Amnesty UK Website, accessed November 2013) unless otherwise 
indicated. 
Amnesty International (AI) was founded in 1961 by Peter Benenson as a response to 
the imprisonment of Portuguese students over a 'toast to freedom', which prompted an 
appeal in the British newspaper The Observer for members of the public to write 
letters on their behalf. Like most creation myths the story has been retold so many 
times that aspects and details were bound to change. The famous toast to freedom, 
used heavily in Amnesty's birthday celebrations in 2011, has been questioned, as well 
as the motivation and timing of Benenson's appeal (Rabben 2001:181). However the 
growth of the organisation since then is well documented and without question 
(Powers 2002:iv). What started as a letter writing campaign has now grown into one 
of the largest reporting and campaigning bodies worldwide involved in Human 
Rights. International bodies such as the UN Reporting Committee look to AI reports 
to guide decisions about their recommendations, and it is for their detailed reports 
that AI arguably is best known. Rarely do I pick up a newspaper with information on 
human rights abuses which does not quote or look to Amnesty International for a 
comment or information, and by many people it is considered a world moral authority 
on rights (Hopgood 2006:xi). 
Amnesty is an International Non-Governmental Organisation (INGO). As such they 
appear on the UN lists of affiliated INGOs alongside organisations such as Oxfam, 
The International Red Cross, ActionAid and MSF under a broadly shared of being 
not-for-profit, and operating to improve social and material conditions around the 
world4. They share a concern with social improvement justified by the notion of 
'humanity' as a whole, however within this broad remit exist very different 
4 See http://www.un.org/en/civilsociety/ for a list of INGOs that the UN cooperates with.
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approaches to how and why this improvement might take place depending on an 
organisation's focus on poverty, aid, development or rights (Provost 2005:2). Aid and 
development organisations such as IRC and Oxfam are most commonly classified as 
humanitarian, while Amnesty International is explicitly concerned with defending the 
human rights set out in international law. Their manifestos demonstrate subtle yet 
important differences:
Figure 1c: Section from Amnesty International's Statute. http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-
are/accountability/statute
Figure 1d: Section from Oxfam Mission Statement. http://www.oxfam.org/en/about/what/purpose-and-
beliefs
The wording in the opening statement to AI's statute refers explicitly to the 
mechanisms of international law (the UDHR), while Oxfam's reference to rights are 
not legally defined, but rather described as the outcome of a 'world without poverty'. 
Therefore despite similar concerns, the focus on how to achieve these goals is 
distinctly legal in the case of AI, while Oxfam make no explicit reference to law as a 
means to affect change. As Wilson & Wilson point out 'human rights and 
humanitarianism share many of the same attributes and emerged from yet the 
intellectual origins' yet are 'distinct' (2009:5). While the two are concerned with 
universal human community and responsibility (Provost 2005:2), they are based on 
different principles (ibid). Provost, in her analysis of the similarities and differences 
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between the two points to the appeal to justice in human rights, and the inclusion of 
'military necessity' in humanitarianism as one of the defining differences (ibid:5), the 
other being the often identified focus on compassion within humanitarian 
justifications for action (ibid; Meyrowitz 1984). Human rights organisations are 
focussed on an appeal to legally defined rights that everyone holds, as AI's statement 
suggests, and as such imply a certain degree of reciprocity. Humanitarianism on the 
other hand is 'justified less by a legal claim than by a moral one' (Wilson & Wilson 
2009:8) - that is to say care for distant others is called upon 'from the heart' in the 
form of sympathy and guilt (ibid). As Moyn points out in his analysis of the relation 
between the two 'humanitarianism could underwrite violations of rights as well as 
their defence' because their primary remit to alleviate physical suffering, which is 
sometimes in conflict with people's rights (Moyn 2007:28). 
While distinctions between the two approaches, like those sketched above provide a 
background to the field of major INGOs generally, it is not as rigidly a distinction in 
practice as legal theorists such as Provost (2005) would have us believe. Increasingly 
there is slippage in the language and practices of rights that some suggest is blurring 
the boundaries between the two (for example Fassin 2006:35). In addition to this 
slippage in goals and practices rights organisations often work with humanitarian 
ones on shared goals5. In my experience this was not without occasional animosity 
over the means to the shared ends. This is because while humanitarian organisations 
hope to appeal to the heart, for staff at rights organisations this is sometimes seen as 
counter to attempts to empower people to claim their rights (discussed in Chapters 4 
and 6). The two approaches therefore consider themselves to employ different means 
to campaign for change. It is not my purpose here to tease out the many nuances of 
difference and similarity between the two approaches (see Provost 2005 for a 
discussion of this), rather I highlight this distinction as a background against which to 
understand the campaign activities of Amnesty International.
AI’s influence, despite being overtly concerned with international law, does not stop 
at the walls of the UN, nor is it confined purely to the delivery of impartial country 
reports. Amnesty International is still very much the letter writing campaign group it 
5 Examples of this include the ongoing Global Control Arms Campaign, and EQUALs coalition 
against sexism.
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started out as, but rather than a few people in a dilapidated room in London 
(Hopgood 2006:24), AI campaigns through in-country sections throughout the world, 
and boasts a membership of over 2.8 Million. This includes hundreds of workers and 
volunteers, devoted largely to keeping the campaign wheels turning by running 
awareness campaigns to generate action from the public, similar to the letter writing 
of early days, as well as encouraging new members, and therefore generating income 
which supports campaign work, report compiling, targeted lobbying, and all aspects 
of AI's work. The scope and influence of AIUK makes it a suitable choice for 
conducting a study into human rights images. As a major player in the field of human 
rights, and with a high output and level of influence Amnesty International fulfils the 
criteria of being a human rights producer that many members of the public encounter 
through their campaign activities. The wide circulation of campaigns means that the 
study will provide a cross section of human rights engagement with images that is 
representative of some general trends in this area. 
An organisation of this size is a vast and daunting field of study, but it is also 
unrivalled in its output and influence in the process of human rights. While from the 
outside Amnesty may appear as a homogenous international organisation6, the reality 
in practice is that the work of producing visuals used in campaigns falls to distinct 
elements of the organisation, making the daunting task of engaging with Amnesty 
images more manageable. Below I discuss the structure, scope, and operation of 
Amnesty International in order to explain its selection as the focus of this study, and 
to rationalise a focus on a particular part of the organisation. 
Amnesty International as an organisation consists of two distinct organisational parts- 
the International Secretariat (IS) and the regional sections. The International 
Secretariat is based in London and produces the famous Amnesty Reports. In this 
office, small teams of regional specialists monitor situations in countries in order to 
compile reports that are available online and produced in published format. As well 
as reports, the IS is involved in making recommendations to international bodies, and 
it is in this capacity that Amnesty has come to gain a reputation as an authority on 
6 The fractious nature of the organisation is the subject of much of Hopgood's (2006) Keepers of the 
Flame.
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human rights. However it is not through the secretariat that the majority of Amnesty's 
campaign work is done, but through sections based in over 80 countries, as well as by 
smaller volunteer-run offices in countries without a local section. Amnesty sections 
have handled membership, fundraising and the vast majority of campaigning since 
the 1960s, and are known colloquially by staff as 'the public face' of the organisation. 
Sections therefore walk a line, like many charities and NGOs, somewhere between 
campaigning and fundraising. Their primary remit is confused by the nature of human 
rights campaign work being largely focused on changing minds and practice, rather 
than deliverables such as goods or aid, but nevertheless requiring funding to continue 
these awareness raising activities. These sections deal directly with the public, and 
the chances are that when you see an Amnesty poster, or take part in campaign action, 
it has been designed and implemented by your local section7. A member of staff at the 
IS once told me that the sections are 'Amnesty's PR department', because they do 
much of the outward public campaign work. As such they have an important role in 
defining how human rights look to the public, and act as one of the key mediations 
between the legal system of human rights, and the social practices and beliefs which 
support it. While campaigns involve many elements, their primary mode of delivery 
is visual, in terms of an emphasis on the images used on flyers, on the website, in the 
Amnesty Magazine, and by creating what is known as 'spectacles' such as 
demonstrations which, as well as being visual, also utilise pictures and banners. 
While for smaller sections direction on these visuals comes from the IS, for the larger 
organisations this is not the case, and all visuals are produced and circulated by staff 
in-house. 
If there was a flowchart of the process of campaigns, it would probably have an 
arrow pointing out of Amnesty UK to regional offices in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, and from there to local groups to do the actual 'campaigning'. This 
would not be a totally accurate account of how campaigns are disseminated, which in 
7  Large Amnesty sections (notably in the USA, Netherlands and the UK) design and implement their 
own material, while smaller sections get their material from the campaigns team at Amnesty IS. It is 
considered preferable by most staff at Amnesty to have regionally planned campaigns but some 
sections do not have these resources. The UK, being the context for AI IS as well as one of the larger 
sections, experiences some overlap between the two organisations. 
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practice is more ad hoc, with occasional use of so-called 'chuggers' and direct 
marketing from AIUK in the form of internet campaigns, newspaper campaigns, and 
events. However the basic principle remains that at the heart of Amnesty lie its 
members. Amnesty was an early adopter of subscription-based membership and 
remains legally accountable to its members. Asking members to take action for 
human rights is still the dominant campaign practice, and generally members who are 
also active in local groups disseminate campaigns through events and activities in 
their local areas. A great deal of campaign planning at AIUK is undertaken with this 
in mind, and local, student, and youth groups are instrumental in communicating 
plans designed by AIUK to wider audiences.
Therefore the production of campaigns is not something that remains in the office, it 
is taken up by local group members who prioritise different aspects of images, and by 
the public as they encounter images. Human rights images are not simply vessels 
which are 'encoded' with meaning (Hall 2006). The organisational process of 
Amnesty alone ensures that images are continually moving, and being re-produced, 
by different parts of the organisation and associated groups. Conducting fieldwork on 
images in these circumstances presents many obvious challenges, for example the 
various locations in which images exist, the many layers of production and reception 
at work, and the issue of scale between grassroots activism and transnational 
ideology. Therefore defining and planning a field and methodology which could 
account for the processes at work in planning and encountering images was of utmost 
importance. This is the subject of the following chapter, where a method allowing me 
to access campaign images as a process with many sites in production, circulation 
and reception, is discussed in depth. 
Note on Terminology
It is helpful at this point to delineate some of the terms that are used throughout the 
thesis. As with many studies in academia, words used by informants may have very 
loaded meanings in academic language, and indeed have multiple meanings for 
different informants. I have tried to be clear throughout about what I understand 
terms to mean to different actors, but there are a few overlapping terms that come up 
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repeatedly that require discussion. Empathy as I refer to it in the thesis has a specific 
meaning when staff members use it. To them it is distinct from sympathy, which 
suggests the sharing of another's pain and the inbuilt hierarchy between sufferer and 
onlooker. However empathy is itself a rather loaded term with many meanings. When 
referring to the actual relations which staff members form, and seek to form, I favour 
the description 'imaginative identification' (Kelly 2012a:754) because it captures the 
imagined nature of the process at work, does not presuppose pain, and is not loaded 
in the same way as empathy is, and thus allows the specificity of this approach to be 
clear. When talking about theorists' approaches to empathy, and how they compare to 
this, I have tried to be clear about what empathy means to the individuals referred to.
Closely related to these terms are compassion and pity, both often used by informants 
and by academics in slightly different ways. Compassion in this case emerges as 
similar to but distinct from sympathy, because while it too involves a sharing of pain, 
it is also seen to be linked to action to alleviate that pain. It is this version of 
compassion used by informants that I refer to in the thesis. Similarly, when I refer to 
academic publications that deal with compassion, I am doing so in relation to their 
bearing on this definition. Pity is often equated with compassionate sympathy by 
theorists (Arendt 1990:90), and is generally used by staff members in a derogatory 
way to describe the power inequality that comes from sympathising with others. 
When I use these terms I do so not to unpick their meaning in finer degrees, but 
rather to explain the distinctions made by informants, and how these similar but not 
quite interchangeable categories of relating are enacted and borne out in practice.
The overarching term used throughout this thesis that still bears discussion is image 
itself. Elkins says that it is 'impossible even to make a reasonable list of meanings 
that are assigned to such words as image', because they are so many, and so varied 
between and within fields (Elkins 2011:1). Elkins here draws attention to the way that 
the image has different contextual meanings and interpretations. Throughout this 
thesis I use the term image, and images, as my informants approach them. I look to 
informants’ definitions of images, although this is not without conflict or slippage. 
Broadly speaking, when informants use the term image they are referring to printed 
images in the form of photographs, info-graphics, paintings, drawings and other 
works of art. For the purpose of the thesis, image is expanded to include other aspects 
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of visual practice such as film, acting, and demonstration that while not always 
classed as 'image' in name fall under that category through the way that staff 
members treat and speak of them on similar terms and with similar expectations.  
Synopsis 
The thesis is developed in two parts. Part one is titled Production and deals with what 
AIUK hope to achieve with their images. Part two is titled Reception and deals with 
the way in which images are used and appropriated when released into the public 
sphere. These titles are designed not to be prescriptive, but rather are destabilised as 
discreet stages of image circulation, throughout the thesis. The remainder of the 
introductory section is devoted to a detailed discussion about the multi-sited approach 
to methodology, and specific methods employed to supplement participant 
observation. It deals with the particular issues arising from working within an 
organisation, and how these have impacted on the findings. It concludes with a 
discussion about ethical concerns and the action taken to ensure these have been met. 
The thesis opens with an historical account of rights images to argue that there exists 
a tradition of compassionate activism rooted in images into which Amnesty fits. I 
argue that the field of rights images, and approaches to analysing the field, have 
focussed on images as a means to elicit compassionate sympathy, highly criticised by 
some theorists as detrimental to rights. However in responding to these criticisms, 
organisations have shifted the focus away from images of pain and are thus engaged 
in a rethink of what it means to show distant others. Rather than appealing to 
sympathy, Amnesty hopes to appeal to empathy. It is this appeal with which the thesis 
is concerned. 
People Like Us (chapter 4) highlights AIUK staff members’ central visual and 
campaign approach as oriented around individuals and portraits of people as a means 
of closing gaps with distant others. It uses archival research and ethnographic 
examples of the Burma campaign to suggest that for AIUK staff members, pictures of 
people are used to create a universal humanity crucial to the concept of human rights. 
It suggests that in imagining universal humanity staff members imagine the link 
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between people as residing not in physical suffering, but in cultural similarity, and 
thus hope to use visual tropes to create people who are 'like us' culturally and socially. 
The chapter compares the planned aims of image use with everyday staff practices of 
relating to distant others through visuals.
Imagining Audience (chapter 5) deals with the introduction of an Audience Policy by 
management at AIUK which identifies and encourages staff members to reach out to 
'new audiences'. While the policy is specific in what this means, staff attitudes and 
practice relocate the new audience and identify it as 'different' in ways which reveal a 
persistent organisational identity. In imagining audience, staff members limit its 
potential and therefore limit to some extent who can participate in the moral economy 
of rights activism. In imagining audience, staff members are themselves undertaking 
a type of imaginative relating double: imaging an audience, and imagining them 
relating to the pictures which they select.  
Gaps and Silences (chapter 6) discusses the lack of images of women in the appeal 
for abortion and women's rights in Nicaragua. This chapter looks at Amnesty's image 
criteria to understand why certain things are visually omitted from campaigns. It 
argues that the relatively loose concept of dignity used by staff members to explain 
omissions does not fully explain why some human rights abuses are more undignified 
than others. Rather, there are ideas of appropriateness which are not addressed openly 
by staff members but which nevertheless impact on campaign design. These ideas 
exist in terms of which kind of violence is unacceptable and which victims most 
vulnerable, and how their use reflects on Amnesty's image as an organisation. Dignity 
as it is used by staff members  not only refers to dignity of the victims but also refers 
to their dignity as an organisation. 
Part Two is based on my experiences working with local groups and addresses how 
the campaigns discussed in Part One were used and consumed by local groups and 
members of the public. It opens with an overview of the dissemination of campaigns 
by AIUK through local groups to provide a context for some of the differences 
between AIUK's intentions and campaign practice by highlighting differing 
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motivations and visions between local groups and AIUK staff. I use the specific 
example of Amnesty's 50th Birthday poster campaign to chart and follow a set of 
pictures into a variety of dissemination contexts. I suggest that in disseminating 
campaigns local groups have their own priorities, distinct from Amnesty UK staff 
agendas, and that this creates cul-de-sacs in the flow of information.
In Too Much Empathy (chapter 8) the goal of empathy identified in People Like Us is 
questioned through experiences of public interactions with campaigns at Lovebox 
Music Festival. In this chapter we see empathy as present, but without a knowledge 
of rights to ground it in similarity with distant others it becomes a barrier to taking 
action on their behalf. This chapter reflects on conditions needed to relate to images 
in ways that are productive of action on behalf of Amnesty, and the processes needed 
to go from imaginative relating to the recognition of the rights of others.
In Chapter 9, Performances of Pain, local groups are shown to reintroduce pain and 
suffering to the narrative through performances of the images – literal performances 
such as human rights skits and use of people in cages, as well as narrative 
performances, which draw from intervisual contexts. This chapter suggests that for 
local groups, shared pain is a component of connecting with distant others, and part 
of an embodied approach to experiencing images and distant others. 
In Beyond Empathy (chapter 10) the themes from the preceding chapters are drawn 
together to reflect on how the processes of imaginative identification being 
undertaken relate to theories about empathy and care for distant others, specifically as 
these pertain to the visual. I suggest that for local groups and staff at AIUK there is a 
process of ‘ethical looking’ being undertaken. This chapter suggests that ideas of 
ethics are paramount to activists working in this field and that these ideas are worked 
out, in, and through images. It suggests that there are possibilities for rights images 
which are not images of atrocity, but that narratives about rights do not need to 
escape physical suffering or be reduced to merely the practice of compassion. Rather, 
activists engage in particular types of looking, and understanding these processes can 
contribute to debates on the presentation of rights and distant others. The thesis is 
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concluded with a summary of key findings and suggestions about future directions 
for research. 
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Chapter 2: Researching Rights Images 
The fieldwork that I undertook to investigate human rights images involved 
following the images as they moved through various locations within and outwith 
Amnesty UK. This fieldwork took place over two years, from 2009-2011, and 
involved conducting participant observation within AIUK's London office in order to 
understand organisational and social principles behind and developing from image 
production, as well as participant observation with Amnesty local and student groups, 
and attendance at events and demonstrations where the images were present. This 
was supplemented with archival research and over 50 interviews. The rationale for 
this approach is discussed in this section firstly by defining what has been meant by 
the anthropological field in the past and looking at how current trends apply to my 
project. I then go on to describe in detail the sites of inquiry and the difficulties and 
opportunities which these presented before giving an overview of specific methods 
covered by the umbrella term 'participant observation' as they pertain to my chosen 
field site in order to give a comprehensive and transparent overview of my time in the 
field.
Defining the Field
Anthropology is often equated with a particular methodological process rather than a 
specific theoretical position (see Clifford 1992; Gupta and Fergusson 1997). 
Anthropologists traditionally go into ‘the field’ and conduct participant observation. 
It is this process of gathering information  through immersion over an extended 
period of time (Amit 2000:2) which generates the type of data that anthropologists 
seek to gain, namely, ‘the everyday living’ (Levi-Strauss 1966:114). This allows 
anthropologists access to taken-for-granted-aspects of social life, which cannot 
therefore be found through direct questioning (Bourdieu 2003:285). The field 
therefore, has long been considered as intrinsically linked to the method of gathering 
data. Stocking points to Malinowski’s defining methodological example as ‘less a 
matter of concrete prescription than of placing oneself in a situation where one might 
have a certain type of experience’ (Stocking 1992:58). This 'situation' traditionally 
took place in a distant locale such as a village (Amit 2000:2). Therefore when 
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Malinowski called for anthropologists to ‘come down from the veranda of the 
missionary compound’ (Malinowski 1926:99) ’into the open air of the 
anthropological field’ (ibid:146-7), he clearly imagined that the field was a discreet 
location that could be entered. 
Recent literature however, has emphasised the ‘transitory de-territorialised, unfixed, 
processual character of much of what we study’ (Malkki 1997: 86). Many 
anthropologists no longer assume their field site to be as unproblematic as previously 
imagined. Whereas previous notions of the field were geographically bounded, and 
equated with a culture, these ideas have been repeatedly questioned as we encounter 
‘groups no longer territorialised, spatially bounded, historically self-conscious, or 
culturally homogenous’ (Appadurai 1991:191). The process of globalisation and the 
exchange of ideas and persons, as well as the interest in studying that which is 
transnational, and interacting with ever wider networks in ever changing situations 
means that situating oneself ‘there’ becomes difficult (Eriksen 2003). Indeed ideas of 
'here' and 'there' which can be seen as endemic to traditional anthropology are now 
murky and unstable, causing anthropologists to pay more attention to how they frame 
and define their field, and the implications that has on their research. As Falzon sums 
up: 'World systems theory, transnationalism, migration studies that go beyond 
classical push-pull and/or integration concerns, diasporas, cosmopolitanism, and so 
forth: all posit frameworks and scales that invite supra- local understanding and 
therefore methodology' (Falzon 2009:5) . 
Cultures, therefore, if they ever did exist in discreet ways, are now so enmeshed in 
trade, media, and migration, that to understand them as bounded and discreet makes 
little sense. Rather, anthropologists are increasingly interested in looking at 
connections between things, instead of distinctly bounded fields. The global has often 
been opposed to the local for comparative purposes, but increasingly it is necessary to 
question this dichotomy. Connections between people are now considered important, 
and constitute a large and relatively unexplored part of social experience. Marcus’ oft 
quoted piece Ethnography in/of the World System gave this ethnographic movement a 
name and a set of suggestions about how to conduct ethnography which was situated 
not by place, but in other ways (Marcus 1995: 105). He puts forward a list of possible 
structuring principles for conducting multi-sited ethnography, based on the types of 
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studies which anthropologists have been carrying out. These include: following the 
people, the thing, the metaphor, the plot, life histories, and extended case studies 
offering examples of each of the above (ibid 107-110). The seeds for this type of 
research can be seen in well-known studies such as those of Appadurai (1986) and 
Mintz (1985), who follow objects through their circulation, in order to build up a 
picture of the systems and contexts which exist in capitalist consumer flows of 
produce. Through approaches like this to anthropological methods, Marcus and 
others have moved beyond studies which posit local against global, to build up a 
picture of complex connections which produce world systems in which people live 
(Marcus 1999:50). 
Following the Thing
For this project, the implications of such visions of the field are clearly important. 
Human rights, perhaps more than other areas of study, have been caught in this 
global/local bind through comparisons between local appropriations and a seemingly 
transnational legal set of ideas (Goodale 2007:16). Attempts to move beyond the 
binary often result in its being reinforced in other ways (ibid). Campaigns represent 
the seeming contradiction between global aspirations, techniques conforming to local 
market research, and the reduction of the global by campaigners into manageable 
audiences who represent or speak for global ones. Therefore a methodology which 
does not impose a divide between practices and the underpinning aspirations of 
transnational appeal, is needed to account for human rights as a practice. A focus, like 
Marcus suggests, on connections would seem to offer an answer, by showing 
processes of campaigns as they are intended- as mobile and transformative. However 
accessing connections is not a straight forward task. Appadurai's approach to 
economic systems, mentioned above, acknowledges connections by following 
objects. It thus offers an account of a wider set of social and world systems, or 
connections, illuminated by the object at various stages on its journey (Appadurai 
1986: 11). This is a clear example of 'following the thing' (Marcus 1990:50). 
However a method that accommodates images is presented with a number of 
difficulties that Appadurai's study was not faced with.
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Following the thing can be seen as applicable to rights images specifically, which are 
in many ways objects which move in material ways, and following them would seem 
to offer a means to understand the systems which they are involved in and contribute 
to, offering a way to access how images are used by people, and act on people, to 
produce and reveal understandings of rights which does not exclude their place as 
part of a wider process and project. However rights images are not simply things, 
they are also convergence points for a whole set of issues around human rights. 
Images are objects, but they are also representations, reproductions, and their status 
as such determines their use and circulation. In many ways this aligns them more 
closely to the following of metaphors, and the field technique which I used can be 
seen as a combination of these approaches. While the difference between following a 
thing and following a metaphor may seem academic at first glance, there were 
actually practical distinctions which are worth highlighting. While an object can be 
seen as moving in distinct geographic locations, a metaphor's locations are not 
necessarily geographically discreet. In the case of rights images it makes more sense 
to talk of sites in terms of 'contexts of engagement' rather than of set geographic 
places. Images were at times in the same physical space of AIUK's office, but in very 
different places depending on which team they were used by, for what purpose, and 
who was interacting with them. Sites in this instance are not only physically different 
spaces, but are also contextual ones in which images move and take on different 
meanings and uses. For that reason the study can be seen as  a version of the social 
life of things, with its focus on motion and connections, but with key differences 
which are specific to the nature of images as bearers and creators of ideas which are 
enacted in various overlapping contexts, suggesting that we view them not just for 
where they go as objects, but for what they do as images. 
This approach clearly borrows from both the multi-sited ethnographic approaches 
discussed above, and also from actor network theory's notion that objects gain their 
significance through their place in networks. This in many ways reflects the role of 
images as existing in both physical spaces, and those spaces that I have described as 
contexts of engagement. These contexts can be seen in this light as akin to networks 
through which image use and meaning can change without a change in the physical 
setting, but through their repositioning in these networks. As discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis, understanding contextual meaning in the form of networks 
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is an important aspect of my approach to images. I draw on both Gell and Latour 
(Gell 1998; Latour 2005) when talking about networks in this thesis. While in this 
project images are indeed studied as existing in complex contexts of engagement, or 
networks, which determine their meanings, the question of where agency originates is 
left relatively open. While there is little doubt as to the effect images can have on 
humans around them, and that this agency goes outside human intentions, I have tried 
to pay attention throughout to the social relations which facilitate this, and account 
not for a point of origin, but rather for the processes at work which allow rights 
images to gain meaning and act to produce and reinforce what human rights are. So 
while images are treated as agents, in networks of signification, I do not begin the 
thesis with a predetermined idea about the line between humans and agents. Rather I 
reflect on this throughout the ethnography. 
The Multi-sites of Amnesty Images 
Figure 2a: The Human Rights Action Centre Entrance, Shoreditch, London.
As one of the most well-known organisations in the world, Amnesty has an important 
role in defining and communicating supporting narratives for human rights, as 
discussed in the introduction. This is done through campaigns and reports, and 
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through production of visual media in support of these campaigns. Amnesty is 
therefore an important site for the investigation of human rights images. However as 
mentioned above, within the organisation there were many different sites in which 
images were used and existed.  For that reason I formed a research plan that involved 
following the thing not just in AIUK, but throughout the image's circulation through 
overlapping sites within and outwith the organisation. Taking into account 
approaches from cultural and media studies where the prevailing attitude is that 
media can only be understood in its circuit, and not as isolated moments (Hall 
2006:295), and drawing from multi-sited approaches to ethnography. I attempted to 
capture a picture of image contexts of engagement through the many sites of 
production, circulation and reception. This begins with ethnography in AIUK where I 
focused on ‘...the ways in which individuals and groups negotiate the constraints of 
the particular material conditions, discursive frameworks and ideological 
assumptions in which they work’ (Mahoon 2000:468) and extends into ethnography 
of reception with local groups which are themselves an extension of the organisation 
and form a key role in the circulation of images into the public arena. I hoped to 
convey and investigate human rights campaigns as mobile and dynamic through a 
study which is not only grounded in multiple geographic locations such as the office 
and local group meeting places, but also multi-sited and flexible enough to move as 
the images themselves do between different sites within those locations.
While my time at AIUK is primarily a study of media production in the vein of 
Ginsburg (1993;1999), the methodological approach is more akin to the studies of 
organisations, as I attempt to untangle the organisational principles and practices that 
underpin and shape image use. Ethnographic studies of and in organizations are not 
new, for as Susan Wright points out, ‘anthropologists from Turner onwards have 
always been concerned with how people organize themselves’ (Wright 1994:5). 
Richardson & Walker’s famous study of  shop floor efficiency was conducted in 1948 
(Richardson & Walker 1948), and since then such studies have been growing in 
number (for a detailed analysis of these studies see Baba 1986), and coupled with 
studies of bureaucracy (see Britain & Cohen 1980 for a review). More recent 
accounts attempt to look at organisations as this project intends to, through how they 
think and act (see Weiss & Miller 1987; Douglas 1987), and through how these 
actions are the products of networks of significance. Studies have struggled with 
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bounding this network, as interconnectedness is potentially never-ending. The 
methodology for this project bypasses that by being focused not on the whole, or on 
one department, but on the cross-cutting field provided by images as they move 
through the organisation, and therefore a more comprehensive account of the process 
of campaigns can be built up. While it can never be entirely natural to limit the field, 
these limits are created in part by the informants’ own practices, and therefore are not 
imposed exclusively by the anthropologist. Of course no campaign is entirely 
emblematic of the way that an organisation works because of the individuals involved 
and the campaign intention, however I hope that the field within the organisation 
created by the movement of images is as cross-cutting and organic as possible, and is 
therefore reflective of the processes of producing rights campaigns more generally. 
In order to fully comprehend the significance and use of rights images I was keen to 
understand their use in contexts outwith the office. My focus was primarily on local 
and regional groups where it would be possible to participate in meetings and build 
relationships with groups of people invested and interested in the images. Through 
these groups I also had access to members of the public and attendees at events as 
they responded to rights images. Studies of reception are notoriously hard to 
undertake, and while there is growing anthropological interest, such studies are more 
common in fields such as media and cultural studies. I therefore looked to this field 
and used a hybridised approach based loosely on the field of 'audience research' 
characterised by Alasuutari (1992) and influenced by anthropological approaches to 
studying audience (Abu Lughod 1994), which now emphasise the meeting of 
production and reception in meaningful ways (Radway 1988:362). To do this, I use 
the term audience loosely to refer to those people who experience meeting the images 
publicly, because those were most accessible to me, and because I was interested in 
taking part in discursive and physical encounters through which people make 
meaning. In this way, I do not study audience widely or exhaustively, rather I focus 
on the creation of particular publics through encounters with images as 'concrete 
crowds' (Warner 2002:49) and their processes of meaning making. I do this by 
attendance at events including music festivals, film screenings, exhibitions, and 
demonstrations and taking part in what Wood calls the 'conversational floor' (2007), 
whereby people make sense of images at the point of encounter through conversation 
(2007:76). I use follow up interviews where possible, and attempt to ground these 
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encounters in wider social narratives.  
Amnesty and the Human Rights Field 
It is important, before proceeding to unpick the organisation of Amnesty 
International, to first place them in the context of the field of human rights 
campaigning. As discussed in Chapter 1, Amnesty International is explicitly 
concerned with human rights in a legalistic sense. Their statement appeals to the 
UDHR, and their campaigns and regular urgent actions clearly address violations of 
specific legal rights. As such I have suggested that their focus is similar to other 
INGOs, but differentiated from humanitarian organisations by this appeal to law as 
the means by which change is sought. This focus on law that comes with a rights 
based organisation has been critiqued by scholars for its potential to reduce complex 
socio-cultural situations into a set of objective facts required for a comparative legal 
process (Wilson 1997:153; Hastrup 2003:319). The field of human rights 
organisations and Amnesty in particular, has come under intense scrutiny for a 
portrayal of rights 'characterised by a liberalism and minimalism which strip events 
of their subjective meanings in pursuit of objective legal facts' (Wilson 1997:134). 
Wilson suggests that while human rights reports are written largely for an intended 
audience of the UN and international bodies (ibid: 135), their constructions of what 
constitutes a human rights violation, and stripped down version of individual stories 
into legal 'facts' permeate human rights discourse at the level of campaigns, local 
groups, and activists, who look to rights reports for their information (ibid: 154).  
Thus the field of human rights becomes one where subjective narrative is sidelined 
for the delivery of information through the genre of legal language.
Wilson's critique (1997), echoed more recently by Hastrup (2003), portrays human 
rights campaigning as legalistic and based on 'facts' that hide many of the decisions 
made in deciding what counts as a rights abuse. However, while this may be true of 
the reports written for evaluation at the UN, a closer examination of the organisation 
of Amnesty International suggests that this might be an over estimation of the role of 
law within the organisation. Within the IS, the part of the organisation that produces 
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the reports, there is a very small legal team (three practicing lawyers), and while 
other members of staff may have a legal background, it is not a prerequisite to work 
for the organisation. In fact Lisa, a member of HR responsible for looking at job 
applications at the IS and AIUK branches of Amnesty, told me that country specialist 
knowledge was the most looked for background in an employee (Lisa, interview, 
October 2010). Of course just because staff are not trained in law does not preclude 
their writing in that genre, especially where reports are concerned, however as 
discussed in the previous chapter, the organisation is not only concerned with 
producing reports.  The wider scope of Amnesty involves campaigns designed within 
AIUK where the remit of communication is not to deliver facts in reports, but rather 
to 'change hearts and minds' (Alison, interview, January 2011). In fact none of the 
campaigns I worked on made reference to specific laws and bills, and as will be 
discussed throughout this thesis, were concerned largely with 'humanising' the legal 
process of rights through campaign.
Rather then than seeing the process of human rights campaigning as either legally 
orientated, as Wilson does, or entirely devoid of the constructions set up by 
organisations when they write reports, the work of Amnesty International must be 
seen as a response to both. By which I mean that to understand the campaigns 
produced by Amnesty, they must be viewed in light of the legally determined field of 
rights monitoring, and their own legal aims, but also as part of a wider field of INGO 
campaigning, discussed in the previous chapter, that puts organisations in competition 
with each other for funding for similar but differently orientated goals. The mediation 
between the research side of Amnesty's work, and the campaign side, takes place 
through Amnesty's local sections like AIUK. While the IS produces reports factually, 
to stand up in court as evidence, AIUK see their work as translating this research into 
appealing campaigns (discussed in Chapter 4). Wilson's critique is aimed at 
publications produced by Amnesty's IS (Wilson 1997:134), and largely ignores the 
work of sections. Therefore while slippage between reports intended for the UN and 
the general public, as Wilson rightly points out , is inevitable (1997:154), and staff 
work within a context where appealing to law is their ultimate remit, there is also a 
process of mediation undertaken by Amnesty sections that attempts to alter these 
legal narratives into campaign ones. It is this process whereby rights that were legally 
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defined originally become campaigns for public consumption that this thesis is 
concerned with. For that reason I base my research within AIUK, rather than the IS, 
to better understand what criteria, if not legal ones, staff try and appeal to the public. 
Below I discuss the organisation of AIUK as I understood it to work in practice. I 
elaborate the alliances and processes behind campaign production throughout the 
thesis, but a background to the context of production is important for understanding 
not only my role and interactions in the field, but also for understanding how the 
findings presented in the thesis came about.
The Organisation of AIUK
The flow diagram given to new staff at orientation shows a flow of information from 
the IS to sections, whose workers are given campaigns which they implement 
according to local conditions (Appendix 1). Sections have clear roles and 
responsibilities, as discussed briefly in the introduction to this thesis. They handle 
recruitment, managing groups, and mobilising campaign action through public 
appeals and local groups. While the IS shines a light into dark corners, the sections 
make sure that as many people and as widely as possible see what has been 
illuminated, leaving sections with a clear mandate as the mass communicators of 
rights abuses. In this vision of the organisation there is a streamlined relation between 
the two, with the IS providing information and direction, and the sections acting on 
them. The reality of course is not so simple, and while the flow chart works as a 
guide to the structure of the organisation as a whole, the relation in practice was not 
quite so straight forward. To describe 'Amnesty International' is actually to describe a 
number of complementary and sometimes antagonistic organisations, which come 
together under that name and the well-known candle symbol. To navigate the internal 
organisation of this organisation in practice, rather than through neat flowcharts, was 
a confusing and often difficult task. However it is a crucial aspect of the production 
of campaigns and one that I had to untangle in order to conduct fieldwork. I will 
begin briefly an elaboration of the relation between the IS and the UK section 
discussed in the introduction, before going on to describe the UK section, where I 
was based, in more detail.
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Many see the International Secretariat as the 'real' Amnesty, and in many ways this is 
indeed the beating heart of the organisation. It is the centre of research, the place 
where decisions are made about which countries, issues or individuals are put 
forward for campaign, and all of this behind bullet-proof glass and airport-style 
security which gives the impression of sombre importance. The sections on the other 
hand, the 'commercial' side of the organisation which are places that the public can 
visit, are in danger of being overlooked as simply the little sisters of the IS. In 
practice, however, sections hold considerable sway within the organisation. The 
relations suggested by the flow charts showing information and ideas flowing from 
the IS downwards to sections, and then to local groups and the public, are misleading. 
In fact staff at the IS number less than those at the larger sections (UK, USA and 
Netherlands are among the largest) and staff in these organisations have acquired a 
high level of experience and skill in campaign work before they find themselves 
working at Amnesty. The size and skill of sections means that they function fairly 
autonomously. Sections have their own organisational structures, and their own 
priorities and areas of expertise, which often exceed the IS's capacities, and bring into 
question the relationship between the two. The UK section for example does much 
work in Burma and in the Palestine and the occupied territories, meaning that UK 
staff members have contacts, information and priorities which the IS staff, being 
more commonly desk bound, do not. This means that when making campaign 
decisions about these regions the UK is often the authority. Other sections have their 
own areas of authority. Therefore while the IS retains an aura of mystique and a self-
styled parental role over sections, the reality is that large sections and IS work on a 
horizontal plane, with different areas of specialty. For the production of images, this 
has implications. While on an international level the IS does produce many visuals 
which are given to smaller sections in non-Euroamerican countries, and even runs 
some of its own campaign designs here in the UK, the UK section AIUK has a much 
greater output of visuals in Euro-American contexts, and its own systems, authority 
and processes to do this. 
This relation is not unproblematic, as will emerge throughout the thesis. The IS and 
UK sections have considerable overlap as both are based in the UK and produce 
campaign materials, yet both have different approaches to doing this. Staff at the UK 
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section certainly, take pride in their running of the section's campaign work, and do 
not always agree with the choices made by the IS. The UK section has its own colour 
scheme, logo and font, but the differences in output are often more subtly to do with 
how those involved imagine Amnesty and human rights campaigning, as will be 
discussed later in the thesis. There was sometimes what one staff member described 
to me as 'tension' about 'who's in charge'. AIUK members often disliked too much 
direct control over their running of the section. For the most part staff get along and 
work productively with colleagues from the IS in the few instances where they have 
any direct collaboration, despite these differences. In the recent turmoil caused by 
proposed plans to restructure AI, so that more of its operations would be based 
outside of the UK, UK section staff and IS staff protested together in solidarity 
against management decisions that most staff disagreed with. Though this was after 
my fieldwork had finished, friends in the organisation spoke to me about how it was 
only then that they were meeting many of the staff in the IS. This speaks to a certain 
level of separation between the two in practice. Decisions made in campaigning then, 
are a product of this relationship, on the one hand cordial with shared goals, but on 
the other hand separated by a structure and practice that contains a certain degree of 
ambiguity about decision-making and ownership of the Amnesty legacy. 
Amnesty International UK is based in a converted factory in Shoreditch, East 
London. When the section moved into the custom-renovated building almost ten 
years ago, it was designed to be a 'flagship', somewhere where the ideas and work of 
Amnesty could be shown to and accessed by the public, as well as a 'human rights 
hub' for London. Rather than being called AIUK, it is named the 'Human Rights 
Action Centre'. Its exposed brick walls, large glossy portraits, and inspirational 
artwork, speak to the type of organisation that the UK section aspire to be. It is a far 
cry from the formal and colourless IS. The building is open plan, broken up 
occasionally by glass, and despite state of the art sound-cushioning there is always a 
buzz of conversation audible. The building spans an open basement, and three further 
floors of similarly open plan desks. It can feel like a maze for new staff, because of 
the numerous stair cases, and the lack of sign posting about which team sits where. 
During the majority of my time there the office was arranged roughly as follows. 
Basement: Education & Student team, Ground Floor: Facilities Management, 
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Activism Team (including Individuals at Risk), First Floor: Campaigns Team, Press 
& Media, Second Floor: Design, Supporter Care, Events, Brand, AITV, Third Floor: 
Finance, IT Support, Web Team. However the ever increasing Brand and Events 
Team had to be moved twice during my two years there to accommodate their 
growing size, and arguably therefore their increasing importance in the running of the 
organisation. The flow chart available online and given to staff when they join AIUK, 
shows the role of the board and management, with the different teams low down on 
the list. Interestingly has flows ending with all but the campaigns team. The chart is 
mainly an 'account of accountability in the organisation' I was told during my 
induction. Further charts detailing the relationships between teams in departments 
exist (see Appendix 2). The charts show that within each of the departments at 
Amnesty there exist several teams, and within these teams there are further 
distinctions. 
While charts like this are useful in a broad sense, the system at AIUK for 
collaboration between teams is such that it is difficult to show in chart form. Most 
undertakings are managed in one team, but supported by project groups who meet 
regularly and take on different aspects of the project. The lead team decides who is 
most appropriate to include on the project group, but most activities at AIUK involve 
members of the marketing team (to promote activities), and the campaigns team (to 
guide the campaign focus). Individuals from these teams are chosen depending on the 
project, the indented deliverables, and to some extent the working relationships 
between staff members, since how well people get on working together plays an 
important role decisions about recruitment to project teams. A better description than 
the flow chart would be to look at a more detailed layout of the building, which 
shows teams sitting together. Rather than having a floor for each department, which 
would technically be possible, the teams which work most together are often based 
near each other geographically in the building. There are also odd pockets of people 
who sit outside their teams for reasons of practicality or preference. Mikey, a 
colleague in the events team, is not a member of the student team, but he sits in the 
basement with them because he runs the student conference. The building therefore is 
a more realistic visualisation of the movement of ideas and people in AIUK. It is not 
entirely linear like the flowcharts suggest, but is arranged in practical and sometimes 
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impractical ways, and when you first enter the building you get lost several times a 
day, but after a year of working there that seems impossible. This was how I felt 
about many aspects of life at Amnesty: what had seemed at first to be mystifying 
would eventually become second nature to me. I needed a field approach that could 
accommodate movement through these different structural and interpersonal aspects 
of organisational life, yet which did not end up as an account of Amnesty itself more 
than an account of the images I set out to study.
Limiting My Field of Vision
Human rights images are mobile and discursive in nature, and they benefit from 
examination which looks at them in motion, as discussed above. However, defining 
and limiting the field through objects is very much constructed by the anthropologist 
(Amit 2000:15), and runs the risk of over extending the field and losing the depth and 
relationships which are crucial to gathering ethnographic data (Horst 2009:119). As 
Burawoy warns, ‘bouncing from site to site anthropologists easily substitute 
anecdotes and vignettes for serious fieldwork’ (2003:673). The above section 
suggests something of the scale and complexity of AIUK. Its multiple teams, its 
reliance on local groups, and a lack of clear information about how these all relate 
made for a complicated overall field site. For this reason careful planning was 
undertaken to devise an approach based on images, which allowed for the 
development of relationships and a sense of place within the sites visited. The bulk of 
my research was carried out at Amnesty UK's head office, the Human Rights Action 
Centre (HRAC) between November 2009 and August 2011. This allowed me to 
conduct participant observation from my position within the organisation as a 
volunteer over an extended period of time and to identify key images and campaigns 
to follow. While I had initially intended to follow images from just one campaign, the 
practicalities of my role within the organisation meant that I interacted with a number 
of campaigns over the two-year period, as campaigns ran their course and were 
'wrapped up'. For this reason I follow images from a number of key campaigns over 
that period, to build up not a profile of a particular campaign which would preclude 
differences between campaign topics and regions, but rather to paint a picture of 
Amnesty's visual campaigning more generally. In my voluntary capacity I was able to 
get involved with many stages and processes of image design and marketing, and to 
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observe similarities and differences between people and campaigns. 
In order to continue to follow the images after their treatment by AIUK, I took part in 
three local and student Amnesty groups on a regular and semi regular basis over the 
course of my fieldwork. There are 240 local groups across the UK, which form an 
important part of Amnesty's distribution strategy. Local groups are trained and briefed 
on campaign objectives, and provided with materials and support to campaign locally. 
They do this by organising meetings, fundraising and most importantly by raising 
awareness and encouraging people to take 'actions' in the form of letter writing, or 
signing a petition either online or offline. It was often suggested to me by staff at 
AIUK that local groups 'do the really hard work' of being Amnesty's 'face on the 
street'. In this way, by working with local groups, I was party to the first point of 
contact between public and pictures, as well as being involved in their further 
propulsion into public arenas. The informed decision to limit my participant 
observation to these arenas was based on analysis of the circulation of Amnesty 
images conducted as a pilot study during my previous MSc by Research, and to some 
extent on my undergraduate dissertation. Both of these projects suggested that these 
two areas are points at which images are designed and altered greatly, but which 
could also provide an opportunity for in depth analysis of production and responses. I 
used pre-existing contacts in my hometown of Edinburgh to gain access to a group 
there, who were chosen because of their role in supporting AIUK campaigns during 
the annual Edinburgh International Festival, which is one of the main events in the 
AIUK campaign calendar. Attendance at Edinburgh group meetings was varied, 
falling intensively over the summer months when I was based in Edinburgh (July-
August 2010 and 2011) and semi-regularly during the rest of the year. Regular 
attendance was possible with groups in London and Cambridge, selected because 
they are extremely active local and student groups respectively, and I was able to 
attend monthly meetings  of both groups. Meetings took place in designated halls and 
university rooms, and while attendance did vary, there was a core of people in each 
group with whom I came to form close relationships. To supplement these sites, other 
places where fieldwork took place included events at which campaign materials were 
disseminated such as music festivals, film screenings and exhibitions organised by 
Amnesty or other local groups and interested parties, over 50 interviews with other 
activists, photojournalists, and media representatives, and archival research in AIUK's
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Resource Centre and the collection of materials held in Amnesty's International 
Secretariat. Through being present at the above sites I was able to gather information 
at important stages throughout the circulation of Amnesty's human rights images and 
to gain insight into their multiple and shifting meanings and uses. 
 
Observant Participation: being in the field
Figure 2b: My Staff Card. Staff are issued with an identity card allowing access to the building during 
and after hours.
In my field sites both in the HRAC and with local groups, I conducted participant 
observation through being a member of staff or group member. This obviously 
creates certain ethical considerations, which are dealt with in more detail in the 
section immediately following this one. There are also methodological considerations 
as I was implicated in the thing that I was studying to a greater degree than is usual in 
anthropology. This is a shift which has been characterised by Turner as 'observant 
participation' to account for the changed field dynamic (Turner 1990:10). I originally 
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applied as a volunteer in the events team where my responsibility was programming 
human rights films for screening at the HRAC, but I found that it was a limiting role 
for my research purposes, and I changed position to be an Events Volunteer attached 
to current campaign events, with occasional secondments to other teams as part of the 
Volunteer Exchange Program. In that way I was able to be part of the working groups 
relating to specific campaigns, and was present for their launch and publicity events. 
I was supervised directly by Laura and Amanda, both members of the events team, 
and useful contacts and supporters of my research. Over my time at Amnesty, my 
responsibilities grew. I took on the role of Volunteer Representative as one of the 
longest serving volunteers, and my responsibilities especially around the Amnesty 
Media Awards were such that many members of staff were surprised to find out that I 
was a volunteer, let alone that I was a research student conducting research on human 
rights images in Amnesty. 
This obviously presented as many difficulties as it did opportunities. The issue of 
consent required me to regularly remind people that I was doing research, and to 
reaffirm my position as a researcher with new and distant members of Amnesty's 250 
staff. For my immediate team and those on working groups with me this was not an 
issue, as my regular questions and scribblings in field journals would have been 
reminder enough, had I not also asked for signed consent to using meeting and other 
materials and from every new interviewee. Often the quick turn over of volunteers 
and temporary staff meant that continuous rather than one off consent was required. 
In some cases, where consent was in doubt or where I was unsure of the nature of 
materials, I sought consent retrospectively. However my dual role as researcher and 
member of the team also presented me with opportunities: taking part in daily work 
meant that I was able to experience my time at Amnesty as other staff did, and relate 
to their point of view, and  day to day activities were not necessarily marred with the 
obvious stigma of being an outsider, or the difficulties of translation.
In field sites throughout my research, the issue of insider/outsider was a prominent 
one. As discussed above I was often 'part of the furniture' in my field sites, and as a 
British graduate I had a broadly similar background to my informants in all my field 
sites in terms of class and social background. My manager at AIUK had a degree in 
Social Anthropology, and within both AIUK and in my local groups I had social 
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connections with some individuals through shared acquaintances. This would seem to 
position me as 'native' or insider in the traditional anthropological dichotomy. In 
practice I found that distinctions like this were not very useful because the shifting 
nature of identification and the nuances of social life meant that I was never either 
inside or outside. Rather, I was at times a researcher, at times a student and at times a 
member of staff. There were differences and similarities between me and colleagues 
in terms of gender, regional background, position within the organisation or group, 
and age. In some contexts these were highlighted, which implies that suggesting that 
the anthropologist can ever be either inside or outside takes far too broad a view of 
the dynamics of social relations. I tend to agree with Narayan when she calls for a 
removal of this dichotomy in favour of understanding fieldwork ‘in terms of shifting 
identifications amid a field of interpenetrating communities and power relations’ 
(Narayan 1993:2). I have tried throughout the writing of this thesis to draw out these 
relations and reflect on their impact on my findings. 
There were elements of work in Amnesty that were very reminiscent of the work that 
social anthropologists do. Throughout this thesis I discuss some of the similarities in 
approach to questions of representation, and dealing with difference, noting that often 
staff at Amnesty and theorists in academia are drawing from the same knowledge 
pool in a way that is increasingly being considered in anthropological accounts. Riles, 
in The Network Inside Out, suggests that for her study on Fijian activist and 
bureaucratic networks, the subject of the study was equally indigenous to her 
informants as it was to academic traditions (Riles 2001:2). She suggests that 'we are 
already inside the network' (ibid:4) and calls for a methodology that turns it inside 
out, that is to say that finds a point of access from within (ibid). In many ways I have 
tried to answer this call. At a literal level I was based within the organisation, and at a 
theoretical level I was within a knowledge system that was shared but that I have 
attempted to turn outwards and make intelligible. However at the same time I am 
conscious of trying not to overestimate similarities, or prejudge the practices at work 
as merely the result of a shared knowledge pool. To do so simplifies the way that 
different pools, practices and power dynamics interact. What results is an account of 
Amnesty and my position that is detailed and reflexive about these issues.  
My role as a volunteer with my own workload also created time pressures and 
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limitations to my potential field in terms of access. Making requests to sit in on 
meetings that I was not already party to was not comfortably received by staff, and 
access was an issue which determined some of my choices about which campaigns to 
follow and how to be involved. The problems of access when you are 'studying up' 
are well documented (Nadar 1972), and it has been pointed out that the imbalance of 
power means that those being studied have the means to exclude themselves or 
aspects of themselves from interrogation (Cooper and Packard 1997:5). While there 
were certainly times when my role prevented me from gathering information in 
specific sites, and from certain informants,these barriers were often explicit and 
enshrined in organisational hierarchy charts produced by AIUK. Thus I was able to 
identify and adapt to these 'blind spots' by utilising other methods. Throughout the 
thesis I am explicit about where information was not available, and how I adapted. As 
well as access which was prevented through the hierarchy of the organisation of 
which I was on the lowest rung as a volunteer, there were also practicalities which 
prevented me from having full access. Muzzucato points out that anthropologists 
studying flows and exchanges will have to contend with a greater level of 
simultaneity than previously (Muzzucato 2008:69). This is because things will be 
happening at all field sites all the time, and the anthropologist will only be present at 
one. This was true of life within an organisation as well. Most work is done 
independently and quietly on computers, and while I was involved in some parts of 
image production, other parts were being conducted elsewhere in inaccessible ways 
at the same time. Anthropologists are increasingly involved in working at their 
chosen field sites (Marcus 2009:197) and their jobs and roles will make them bound 
to do certain things at certain times. This was the case with my work in Amnesty, 
which meant that research was undertaken while at the same time I had deadlines and 
tasks to complete which were demanding, time-consuming and prevented me from 
getting involved with every activity or event which looked interesting. To address 
these limits I conducted interviews which supplemented participant observation, in 
order to fill in blanks created by issues of access. I heard opinions and versions of 
meetings from those present which often created interesting comparisons between 
competing versions of the same things. I had to select therefore, not only when to 
prioritise my presence, but also who to interview about things that I had missed. 
Interviews formed a significant aspect of my field research and I found that clarifying 
things that came up in other contexts in meetings helped to clarify consent for certain 
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topics. The selection of interviewees and topics is clearly anthropologist driven, 
however the flip side of that is that the selectivity is overt, rather than in straight 
participant observation with its mystique of unbiased ‘integration’.
Ethics and Considerations
Consent
My research complies fully with the ASA ethical guidelines. All research participants 
consented to taking part, with written agreements where possible, and were informed 
about the purposes for which the information would be used. The conditions of my 
being able to conduct research of this sort were worked out with my head of 
department at Amnesty and require anonymity for all informants and so for that 
reason names have been changed. However the nature of the organisation is such that 
often there is only one person in a certain role or meeting in which case name 
changing was rendered useless. In these few cases I have made attempts to protect 
their privacy by other means such as changing incidental details of the meeting or 
situation, or making efforts to disguise their role where it is not crucial to the 
narrative. As mentioned above, consent in this situation is hard to ensure and required 
continuous reminders to new staff. Initially upon undertaking research I put out a 
notice on the intranet letting staff know about my project and inviting people to come 
and speak to me about it. While this generated some interest at the time, over the 
research period it often felt that people saw me more as a volunteer  than a researcher. 
This required me to make judgement calls about what information was appropriate to 
use and what was private. I have attempted to seek explicit consent in every instance 
where I was unsure about the privacy of the material. The same difficult balancing of 
my role as a researcher took place with local groups where I was seen very much as a 
local group member. In the case of Edinburgh and Cambridge I had existing ties with 
members of the local groups from prior to undertaking research. However in these 
locations consent was easier to manage because of the bounded nature of the groups, 
for unlike Amnesty's constantly changing 250 staff, local groups were small enough 
that I could sit down with each member and discuss the project and their role in it. I 
had no objections from anyone taking part. When using materials from members of 
the public I sought consent from people who are quoted directly and where possible 
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conducted follow up interviews.
Confidentiality
As a volunteer with Amnesty I had to sign a confidentiality agreement which 
prevents me from disseminating any materials marked 'internal'. Amnesty as an 
organisation is very concerned with confidentiality because of the sensitive nature of 
their research. This is less the case for AIUK who do not handle the sensitive case 
information held at the IS, but I felt it necessary on occasion to seek consent for the 
use of documents which were not market internal, but which I would not have had 
access to outwith my role as a volunteer. I chose to err on the side of caution where 
Amnesty's organisational confidentiality was concerned because of the importance 
placed on it by the organisation. For that reason, very few documents have been 
reproduced in this thesis. I have summarised where possible, and I focus my attention 
and analysis on what people say and do with these documents rather than on the 
content of them. Amnesty UK are concerned with organisation transparency 
following a series of recent scandals, and most of the information that I use 
pertaining to the organisation of Amnesty and the processes involved are freely 
available in the public domain. 
Positionality
My insider status in my fieldwork contexts as mentioned above brought issues of 
consent and required me to make judgements about appropriateness throughout the 
writing up of my field notes. It also raises questions of objectivity because as an 
insider myself, it sometimes took an effort to see things with the outsider perspective 
which anthropologists value. There were times when being so involved with projects 
and the work place frustrations which come as a result of that meant that I had to 
make extra efforts to reposition myself as an observer and researcher, to take part in 
'participant deconstruction' and to step outside of participant certainties (Shore and 
Wright 1997:16-17). In order to counter to some extent these potential biases I have 
tried throughout the thesis to be explicit about my role and relationships in different 
situations, and I have made every effort to be self-aware and reflexive while in the 
field. I hope that my insider status works not to make me a sympathetic researcher, 
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but to make me an aware one, and allows me to understand and explain some 
occasionally confusing practices by AIUK and local groups in their terms, and with a 
genuine understanding of the pressures and processes behind them.
Despite, or possibly because of my close relationship with the people I worked with 
throughout my fieldwork I imagine that some of the people depicted will disagree 
with my analysis of some matters. Previous studies in the field of charities and NGOs 
have found a critical response from those involved (for example Mosse 2004:x), 
partly because of the nature of their work as funding dependent, and therefore their 
deep concern with regulating the flow of information and the representation of the 
organisation (ibid: 12). To counter potential negative responses, I invited participants 
to read my work and the parts of it pertaining to them. The invitation was rarely taken 
up, and I was told more than once that I was 'trusted' to 'do justice' to the material. I 
hope that I have been able to live up to this trust, and I have tried to give an honest 
and balanced analysis of the paths of human rights images. The analysis and 
perspective however is not a final word on any of my informants, fieldwork contexts 
or indeed on human rights images: it is simply my version of these things as I saw 
and understood them.
Methods and data gathering
Within the blanket term of participant observation there have always been multiple 
methods employed (Bernard 2011:34). This was particularly the case in my research, 
where as discussed above, it was not always possible to have access to events, and 
aspects of people's lived experiences and parts of the organisation remained closed to 
me. For this reason I relied heavily on these additional methodologies including 
archival research, visual research and most importantly interviews. What follows is a 
brief overview of my use of these tools and how they worked in practice.
i) Interviews
Interviews allow for several advantages over other methodologies, including a 
formalization of relationships, access to closed offices and individuals, a way of 
accessing specific and targeted information, and for exploratory purposes (Gray 
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2009: 371). One of the key advantages of interviews is that they facilitate focused 
and in-depth discussion where an interviewer can probe in order to clarify meanings 
and assumptions which would not be expressed otherwise because to the interviewee 
they are obvious (Arksey & Knight 1999:32). During the course of my research I 
conducted over 50 interviews and they formed a significant part of my data-
gathering. Interviews were invaluable because they allowed for the gathering of 
information from hard-to-reach informants within AIUK and in the media including 
photojournalists, and at Amnesty IS with members of the research teams there 
(through structured, focused, in depth interviews: see Appendix 3). They also helped 
to build relationships with members of AIUK and key photographers, and provided 
me with background and specific information. Interviews however only informed me 
about what the interviewees themselves wanted or were able to convey. Bourdieu 
points out that we could ask ourselves why we put candles on a birthday cake as a 
way to count years lived, and that we don’t know, we just do, or when we do have 
ideas they differ greatly between people (Bourdieu 1993:283). Much of social life is 
habitual, therefore, rather than theoretical (Jenkins 1994:439). In addition, informants 
may not want to talk about certain things and may censor themselves consciously or 
unconsciously (Holloway & Jefferson 2000:2). All are valid points, however the 
interviews that I conducted, backed up with long term participant observation as they 
were, avoided some of these pitfalls through being part of a package of methods 
rather than the primary source of information. For example I was able to make a 
comparison of practices observed with those being described by interviewees. When 
analysing interview data, as well as conducting interviews, I was able to bring in 
additional knowledge to inform my conclusions, thus allowing interviews and 
participant observation to support each other. Interviews were either structured or 
semi-structured based on loose questions devised for the individual being 
interviewed. They were recorded where possible on my mobile telephone using a 
plug in microphone, and detailed notes, with time references made to accompany 
recordings. In some occasions it was not possible to use a recording device because 
of respecting the wishes of the individual, or because I deemed it likely to be a barrier 
to the flow of conversation. In these cases, detailed notes were made during the 
interview and written up afterwards. Interviews took place in various 
locations.Informal interviews were held in the 'break out' area of AIUK where there is 
a small kitchen and a large dining area, while other interviews took place in the office 
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of the person being interviewed, if appropriate, or in cafes and pubs nearby. 
Maintaining privacy in the latter locations was difficult, but conducting some 
interviews in neutral locations outside the workplace or group meeting room was 
important to me because I found that conversation flowed more easily. 
ii) Visual Methodologies
Visuals were a central vehicle for conducting this study as both the focus of study, 
and as discussed above, the means by which the study was structured. They were also 
instrumental as methodological tools themselves. My project is in a way a large scale 
photo elicitation. Clearly this is a simplification, but responses to images form a large 
part. Interviews were largely structured around images. Within the context of this 
project, making links between the verbal and the visual is given priority, as this is 
how narratives of human rights and agency of images emerge. Pink suggests that 
shared viewings of the visual ‘offers further ways of exploring and creating 
relationships between verbal and visual knowledge’ (Pink 2007:92). Talking about 
pictures is therefore key, and as discussed in the above sections, this involved 
following and using images to elicit narratives (e.g. Harper 2002; Pink, Kurti and 
Afonso 2004). As well as being the primary focus of the study, images facilitated 
much of the subsequent methods used. I observed that people find it easier to talk 
about images rather than simply about themselves, they create a buffer between 
interviewer and interviewee making the setting more relaxed, and they provide an 
impetus for discussions with further-reaching implications than those suggested by 
the images themselves. 
Images are used throughout the text because context is crucial to the meaning of 
images and presenting these contexts visually will help to render these arenas 
accessible after the fact. This is in terms of the visual setting in which images, such as 
a demonstration or exhibition space, but also in terms of maps and visual aids to 
place the images and image trajectories and to process the network mapping. Use of 
visual methods has a controversial history in anthropology, with debate about the 
subjective nature of photography (Collier and Collier 1986; Hockings 1995), which 
have more recently been replaced with debate about how to use the visual rather than 
if (Pink 2007:10). The inherent subjectivity of images that has caused so much 
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concern is well positioned in a project whose concern is with the subjectivity of 
visual narratives, such that I would suggest that reflexivity is to an extent inbuilt. 
iii) Archival Research.
In order to situate current campaigns in context I relied on archives held by AIUK 
and the IS. Amnesty UK stores information in the Resource Centre which includes 
copies of all reports, campaigning aids distributed to groups and all the materials 
which staff themselves use to research campaign strategies. I also used Amnesty 
Digital Asset Management (ADAM), a visual archive to which I was granted access 
thanks to the supportive staff at the IS. This allowed me to situate images in visual 
current contexts which are available to staff at AIUK. Because there is no one 
coherent archive reflecting a systematic narrative, I was not focussed on the archives 
themselves as my object of study as others have been (e.g. Derrida 1995; Foucault 
2002). My intention was to gather information about campaigns and images from 
different periods, as well as to reflect on the images held in the archives and what 
their storage means to staff. I did not have access to Amnesty's full archival collection 
which is held in an old underground mine, and can be recalled by staff piecemeal 
with 'a suitable reason' from the Facilities manager at the HRAC. However I was able 
to use the catalogue to reflect on the materials stored, and the process for recalling 
these materials. Outside of Amnesty I used online resources to access the media, and 
compiled a collection of human rights and humanitarian campaign materials from 
other organisations in order to build up a picture of the intervisual context of NGO 
marketing. The archival research performed is not exhaustive but rather is illustrative 
and was used largely to inform my work in the field as well as a tool for analysing 
and understanding Amnesty's work.
Conclusions
Fieldwork has been re-imagined in the context of this project to accommodate the 
study of the transitory phenomena that are rights campaign images. This has been 
achieved by allowing the development of a flexible field site, defined by the various 
contexts of engagement that images move through as a result of campaign activities. I 
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was based as a volunteer at AIUK, and a member of three local Amnesty groups 
during my fieldwork, which allowed me access to the people and processes involved. 
To gather data I relied on a range of methodological approaches including 
participation and interviews. All of these methods were underpinned by the images 
themselves which formed the basis of the field site, and were also the means by 
which communication was facilitated. The methodological approach therefore 
utilised many elements of traditional anthropological research, including a strong 
focus on the lived experiences of people involved with campaign images, and 
understanding approaches to images and rights from the point of view of informants. 
At the same time the study can be seen as a deviation from traditional methods 
through its understanding of the field as created by image movement, rather than a 
grounded cultural or geographic space. Therefore greater emphasis on positionality 
was required to situate me as a researcher in these various arenas as my role was 
constantly changing, and many of the ethical considerations unexpected. In many 
ways the study serves not only as a study of rights images, but as a reflection on the 
methods and approaches which anthropologists use to engage with the transitory 
nature of much of modern life. The methods used in the thesis suggest that in order to 
study phenomena such as rights, which have a de-situated aspirational quality, as well 
as grounded local meanings, anthropologists must not only come down from the 
veranda, they must also find ways to move outside of the village without losing sight 
of it. For rights campaigns, where images are so central, this way of moving as shown 
above can be guided by them, as well making them the focus of the study. 
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Chapter 3: Human Rights and Images
In this chapter I provide an overview of the field of human rights anthropology and 
images to situate the findings in my thesis, and further develop the rationale behind 
my approach. I offer an account of the literature and history in this area that explains 
the fundamental importance of images to the field of human rights, and their many 
uses. I argue that rights images have largely taken the form of exposing that which is 
wrong, as a demand for change. I use literature from a variety of academic traditions 
including anthropology, philosophy, legal studies, and visual studies, as well as using 
examples of images and extracts from NGO statements and materials, to build an 
account of the important role that images have in the process of human rights, and the 
dominant uses of images and how we can account for them. I begin with a brief 
account of the history of human rights, and anthropological approaches to the study 
of rights. I argue that there is a bias towards the study of 'others' that reinforces a false 
impression of unity in Euro-American approaches to rights. I then go on to 
characterise the legal process of human rights, and the role of NGOs and images in 
the mechanisms of rights, before going into more detail about the photojournalistic 
origins of rights. 
I suggest that there exists a 'circuit' (McLagan 2005) of rights images as claims, that 
is itself reflective of the process of international soft law and the focus on exposure 
mentioned above. This circuit requires not only that images expose what is wrong, 
but also an appropriate reaction from viewers to seeing the images that can be 
generated into public pressure. A practice in rights images of depicting suffering is 
identified, and it is the focus on showing people in pain and discomfort that is 
expected to elicit a response. This is linked to Enlightenment ideas about why we 
care about others to suggest that there exists a practice of appealing to the 
universality of pain to make claims for rights. Rights images then can be seen to call 
for sympathetic identification with others based on pain. In this respect they are 
shown to fit into wider trends that root rights in biomedical rather than judicial 
practices and identifications. I end by discussing critiques of this process and use of 
images, that are prevalent in academic and non-academic circles, and the implications 
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for a rights practice based on compassionate sympathy. It is with this background of 
critique that I suggest we must view the use of images by AIUK, by seeing them as a 
response to a particular tradition of rights images. 
The Growth of Human Rights 
Human rights are now the major internationally recognized and practised approach to 
social justice, and one of the few grand political narratives to which most 
governments at least claim to subscribe. Application of human rights law, and public 
awareness of and discourse on human rights, have grown steadily over the past few 
decades (Brysk 2002: 4), and while realization and application may differ 
considerably in practice, the language and ideals of human rights are used extremely 
widely (Wilson 1997:2). However, universal as they may appear, many theorists are 
quick to remind us that they grew out of a very particular Euro-American tradition of 
law and individualism (see Bell 1996; Zechenter 1997; Huntington 1996:41; 
Macpherson 1964). 
Human rights are situated by many theorists as part of an historical development 
which has its roots in classical republicanism, and grew most firmly out of ideas 
about natural law, the theories on the social contract, and Enlightenment morality (see 
Douzinas 2000; Falk 1980; Freeman 1994; Hunt 2008; Shestack 1998). Human 
rights, seen in this way, are explained with attention to the move away from Divine 
Right of Kings, characterised by seventeenth century philosophy, towards rights as 
based on reason and mutual cooperation. Hobbes' theory of natural law is credited 
with framing philosophical thinking about rights (Macpherson1964:9). Hobbes' 
assertion is that individuals relinquish some rights, so as to be protected from their 
violent natures and the natures of others (Hobbes 1997). In claiming this, Hobbes and 
other thinkers of his time accept a universal element to rights (Hart 1984; Donnelly 
1989). This is expanded and articulated by thinkers such as Kant and Hume, whose 
versions of rights as residing in reason and sentiment respectively (Kant 1983(1795); 
Hume 2000 (1740)), form the basis for much philosophical thinking during the 
Enlightenment, the culmination of which was the creation of the documents of 
revolution: The American Declaration of Independence (1776), the Bill of Rights 
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(1791) and the Declaration des Driots de l'Homme et du Citoyen (1789). In these 
historically specific documents, the language of the international legislature which is 
to be applicable to all nations can be found. The '...natural, inalienable and sacred 
rights of man' of the French document, and the 'inalienable rights' contain the very 
wording that comes to be used in the UDHR preamble (1948). This is of course a 
very brief account of a process, but is the broad strokes route that is most often 
described in historical accounts of rights (Hunt 2008; Ishay 2008). Rights, explained 
in this way, form a relatively coherent narrative which charts their development over 
time in Europe and North America. It presents rights as we experience them today, 
and in law, as a relatively inevitable result of a system of law, approach to morality, 
and attitude to the individual. 
Yet the philosophical tradition from which rights are credited as coming, is also one 
where criticism of universal rights ideas has as long, if not longer, tradition (Waldron 
1987; Lyons1984). While European and North American society saw the increasing 
presence of rights in law, it was not without its staunch opponents. Some of the most 
important thinkers of recent times came down on the concept of universal natural 
rights. Bentham's famously quoted that rights are 'nonsense upon stilts' (Bentham 
2002:371), while Burke condemned rights as 'abstract principles' (Burke 1982:28) 
and spawned something of a pamphlet war with Thomas Paine and Mary 
Wollstonecraft on the rights of man (and woman) (See Blakemore 1997). Marx 
famously denounced universal rights in language not unlike that used by relativism 
later, by suggesting that rights were a products of capitalist endeavour (Marx 
1977b:324). More recently there have been attacks on the UDHR and rights as they 
exist in international law. Rights are considered too vague to be usefully applicable 
(Kennedy 2002), and a 'dangerous dogma' which overshadows the principles it hopes 
to protect by trying to codify them (Blattberg 2009). As discussed later in this 
chapter, anthropological contributions that question the universality of rights play no 
small role in providing background for this critique. My point here is not to 
interrogate these critiques of rights, but rather to draw attention to the level of debate 
that exists and has existed around human rights both in terms of questions of the very 
principle of universal morality and in terms of questions about how this principle can 
be fairly pursued and protected through law. 
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Rights are far from unquestioned in their so-called sphere of origin. Recent debates 
and public outcry and debate about the introduction of a Bill of Rights to the UK to 
replace the Human Rights Act8, suggest that while rights may have their origins in 
this social cultural setting, it is far from being a closed book. Debates exist around the 
acceptance of rights and the legal form their protection should take. While histories 
of rights do of course make ample reference to these critiques, they are an aside, the 
side that did not win the war of words. However while that may be true to some 
extent, there is now an internationally recognised bill of rights, and seeing rights as a 
closed book, a neat narrative, or a forgone conclusion ignores the way that they are 
continually changing. The later introduction of 'third generation rights', and the 
growing number of specific bills suggests that what rights are and what they protect 
against is still in development. Third generation rights are those loosely associated 
with group and environmental rights (Orend 2002:30), rather than those covered by 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) or the socio-economic 
rights of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), 
and they therefore represent a relatively new way of thinking of rights. Third 
generation rights are now campaigned for by major rights organisations such as 
Amnesty International, who launched the Poverty and Human Rights Campaign in 
2010 to campaign for environmental and group rights. These rights are themselves 
not without criticism and debate (Alston 1982). Therefore we must view rights not as 
fixed, but rather as part of a process of negotiation which takes place in Euro-
American contexts as it does further afield. In the following section I discuss how 
anthropology has contributed and can contribute to understanding this process.
Anthropology and Rights
Anthropology has been described as having a 'turbulent' (Engel 2001) and 
'ambivalent' (Dembour 1996) relationship with human rights. A 1947 statement 
8 The Commission on a Bill of Rights, tasked with looking into making the change were themselves 
unable to agree on how to proceed (see http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/about/cbr/uk-bill-
rights-vol-1.pdf) and public opinion was divided with mainstream media representing differing 
positions on the issue. 
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issued by the American Anthropological Association rejected an international 
declaration of rights, on the basis of cultural and moral particularism, stating that: 
'...persons, living in terms of values not envisaged by a limited 
Declaration, will 'thus be excluded from the freedom of full participation 
in the only right and proper way of life that can be known to them' (AAA 
statement 1947). 
A follow up statement was issued as late as 1999, which sees human rights as a useful 
means to protect indigenous rights, but in many respects it is similar to the original in 
its commitment to have: ‘respect for human differences, both collective and 
individual, rather than the abstract legal uniformity of Western tradition.’ (AAA 
Website accessed 17/5/2009). I would suggest that in the 1947 statement we see a 
precedent of relativism, echoed in the 1999 statement, which is still strongly present 
in anthropological approaches to rights, and which, when interrogated, reveals a 
dualistic approach between what are deemed to be 'our' rights, and the practices of 
'others'. 
Engel, in her analysis of the history of the AAA's approach to rights, states that 
'neither the AAA's political commitments nor its understanding of culture have 
changed significantly since 1947' (Engel 2001:537). By this she means that despite a 
seemingly radical shift in approach, it is actually a faith in legal mechanisms which 
has changed, rather than the principles of anthropology (ibid). In this she may be 
right, however rather than seeing this as proof of a continued and inevitable road to 
commitment to rights that Engel, and to a lesser extent Messer (1993b) does, I 
suggest that this is in fact a symptom of a sub-field of anthropology still very much in 
development. Goodale's assertion that rather than creeping towards acceptance of 
rights, the academic field of anthropology ignored rights for the best part of fifty 
years (Goodale 2006:487), may be closer to the reality of anthropological approaches 
to right. He points out that no papers were published by the AAA with human rights 
in the title over this period, and there is little evidence of debate. Even now many of 
the key texts in the anthropology of rights come from the fields of philosophy and 
law rather than from within anthropology (see ibid: 489; Dembour 1996:22 for a 
discussion of this). While this statement does not acknowledge contributions made by 
anthropologists in areas tangential to human rights over the period, it cannot be 
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denied that there was little activity within anthropology until the late 1980s. 
It is little wonder then, if the approaches taken do in some ways follow on where the 
1947 document left off, with a focus on the 'imposition of hegemonic values on less 
powerful groups of people' (Goodale 2006:486), and a keen interest in the indigenous 
and group rights of other cultures. Offering a relativist critique of human rights, 
anthropologists have asked questions such as ‘what is human?’ ‘is there a human 
nature?’(Messer 1993b; Ranciere 2004), and debated the ability of a universal 
doctrine to encompass vastly differing ideas of right and wrong around the world 
(Bell 1996; Nagengast 1997; Perry 1997). Anthropologists have been involved with 
providing ethnographic accounts which show different ideas of personhood and the 
individual (Brugger 1996:601), as well as providing examples of moral and ethical 
codes which, though not in keeping with the ideals of the UDHR are equally valid 
(Bell 1996:664). These approaches fit in with an early concern within the discipline 
for group and indigenous rights, sometimes seen in opposition to the individual rights 
posed in international law (Jones 1999; Kenrick & Lewis 2004; Gledhill 1997).These 
approaches often see international claims of human rights as an ‘imposition’ of 
western concepts of rights (Renteln 1990:2), offering what Cowan et al characterise 
as the 'rights versus culture' approach (Cowan et al 2001:4), or conversely the 'right 
to culture' approach (ibid:8), depending on what position the theorist is arguing from. 
Where rights are supported it has tended to be through critiques supporting the spread 
of human rights despite relativism (Donnelly 1999:60)9, and through the use of 
international rights regimes to campaign for indigenous rights (Kenrick & Lewis 
2004:5). While these studies are important and useful, for the field to develop we 
must open up avenues of research which go beyond this distinction. 
To some extent this movement is already taking place. Anthropology has pulled itself 
out of the universalism/relativism debate to accept that rights are here, and we must 
understand how they work in practice, rather than focussing on their philosophical 
legitimacy (Cowan et al 2001:1). This approach has yielded interesting results 
focussed on legal pluralism, examining places where international law and local 
9 Jack Donnelly is not an anthropologist by training, but is included in this discussion because of his 
influence on anthropological accounts of rights.
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custom and law intersect (Wilson 2000; Demian 2011; Wastell 2007; Fuller 1994; 
Merry 1988). In studies of these kinds a certain acceptance of the proliferation of 
rights is assumed, and their local applications and understandings are the focus. 
Merry's various studies in this area (Merry 1996, 2006a, 2006b, 2007) provide 
detailed accounts of how rights are 'remade in the vernacular' (2006a: 55). For 
example her study of the Hawaiian sovereignty movement discusses how the 
movement draws from national, global and indigenous law to frame its demands 
(1997:29), in order to show how local law becomes globalised and vice versa (ibid: 
46). Others focus on rights as they are experienced by those who have suffered rights 
abuses (Das 1994; Daniel 1994), to try and understand the repercussions of rights 
violations. These approaches, coupled with other studies that pay attention to the 
mechanisms of rights administrations (Riles 2006; Kelly 2009) have opened up a 
wider understanding of the process of rights, and show it to be more than a simple 
imposition of values on a disempowered other (see An-Na’im 2002). Yet despite this, 
the institutional bias which prefers the study of the other to the study of more familiar 
cultural settings, means that the field of human rights anthropology has developed in 
a somewhat lopsided manner. Human rights anthropology contains echoes of 
assumptions made in 1947 that human rights are relatively unproblematic in 'this 
culture'. That is to say that anthropologists have either actively, or through omission 
in the areas of study, bought into being an account of rights which situates them 
comfortably in the philosophy and practices of Euro-American settings. 
Studies such as those mentioned above have an overt focus on rights as understood 
through the proliferation and integration of law and legal systems. This focus is re-
enforced by approaches in anthropology that favour the study of rights through legal 
institutions and monitoring (e.g. Kelly 2009; Merry 2012) or legal language (Hastrup 
2003), thus focussing on professional spheres and legal structures to mediate rights, 
rather than public or social experiences of rights. This means that when rights are 
looked at 'at home' they tend to be examined through a legal lens. These studies, 
while important to the field, do not cover the area of rights that interests me 
specifically- that of how rights come to be supported and contested outside of legal 
institutions or situations of abuse. There are some moves to address this area of 
rights. In medical anthropology, Kleinman looks at mediated images of rights abuses 
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as a form of violence (Kleinman & Kleinman 2000), thus moving the debate away 
from the legal to the publicly mediated sphere of engagement. Similarly other 
medical approaches question the rights that we have enshrined through showing the 
role that inequality plays in health and illness transmittance (Farmer 2001), and 
through recent studies that similarly focus on the cultural production of rights norms 
across transnational spaces (Levitt & Merry 2009). Therefore while the field is 
developing in new and interesting directions, it remains concerned largely with 
distant places and legal spaces.
For the field to continue to develop in a less lopsided way, more attention must be 
paid to how rights are imagined and constructed outwith legal institutions, and 
outwith the experience of different 'others'. This is an approach that borrows heavily 
from Cowan et al's discussion of rights as a culture (Cowan et al 2001:12), yet while 
they base this approach on law as a function that shapes and reflects society (Geertz 
1983), I use rights more broadly but with the same focus on rights as a possessing 
culture. Rather than legally shaped culture, I propose that the area of the cultural 
production of rights is a neglected one, and one where we can begin to understand the 
processes and practices that constitute rights culture. Through examining how those 
working in the field seek to promote rights, and the understandings of rights that 
support their commitment, a picture can be built of rights culture in Euro-American 
settings that is as diverse as it has been shown to be elsewhere (see Merry 1997). In 
demystifying the processes at work in Euro-American contexts as well as 'other' ones, 
we can start to see rights not as the product of all powerful nations, but as fractious 
and contested in these contexts too. In doing so we begin the process of a conception 
of rights which is global rather than dualistic. Such an approach is most clearly 
realised, I would suggest, in the growing field of network analysis of rights discussed 
in  the previous chapter, and which I intend to expand upon through a mobile and 
networked approach to images of rights. 
The point of this thesis is not to support or refute the Enlightenment origins of rights, 
and the agency which some countries have in the field of human rights. To do that  
would not only be to ignore an important power dynamic, but also would be to open 
up again the circuitous universalist/relativist debate which has been discussed at 
64
length by others more qualified than myself. Rather I highlight this viewpoint to draw 
attention to the way that it creates a certain acceptance that rights are somehow 
'natural' and 'inevitable' in the Euro-American context. It is this acceptance which this 
thesis will address, not simply by looking at rights as the moral export of 'the west', 
but rather by looking also at the methods of construction and contestation that take 
place through rights public interaction with campaigning which suggests that even in 
this setting rights are a shifting and developing concept, rather than an absolute. This 
approach to understanding how rights play out and are debated and constructed is 
reflected best in sociological studies of mediated rights (see Nash 2010; Philo & 
Berry 2004; Freedman & Thussu 2011). Anthropological ethnographic approaches to 
how rights ideas and practice are produced 'at home' in non legal arenas are needed to 
appreciate the full range of issues that play out in the day to day production of rights 
(McLagan 2006). If, as Merry and Levitt suggest, rights are a language with many 
dialects (2009:451), it is important that we do not view those spoken in Euro-
American contexts as the standardised form of that language. Rather I hope to show 
that there are dialects of rights in these contexts. In doing so I hope to move the focus 
away from a dynamic which places rights in the hands of certain countries and 
traditions, to consider that here too rights are contested and appropriated. 
The Human Rights Process: Law and the role of NGOs 
Originally stated in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 
enshrined in law through the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1966 (999 UNTS 171; 6 ILM 368) and with socio-economic rights of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (993 UNTS 5; 
6 ILM 361), rights are protected specifically through individual bills, for example the 
Covenant on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 1981 (1249 UNTS 
13; 19 ILM 33). Documents are designed to be open enough to allow for local 
interpretation (Chayes & Chayes 1993:184; Scott 2004:7). This openness is currently 
under closer scrutiny  with concern from campaigners that the international treaties 
are being used to push other agendas (Chayes & Chayes 1993:187). The presentation 
of rights is therefore a variable and contested issue, even in the seemingly stable 
arena of law. 
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Rights are protected by international law though UN treaties, and monitored through 
reports made to the UN by Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which inform 
the recommendations made by the UN to countries regarding action needed to be 
taken to comply with their treaty commitments (UN Website, accessed 7/4/13). 
Countries who have ratified bills are in theory accountable to meet those obligations 
entailed, however there are rarely legal or fiscal repercussions for countries who do 
not meet their requirements (Boyle 1980; Kennedy 1987), and there are those who 
question the effectiveness of international human rights law (Keith 1999; Donnelly, 
1989; Oberleitner 2007). Much of international law is soft law, and therefore not 
enforceable by threat of penal action. In simplified form the idea is that it is in the 
best interest of a country to comply with these recommendations for their 
international reputation and standing, and for reciprocity from other governments 
(Scott 2004:43; Keith 1999:95; Kennedy 1987:11). Countries therefore respond to 
pressure from other governments, and public pressure, when acting on their 
commitments under international law. The growth in human rights has gone hand in 
hand with a huge growth in the number and scope of NGOs concerned with 
protecting those rights (Carroll 1992; Clarke 1993). These organisations fulfil the role 
of monitoring, and ultimately of providing the surveillance culture which is hoped 
will prevent countries from abusing rights (Keenan 2004; Gaer 2003). NGOs 
therefore play an important role in the process of human rights law. Among the 
largest, and arguably the most influential organisations working in this field is 
Amnesty International. 
As well as reporting to the UN, Amnesty International and other rights organisations 
lobby governments and act as  intermediaries between the international processes and 
practices of human rights and the public, through their campaigns. Campaigns are 
crucial to the process of human rights, as international reputations and the shaming of 
abusers depend on public outrage and awareness. Organizations such as Amnesty 
International10, Human Rights Watch11, Liberty12, and many other organizations 
10 www.amnesty.org  
11 www.hrw.org
12 www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk
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attempt to communicate rights issues and to encourage the public to take action by 
writing to their Members of Parliament or governments abroad to demand change in 
the international arena. Thus the process is at once a distant international legal one, 
working at very high levels, but underpinned by and essentially depending on a large 
scale grassroots marketing campaign. Public participation in campaigns is therefore 
not only a way to influence opinion at government level, it is also an integral aspect 
of mobilising compliance for international human rights soft law. 
Despite the role that campaigns play in constructing and communicating rights, few 
studies have been conducted into the internal processes that make up campaign 
design (exceptions include Korey 1998; Watson 2004), and of these none have 
managed to go much beyond an organizational chart model favoured by political 
science13. There is therefore a certain level of mystery surrounding how campaigns 
are devised. It is in part a response to this mystique that I opted to focus my study on 
a human rights organisation, rather than other producers of rights images such as 
news media. As key players in the arena of rights they are not only an important site 
for the production of  reports of rights, but are also responsible for determining much 
about how rights are presented and redeemed in the public sphere through campaigns.
As discussed in the Introduction chapter, images are a central part of the process 
through which rights are claimed, as evidence-making and awareness raising. They 
are used in report writing by the UN, by Amnesty International, and other 
organisations who report on the compliance of countries with their responsibilities 
under ratified rights treaties. They play the role of providing evidence showing that 
which is hidden and in doing so bring it into the light where it can be interrogated and 
judged. This allows countries to be 'shamed' (Kennan 2004:435) into ensuring that 
problems are corrected. They are therefore instrumental in the process of 
international human rights law. However rights images do more than just provide 
evidence of violations- they themselves contribute to the construction of ideas about 
what constitutes a violation (McLagan 2006:223). In a sense a photographer is in part 
13 Hopgood's 2006 book Keepers of The Flame is a notable exception to this, providing an in depth 
ethnographic account of Amnesty IS. However this book is focussed on internal organisational 
culture, and the vast range of work taken on by the IS mean that campaign design is not a notable 
feature of the account.
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responsible for this, by deciding where to point the camera and who is worthy of our 
attention, whilst those who seek to expose rights abuses are also complicit in the 
preference of some over others. At AIUK one of the commonest reasons for the 
public to contact the organisation was to report a situation they were aware of, that 
they thought deserved Amnesty's attention. Amnesty, like all other organisations 
involved in rights, make decisions about which cases to work on. Often these are 
worked out at the IS level, where diplomatic ties, cultural and social practices, and 
other factors are taken into account to decide what campaigns are viable and which 
sections can run them. However beyond these sorts of decisions, and the value of 
images for their evidential properties, they play another role in determining how we 
understand rights violations.
Images have a role in the process of rights that is beyond providing evidence. I use 
the term 'bearing witness' to describe this role because it captures the spectatorship 
element of this role which rights images fulfil. Beyond just showing abuses, images 
used by NGOs are used with an expectation of a particular response, one that I argue 
is an emotional rather than an evidential one. Images have been used to demand 
social change since the camera was invented, but the types of claims which they can 
and do make are quite specific. Photos used in this way are of course not the only 
approaches to photography; for some photographers the camera has been used 
primarily to record and document (for example see Santer 1986). However as the 
following section will demonstrate, there is a long tradition of the use of images in 
social change. I offer a selective history of this phenomenon to illustrate the 
mechanisms of the process. It is not intended to be an exhaustive account of all 
images that have been used for social change. I suggest that there exists a 
compassionate activism rooted in images, that can be described as 'bearing witness', 
of which rights images are a part, that relies on images of suffering to provoke public 
responses. It is in this tradition of image use that I argue Amnesty visual culture 
exists, and it is an important background for understanding choices made by staff that 
are in part responses to this tradition.
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Pictures of Pain: Claims for Change
Figure 3a: Barnardos Advertisement images no 48 & 49, used with permission from Barnardos. The 
boy in this picture (name unknown) had been dressed and styled in both images to highlight the 
difference between before and after.
Many early claims to social justice have been presented in the form of photographs 
(Ovenden 1997:89; Becker 2007:190). Famously Barnardos used photographs of 
boys in the 1870s 'before and after' their placement in a Barnardos orphanage. The 
'before' pictures showed boys dressed 'in rags' and often looking emaciated, compared 
to ‘after’ photographs which showed the same boys looking healthy and well dressed. 
The images were used to raise funds for Dr Barnardo's work, however they can also 
be seen as an early example of visual claims for rights. Through showing 'before' 
pictures of boys in need, the claim is made that this is not how it should be (Ash 
2008:180), therefore images have a history of being instrumental in calling for social 
change. In this approach to images we see echoes of photojournalistic style. The use 
of images to convey something which is unknown and seen as unacceptable, and in 
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doing so asks the viewer to recognise the need to change it, is the model with which 
photojournalism is most associated (Linfield 2012:37). In the famous early images of 
Capa, Riis, and other photojournalists we can see records of war, poverty, and 
political upheaval which while documenting, are also exposing, shining a light on 
faraway places. It is no accident that the obituary of photojournalist Tim 
Hetherington that appeared in the Guardian, is couched in language so similar to that 
of rights: 'The troubled corners of the world into which he shed the light of his lens 
are brighter because of him; the work he leaves is a candle by which those who 
choose to look, might see' (Brabazon 2011). This is not so different from Amnesty's 
imagery of a candle and its remit to 'shine a light'14. Photojournalism and rights both 
seek to illuminate in order to change. 
While not all photojournalism can be seen as producing rights images, rights images 
traditionally tend to come largely from photojournalists. The process of exposure and 
documentation used by rights organisations lend themselves to the practice which the 
Barnardos example highlights, of showing what is wrong in order to create awareness 
and public intervention to create change. Since the invention of the camera there have 
existed images which have exposed hidden situations. War, previously unknown to 
those not fighting or living through it, was suddenly and graphically rendered through 
the work of photojournalists such as Roger Fenton, John Robertson and Matthew 
Brady15. The latter, whose The Dead of Antietam portrayed war corpses, caused 
public dismay, as this reviewer summed up: 
'Mr. Brady has done something to bring home to us the terrible reality and 
earnestness of war. If he has not brought bodies and laid them in our door-
yards and along streets, he has done something very like it' (NYT 
1862:1). 
This suggests something of the potential that photography can have, that of rendering 
real and immediate that which was distant and obscure (Trachtenberg 1985:12). 
However it was not simply the photographs themselves that caused such public 
outcry over the war, it was the means of their dissemination (Marien 2006:108). 
14 Shine a Light is the name of a 2011 Amnesty campaign based on the Benenson quote 'Better to 
light a candle than curse the darkness' (Benenson 1961)
15 Roger Fenton's 1850s photographs of the Crimean war appeared in the Times, John Robertson's 
pictures of the same war were in circulation during the 1850s.
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Recent technological innovations using stereograph photography for greater quality, 
and tintype photographs, developed on thin sheets of iron, and produced 
inexpensively to lightweight specifications, made it possible for Brady's photographs 
to be mass produced and widely circulated with a level of detail and resolution 
previously unknown (ibid; Trachtenberg 1985:11). The New York Times reported that 
'These pictures have a terrible distinctness. By the aid of the magnifying glass, the 
very creatures of the slain may be distinguished' (NYT 1862:2). The level of what 
some members of the public described as 'disgust', caused many people to turn 
against or rethink war (Trachtenberg 1985:8). 
Figure 3b: Image from Mathew Brady's The Dead of Antietam 1862. Many of these pictures featured 
corpses, shown in detail and clarity previously not available in mass produced copies. It is unknown 
which images from the collection Brady took himself and which were taken by his assistants. Image 
used courtesy of the Library of Congress image archive. 
Two interesting points emerge from this example. The first is that photographs had to 
be seen to cause the public outpouring of opinion that could lead to change. The 
second, that I will return to later in this chapter, is that it was a response of shock that 
so moved people to act. In the process of photojournalism we begin to see what I 
have earlier described as the circuit. For images to provoke change, a particular 
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response is required from those looking at images. Without response, images would 
be mere recordings of events, unable to do more than attest to something. Social 
change relies on a response from spectators.
Photography was at its most explicit as a tool for social change in the hands of certain 
photojournalists, who took the recording and provoking potential of photography and 
turned it to specific instances of social suffering in order to bring about social change. 
Jacob Riis was among the first photojournalists to pursue an agenda for social 
change, and he did this by photographing the living conditions of the poor in New 
York's lower east side. His photographs famously depict people living in abject 
poverty, in overcrowded conditions, and often seen to be sleeping rough. This project 
was followed closely by others such as Hine’s, whose documentation of working 
conditions in the America's post industrialisation, showing young children in often 
dangerous factory settings, earned him the description of 'crusader' (Trachtenberg 
1981:238). Other projects such as Jack London's documentation of East London 
slums (London 1903), and John Thompson's 'gritty' portrayal of London's poor 
(1878), all  pursued social change visually (Marien 2006:163). 
In these examples images are used to call for change. As Rosler puts it:
 'in contrast to the pure sensationalism of much of the journalistic 
attention to working class, immigrant and slum life, the meliorism of 
Riis, Lewis Hine and others involved in social-work propagandising 
argued, through the presentation of images...for the rectification of 
wrongs.' (Rosler 2006:175). 
Public outcry over Riis' How the Other Half Lives (1890) is credited with leading to 
the New York State Tenement House Act of 1901 (Marien 2006:205; Trachtenberg 
1981:237), therefore suggesting that through images, agendas of social change were 
pursued16. This is still an on-going practice, as the recent use of camera phone 
photography to ignite support worldwide during the Arab Spring can attest (Allagui 
16 There are many accounts that credit Riis with this social change, including politicians involved in 
passing the bill (see Marien 2006, Trachtenberg 1977, Rosler 2006), however he was a 
conservative figure who wanted change to come about through charity rather than reform. For a 
full discussion of the political views of Riis see Stein 1983.
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& Kuebler 2011; Khondker 2011). From the early example of photojournalism to 
citizen photojournalism today, the pictorial rendering of events have exposed 
situations, and in doing so brought the attention required to lead to change. However, 
as mentioned, the jump from photograph to change hinges on an appropriate response 
from those viewing the images. Just as the process of human rights itself relies on 
wrongs being seen, so too does photography rely on viewership to produce change.  
Figure 3c: Jacob Riis: Boys sleeping rough Mulberry Street, Manhattan 1880. Riis took his pictures 
using the newly developed flash technology, to which some attribute the scared and startled 
expressions in his subjects’ faces (Marien 2006:205).
There is therefore an inbuilt reliance on audience response to this process of claiming 
change through images. Specifically there must be wide visibility and a type of 
response that renders pictures more than mere documents in order for them to work 
effectively to produce social change. This response takes viewers from simply seeing, 
to witnessing, with all the weight of responsibility which that term implies. I would 
suggest that the creation of this responsibility is intimately bound up with the types of 
wrongs which images show, and with the emotional response it is hoped is elicited by 
them. Riis and Hine share with each other, and with those who followed them, a 
focus on suffering as the means by which the wrong is highlighted. Photographs are 
of course depictions of people's physical person above all else, depicting as they do 
visual reproductions of what a person looks like (Elkins 1996:130). Therefore the call 
to social justice often takes the form of physical suffering, because it is rooted in the 
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body. 
The practice of using images of suffering is deeply interwoven with images calling 
for social change, where compassion rather than legal recognition is the means of 
effecting that social change (Bleiker & Kay 2007:140; Marien 2006:206). The 
catalogue of images of suffering is formidable, as is the body of literature which 
accompanies it. War, famine, poverty, torture, and violence have been photographed, 
and the fall out of suffering and pain captured, to try and command social outcry and 
prevent these events happening again. Famous photographs such as Nick Uti's 
photograph of the child Phan Thi Kim Phuc running naked and burnt remains 
possibly the best known war photos in history17, and is credited for igniting passion 
against the Vietnam War in North Americans (Hariman & Lucaites 2007:172). While 
the effect of images of suffering bringing about social change is of course impossible 
to measure, and subjectivity of response means that even where photographers intend 
an agenda for change we cannot be sure of cause an effect, there is nevertheless a 
strong tradition in Euro-American social history of using images of people suffering, 
as attested to by the number of images available, and the vast scholarship on the issue 
(for example Sontag 2003; Eisenman 2007; Taylor 1998; Berger 1980)18. Images of 
suffering suggest that evidence is not the only reason for use of images in claims for 
social justice. If this was the case then pictures of conditions rather than people 
would be sufficient and Riis would not have needed to photograph human subjects, 
where pictures of dark and cramped tenement conditions would have sufficed. 
Images of suffering suggest that there is a further importance of images in eliciting 
emotion. 
NGOs have picked up where photojournalists began in using images to create social 
change, but NGOs are more explicit in using images as more than evidence. The 
increasing number of staff photographers working for NGOs is testament to the 
importance placed on visuals by these organisations. Pictures such as Salgado's work 
with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) documenting famine Sahel: Man in Distress 
(1986) draws these two strands together, being at once a work explicit in its focus on 
17 This picture appeared as part of the 1973 collection 'The Terror of War' and won a Pulitzer Prize. 
18 Discussed throughout the thesis in more depth, especially Chapters 6, 9 and 10.
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'distress', and its positioned agenda for MSF. Rights organisations and other 
charitable bodies have historically relied on images of suffering for much of their 
visual material (see Benthall 2003). For aid organisations especially, the alleviation of 
immediate distress is their central remit, therefore this process of showing what is 
wrong is quite straightforward. Many organisations which work to alleviate physical 
suffering such as the Red Cross or MSF, do so relatively indiscriminately, without 
passing comment on the wider social situations of their work19. Indeed this is often a 
prerequisite for gaining access during conflict situations. However for development 
and rights organisations, the goal is to achieve long term institutional or social 
change, rather than the immediate alleviation of suffering. 
Figure 3d: UNICEF fundraising advertisement 2010, issued in UK newspapers. 
Therefore the claim for a rights model of photojournalistic imagery which I set out 
above provides some problems. How for example can you show government 
corruption, or unequal access to resources visually? Evidential images would seem to 
pose problems for rights organisations, yet images remain a central feature of 
campaigning. The central role of images in rights practice discussed in the 
19  MSF broke a tradition of silent witnessing in 1985 to speak out against the Ethiopian government. 
Since then there has been public debate from within the organisation about how this should be 
managed.
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introduction means that for rights organisations to shine a light on human rights 
abuses, and the increasing role of visual in media (Levin 1993:3), there is often an 
expectation within organisations that images will play some central role in expressing 
the situation which requires change (Fisher 1997:445). For most organisations this 
has traditionally involved the use of images of suffering in order to claim rights. 
Archival research at Amnesty International IS in London suggests that photographs 
and other graphics have featured in Amnesty reports since the first report was 
launched, both photographically and in terms of artwork and video campaigns 
devised by AIIS. Of these pictures there are at least as many pictures of physical 
suffering as there are other types of rights images. This is surprising given the nature 
of Amnesty's work as traditionally concerned with protecting civil rights. While it 
might be expected of a disaster relief organisation, in a rights organisation one might 
expect to find that pictures reflected a number of different social and political issues. 
Amnesty's well known 'newspaper' campaigns paired shocking headlines, text, and 
photographic depictions:   
Figure 3e & f: Amnesty International IS newspaper campaigns from the 1980s
Current visual practice has changed somewhat since the adverts above were run in 
the 1980s, in the wake of awareness of issues of representation, but there are echoes 
of this 'shock' approach in more recent campaigns. In 2008 the French section 
commissioned a campaign against rights abuses in the run up to the Beijing 
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Olympics, which circulated online and caused a stir for its explicit approach to 
torture,while more recently Amnesty IS in the UK ran pictures of victims of political 
violence in Sri Lanka. These images, viewed in the context of factual reports and 
removal of context through legal language that is prevalent in the rights industry,  
discussed in the previous chapter, can be seen as both counter to, and a reflection of, 
this practice of decontextualisation. Images of suffering, while veering away from 
'factual' accounts, especially when staged, are just as de-contextualising and stripped 
down as legal language has been shown to be by providing little in the way of context 
or subjective or personal narrative (Wilson 1997). The images used by the IS and by 
other Amnesty sections show a very different visual approach than that undertaken by 
AIUK, as will be demonstrated in Part I of this thesis. It is important to see the work 
of AIUK in the context of not only a wider visual culture used to create social 
change, but also specifically within the wider visual context of the organisation.
Figure 3g: 'After the Olympic Games' by TBWA Advertising for Amnesty France, 2008. These images 
were withdrawn by Amnesty France for being 'too explicit', despite the fact that they feature actors.
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 Figure 3h: Amnesty International IS web image featuring what look like dead bodies and injured 
people in Sri Lanka. Appeared on facebook October 2013.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) similarly uses photographs of suffering as a central part 
of their visual practice. While HRW visuals tend to be contained within their 
'publications', and are the result of specially commissioned, embedded 
photojournalists, they too have more images of torture than of other abuses. For 
example the HRW 2011 Burma report 'Dead Men Walking'20 on refugees contains 
nine photos, of which six are pictures of torture or physical suffering. Therefore 
despite the variety of rights issues which organisations work on, many organisations 
show a visual bias towards showing certain abuses, suggesting that evidence is not 
the only use that pictures have. The practice of staging photographs illustrated by 
Amnesty France's picture further suggests this. Staff at AIUK, though  reluctant to 
show images of suffering in general (Chapter 6), were willing to use staged images of 
torture in one of their campaigns (Chapter 6: Figure 6d). While these visuals were 
produced at the IS, they were used by AIUK. Amnesty is open about the staged 
nature of images, and indeed for staff at AIUK it is a matter of principle not to use 
real victims in images of suffering (Chapter 6). The staging of photographs of course 
completely removes any value that they might have had as evidence. At most they 
can be considered illustrative, demonstrating a situation in order to increase audience 
20 This report is now available online at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2011/07/12/dead-men-walking-0
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understanding of it. 
Therefore there exists a tradition of visual activism which is based on pictures of 
people in pain, which can be seen as a backdrop against which staff and the public in 
this thesis work. In many ways, we can see in rights campaign visuals a legacy of 
early claims to rights such as those of Barnardos and other charity appeals since then 
which use pictures of people in distress to demand change. This places rights images 
in the tradition of activism based on images which is outlined above. However it 
suggests that visuals demonstrate a different model to claims for rights, which are not 
based in law, but rather in recognition of suffering. This therefore suggests that 
between visual and other rhetorics there are significant differences in how rights are 
conceived. I would suggest that images are early indicators of a conception of 
humanity grounded in shared physical pain, where rights are claimed through the 
demonstration of that pain. 
Sharing Pain 
The use of photographs therefore is often credited with evidential and documentary 
properties which make pictures work as proof of a situation (Marien 2006:160; 
Meskin & Cohen 2008:70; Walton 1984:246), indeed the quality of 'truth' of 'proof' is 
often used to justify the use of images of atrocity (Gidley 2012:38), especially in 
Human Rights organisations where truth is the major currency (Hopgood 2006:74). 
While it is tempting to think of the early belief that the 'camera never lies' as a result 
of mysticism around a device to which few had access, even shortly after its 
invention there were well publicised cases of visual forgery. Dr Barnardo himself was 
charged with using models styled in rags rather than boys as he had found them 
'before'. This was a relatively large case which drew press coverage (Koven 1997:10), 
suggesting that the potential of the camera to lie has always been recognised, yet its 
importance remains. Even now, when people have their own cameras, and home 
access to Photoshop®, not to mention daily interaction with doctored and altered 
images, the importance of photographs in claiming social change continues. The 
recent, and well documented, release of photographs of abuses in Abu Ghraib prison 
is one such example. The conditions in Abu Ghraib were under scrutiny in the USA 
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after formal reports of abuse made by several parties were made public, but these 
charges received little or no media attention until the photographs depicting the abuse 
were taken and made public (Andén-Papadopoulos 2008:12). After that the story was 
carried by all major media outlets. The Amnesty use of 'staged' images also suggests 
that evidence is not necessarily the main goal of images. Despite general knowledge 
of the potential for lies, a camera still has a tremendous amount of power over public 
engagement with requests for change. 
How then can we account for the dominance of the visual in rights practice sketched 
above? If cameras are known to be deceptive, then why is it that making things 
visible in the tangible sense of photographs and videos is considered so effective a 
way to campaign for change in the sphere of human rights? This is a question that I 
hope to address in more detail throughout this thesis by looking at the uses and 
interactions of images in campaigning. However, looking specifically at the history 
sketched out in this chapter so far of using human subjects, often in positions and 
situations of bodily suffering, it can be considered that it is the emotional response to 
images that is required to complete the circuit of exposing and action. The emotional 
response that is elicited is a subject of debate among scholars, with some claiming 
shock (Sontag 1977), or guilt and shame (Keenan 2004; Anvi 2006; Sontag 2004), 
and others claiming solidarity and responsibility (Linfield 2010), however it remains 
that images, especially photographs, are considered by scholars to be highly 
emotional items. The ability of photographs to produce emotional responses is well 
recoded, and as will be discussed later in this section, heavily critiqued (Benjamin 
2009; Sontag 1977; Barthes 1981; Berger 1980). However for some theorists dealing 
with 'images of atrocity' and rights images, it is the ability to provoke an emotional 
response that makes images effective, particularly an ability to render recognisable 
the pain of others (Linfield 2010). I would suggest then that a close examination of 
the role of pain in images reveals them to rely on a combination of the 
aforementioned emotional responses in order to provoke action.
Barthes, when looking at a photo exhibition in Paris, judged them lacking because 
they failed to shock him and make him shudder (Barthes 1997:71). He did not judge 
them by their ability to convey facts or evidence about the situation, he judged them 
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by their ability to make him feel something, and in that area rather than others found 
them wanting. Barthes is not alone in his judgement of image claims by their ability 
to shock and upset. While I discuss this concern in more detail in the next section, the 
point I make here is that Barthes held an expectation that the way images work was 
bound up with responses of a particular sort. Shock is certainly a part of it, but 
Barthes' telling observation that the problem with these images was that 'someone has 
shuddered for us' (Barthes 1997:71) suggests again the need for an emotional 
engagement with the images on a personal emotional, rather than purely intellectual 
level. It is not enough for him to recognise the situation of horror to be able to care 
about it (ibid:72). I would suggest that shock therefore does not describe the process 
which Barthes seeks. What he seeks is that the image should make him care about 
those depicted; literal photos can allow one to experience 'the scandal of horror, not 
the horror itself' (ibid:73-74), implying that one must feel something of horror to 
care, not just the scandal or shock. This would seem to be borne out by the wide 
range of images used in social change. Riis and Hine, while exposing some hidden 
aspects of society were not shocking in all their images. For many New Yorkers, 
homeless people sleeping rough was a well-known and often-seen phenomenon. This 
suggests that where images are concerned there are some expectations about how and 
what type of information they convey, as suggested by the judgements passed upon 
them by Barthes21. Certainly there is an expectation that you will 'feel something'. 
In the following discussion I link the Enlightenment notions that rights are said to be 
founded on, with the process of generating feeling though images as Barthes 
describes, to suggest that use of pictures to claim rights is deeply entwined with the 
foundational Euro-American ideas about why we care about others. I look to these 
theories for explanation because of their prominence in the development of rights, 
existing as they do in a similar tradition of individualism and morality. However this 
is not to foreclose rights practice or visual cultures of rights in this particular 
tradition; there are of course many cultures of rights images around the world, and 
many approaches to images. Rather it is to provide a background necessary for 
21 Debate about the relation between text and image is a substantial field in its own right (see Mitchell 
1986 for a definitive discussion). While the relation imagined by subjects of this project is reflected on 
at various points throughout the thesis, the point I make at this early stage in the paper is that images 
have a perceived function as carriers of emotional currency.
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understanding the implications of the findings in the thesis, grounded as they are in 
an organisation and context that does share this history. Throughout this thesis I 
reflect on the novel image-practices undertaken at AIUK and by local groups to 
suggest that a rethink of these ideas about how images can be used, and how we care 
about distant others, is being undertaken by many of those involved in rights 
activism.
For many philosophers the ability to care about others is rooted in a shared capacity 
for pain (Hume 1978 (1740); Smith 2011 (1759)). Hume most famously described the 
feeling of another's pain when seeing an operation as the basis for recognising others’ 
rights through a process whereby one mirrors another's pain when seeing it (Hume 
1978:576). This mirroring is most effective, according to Hume, when we have 'sight 
of the object' (ibid:318),by which Hume means a personal encounter, but that may 
very easily be translated into today's experiences as a picture, taking sight as literally 
as it was intended. For Hume, as for many others, the condition for care was the 
acknowledgement of pain. It is this acknowledgement that I would suggest rights 
images have been involved in providing historically, however not to shock only, 
rather to foster a feeling of closeness and sympathy, based on shared pain. 
Language is considered by many to be insufficient for the task of communicating 
pain. Henry James famously wrote in a 1915 New York Times article that about the 
First World War: 'one finds it in the midst of all this, as hard to apply one’s words as 
to endure one's thoughts' (NYT 1915 12th March). Indeed, in anthropological studies 
of pain this is echoed. Pain is seen to break down communication so fully that it 
destroys language: 'Physical pain does not simply resist language, but actively 
destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to 
the sounds and cries a human makes before language is learned' (Scarry 1985:4). 
Pain, it has been suggested, resists communication because it is 'so radically 
individualised and rendered unshareable' (Daniel 1994: 238). Yet where words fail, 
images can be seen to convey the 'sight of the object' that Hume mentions, by 
providing not only a visual of the person, but a visual of their pain. Images convey 
physical reactions in much the same way as Hume describes his feelings at an 
operation- that of discomfort when confronted with another's pain so that the watcher 
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too feels pain. 
People react to images, especially those of people, in physical ways (Freedberg 
1989:1; Elkins 1996:138), and images of pain have a particularly strong effect (Elkins 
1996:109). In his well- known book on how people look at images, Elkins describes 
pictures of pain as having the potential to convey that pain (Elkins 1996:110). He 
describes a series of photographs of an execution of a woman in China charged with 
adultery: 'the pain in those scenes is enough to cause physical changes in my body, 
and when I have shown these images in lectures, I have seen viewers wince, rub their 
arms, and blanch' (ibid)22. In fact many pictures are themselves considered 'too 
painful to look at' and are subject to censorship (Freedberg 1989:352), suggesting that 
there is a conveyance of pain visually (Philips 2002:10). Images then can be seen to 
be central to human rights because they facilitate the sharing of pain, allowing people 
to care about others because they identify with their pain. This in turn facilitates the 
recognition of humanity which Rorty suggests is the real crux of human rights (Rorty 
1999:74-75)23. For anthropologists this sounds like a risky universalisation of 
something which is certainly culturally shaped and constructed in different ways. 
However it is not its universality or lack thereof which is of note, rather it is the 
belief, fostered in Enlightenment sentimentalism and continued through visual 
practice, that our moral obligations to others can be found in our mutual ability to feel 
pain. Therefore images can be seen as having been used in the field of rights 
primarily to appeal not to the reasoned upholding of rights, but rather to a shared 
humanity rooted in a capacity for suffering, and as such represent a means by which 
rights are claimed which is not based on legal entitlement. 
Pictures therefore, as they are used in this particular field of activism, can be seen to 
contribute to an understanding of rights which is rooted in suffering, sympathy and 
pity, and therefore emanating from a very specific branch of the philosophy of rights. 
Rather than a modern phenomenon, images have been used in the media and by 
organisations in a quite specific way, akin to the Enlightenment approach to rights 
22 The implications of this embodied response to pain are discussed in greater depth in Chapters 9 & 
10 of this thesis.
23 This is the subject of Chapter 4, where the role of universal ideas of humanity in relation to human 
rights are discussed in depth.
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and care for others. The claims that images transcend culturally specific boundaries to 
convey humanity may still hold weight, but the version of humanity they have been 
used to convey is very specific. While rights are seen to be  appropriated and 
understood in many different ways, and coming from a tradition of debate and 
contestation, why then are images of rights so particularly rooted in one version of a 
recognition of humanity and consequently of rights? 
Suffering Bodies: Biomedical Claims for Rights 
Imagery of pain and suffering which characterises early photojournalism and NGO 
practice has therefore been shown to be rooted in a belief in the shared capacity for 
pain, and the effective communication of another's pain by proxy. The prevalence of 
pictures of suffering has received criticism over the past twenty years (see Benthall 
1993:177-190; Berger 1980; Sontag 2003, 1977), and more recently it has seen a 
return to favour in some academic circles (Tylor 1998; Linfield 2010). Criticism is 
centred on several concerns. Depiction of suffering others is criticised as othering and 
exploitative, creating and reinforcing stereotypes (Campbell 2003; Campbell 2002), 
giving the impression that this is what it is like 'over there', and thus normalising the 
suffering of distant others while reinforcing the position of Euro-American strength 
(Perlmutter 1998; Boltanski 1993; Ignateiff 1998). This is compounded by an 
awareness that there is an inbuilt inequality in photography between those who make 
and those who are represented in images (Price 1997:58). Studies are concerned with 
the representational aspect of NGO images, and highlight the use of certain tropes 
such as the well-known Oxfam Child of the 1960s which still persist in current NGO 
materials (Benthall 1993:178). Other critiques focus on the way in which visual 
depiction can render people silent (Malkki 1996:386) and reduce people, through 
regularity of visual portrayal which shows certain countries and ethnic groups only 
ever in distress, to 'raw humanity' (ibid 379), or in the case of refugees to 
indiscriminate masses (ibid). The ultimate result then of portraying people in pain 
regularly is that those portrayed are not considered agents of their own situations, but 
are rather disempowered by their depiction as helpless victims, or 'suffering bodies'. 
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In presenting people in this way, it can be argued that viewers are not given the 
means to engage with them as equals (Ignatieff 1998:290) and that the claim for 
change which photojournalism relies on is not a recognition of rights, but an 
experience of pity. In this way images of suffering are simultaneously making 
connections which recognise people through pain, and using the same pain to 
establish a power dynamic of inequality. To use a famous example we might turn to 
Dorothea Lange's best known work ‘Migrant Mother'. This image showing a mother 
and her children looking ragged and pensive was run in a San Francisco newspaper 
under the title 'Ragged, Hungry, Broke, Harvest Workers Live in Squaller.' (San 
Francisco News March 10, 1936). It was accompanied by information on the 
conditions in the migrant workers camp. After the article ran there were thousands of 
calls to the newspaper asking how people could help, and the government sent aid to 
the camp immediately (Curtis 1986:23). In some ways this suggests the model circuit 
for photography aiming at social change: the problem was identified, and relief made 
available. However investigations into the circumstance of the photograph (Hariman 
& Lucaites. 2007), and interviews with Florence Owens Thompson years on (LA 
Times 1978) suggest that while the circuit may appear to be working, it is far from 
unproblematic. In actual fact Florence Owens Thompson was still living in poverty 
for the rest of her life, and had received none of the royalties from her famous 
picture,suggesting that conditions that led to the picture being taken in the first place 
are not so different 30 years on. She is quoted in the LA Times article as saying: 
'I wish she [Lange] hadn't taken my picture. I can't get a penny out of it. She 
didn't ask my name. She said she wouldn't sell the pictures. She said she'd 
send me a copy. She never did...what good's it doing me?' 
This begs the question of how well this circuit works to alleviate the suffering it 
portrays. Hariman & Lucaites point to editing of the picture, and the selective 
portrayal of Thompson that excluded her husband, to create more sympathy from the 
viewer (Hariman & Lucaites. 2007:50). They suggest that the picture and its 
treatment by the media used 'generalized sympathy and state action to alleviate the 
symptoms rather than the causes of inequity' (ibid:51), thus showing that the circuit 
of illumination and response that is based on emotional response, in this case, allows 
for a sympathetic reaction and short term solution, rather than the sort of sustained 
rigorous critique that leads to understanding. 
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Figure 3i: 'Migrant Mother' featuring Florence Owens Thompson by Dorothea Lang. 1936. Image 
from http://www.loc.gov/pictures/ 
The focus on visual portrayals of suffering is critiqued not only for its negative 
depictions of others, but also for a focus on physical suffering at the expense of other 
more embedded forms of suffering (Sontag 2003:198). This is a criticism which has 
been lobbied at photojournalism for a long time, because of an inbuilt selectivity in 
framing a photograph which naturally leads to the omission of a wider frame of 
reference or context (Jacobson 2002:10) thus leaving the viewer with limited 
information. Photographs then, can be accused of limiting this view to one of 
physical suffering, most accessible to the eye. Increasingly theorists suggest that there 
is a shift in approaches to rights which preferences alleviation of physical suffering 
over other ways of understanding. This 'biomedicalisation' of rights, especially noted 
in asylum claims (see Fassin 2008; Ticktin 2006; Brown 1995) entails a discourse 
and practice of claiming rights which is based on physical illness at the expense of 
other types of distress (Fassin 2008:532). Ticktin's analysis of asylum claims suggests 
that in France, asylum is granted most easily in cases of illness rather than political 
persecution (Ticktin 2006:34). These cases seem to suggest that pictures of suffering 
fit into a broader narrative about rights which understands people  in physical terms, 
and through pain and healing, rather than through justice and responsibility. This 
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suggests a universalising of particular understandings of pain  based on physical 
discomfort (discussed in Chapter 6), and preferences a particular conception of the 
human rooted in biomedical understandings (discussed in Chapter 4).
Critiques of the representational qualities of images used by charities have been in 
circulation since the mid-1980s when Oxfam created a photo policy which advocated 
using empowering images in campaigns. Many NGOs make considerable efforts to 
change the face of charity advertising, and are acutely aware of these criticisms and 
debates. For example, Wateraid hired a  photoeditor in 2010, the first time that role 
has formally existed in an NGO24, who is working on collaborative projects with in-
country photographers25. This comes alongside increased numbers of forums and 
panel discussions on photographic representation by charities26, a growth in the 
number of organizations set up to facilitate photography which avoids 
representational pitfalls27, and a number of newspaper articles bringing these 
discussions into the public sphere28. There is clearly a public interest and certainly a 
renewed NGO interest in the depiction of others. Speaking at the Third Frame, 
Rachel Palmer of Save the Children discussed getting a balance between ‘giving 
people the truth, which is often so horrific, and not scaring people away, or horrifying 
them so they look away, they need something to care about’ (Palmer 10/3/10). Human 
rights organisations therefore are involved in an awareness of the pitfalls of 
representation, being one of the major targets for public outrage regarding images, 
and because their aims demand them to be ethically minded about representation. 
They are therefore working within a situation of compromise and difficult decisions. 
However, despite this level of interest and debate, the prevailing visual practice 
remains one associated with suffering and others. Oxfam recently undertook an 
independent audit of their materials and were 'shocked' to find that images of women 
24 Communications departments and managers are usually responsible for photographic editing
25 www.wateraid.com/ 
26 For example: The Third Frame http://open-i.ning.com/xn/detail/3429868:Event:7649?
xg_source=activity 
27 For example: Autograph, Duckrabbit, Photovoice, Proof. All based in London
28 For example: Russell, Ruby. War Photography: Why We Don’t Want to See It. Daily Telegraph. 11 
Oct 2008
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and children in need made up over 70% of their visual materials29. Recent studies 
such as Dogra's on the use of images by humanitarian organisations, which involved 
a large scale analysis of materials produced by several charities, suggests that the 
motif of pain and suffering remains a dominant one, even if this is not the case for all 
organisations (Dogra 2012:31). Rachel Palmer of Save the Children spoke at a 
conference on the dangers of relying too heavily on disempowering tropes30, but just 
a week later the organisation launched a new television appeal which depicted 
children in states of starvation. When asked about this, a charity representative cited 
'market pressures' (Sam Turner, via email November 2010). That is to say that, put 
simply, these campaigns produce funds. Visual practice which favours a visual 
depiction of suffering in order to call for social and political change is therefore 
persistent in the face of considerable opposition, because it is considered effective in 
producing an appropriate response. Therefore for organisations working in this field, 
the use of visuals is far from straight forward, and can result in big questions about 
what the ultimate goals of their work are, and how they identify themselves. 
This wider examination of the field of rights suggests that visual narratives are in fact 
not as far removed from legal ones as might be expected. Both exist in a field broadly 
dominated by the alleviation of physical suffering which was previously the remit of 
humanitarian aid organisations. Rather than activating ideas of justice, rights 
practitioners are mobilising compassionate sympathy in order to attract support. In 
this sense, recognition of the rights of others can be seen to be based not only in 
recognition of a shared capacity to feel pain, but also in hoping to elicit a reaction to 
that pain. The concerns raised about the power dynamics of images of suffering, 
particularly the concern about creating pity rather than entitlement, can be seen to  
extend beyond the sphere of images into the very mechanisms of rights practice. 
Compassionate pity is not suggestive of entitlement to rights, but rather implies an 
unequal power dynamic. Therefore basing rights claims in this manner raises some 
concerns.
29 Oxfam branding study, presented at 'International NGOs: Representations of Global Poverty and 
Development' conference, Goldsmiths 8th September 2011
30 'Does the Camera Never Lie?' Amnesty UK, 23 rd Nov 2010
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The Limits of Compassion
If, as I have argued, images have been used to claim the rights of others through 
appeals to shared pain, what then does this mean for rights? Sontag sets the stage for 
this type of critique of images of suffering with her original On Photography, where 
she calls for 'an ecology of images' (Sontag 1979:180) to limit the dulling effects of 
over exposure to images of suffering (ibid). In Regarding the Pain of Others (Sontag 
2004) many of these same issues are discussed, however here Sontag focusses not on 
the removal of images of suffering, but rather on the role of framing and response in 
contributing to the way in which images are understood. She pre-empts recent 
approaches to rights images which focus on reading and context as crucial factors in 
determining how they work, or could work, to produce productive engagement 
(Azoulay 2008; Linfield 2010; Batchen et al 2012). Specifically, Sontag questions the 
role of compassion in motivating action, calling it an 'unstable emotion' (Sontag 
2004:91) which can easily turn to apathy in the face of over exposure to images of 
pain where no clear course of action for the viewer is available (ibid). 
In On Photography, and to some extent Regarding the Pain of Others Sontag is 
engaging with debates on the issue of what some call 'compassion fatigue' (Moeller 
1999), demonstrating that even when arguing for a more nuanced understanding of 
how images of suffering work on people, as she does in her later work, the issue of 
our ability to sustain emotion for others remains a lurking presence. 'Compassion 
fatigue' can be characterised as a concern with the ability of viewers to maintain 
concerned emotional engagement, when images of suffering become routine. While 
there are a number of different names and terms used to describe the process, there is 
a relatively coherent conclusion about how it works in dulling  emotional concern for 
others when faced with too much pain. An updated and more keenly argued version 
of this phenomenon is provided by Kleinman & Kleinman who liken it to a form of 
structural violence whereby we are coached to accept the suffering of others: 
'Viewers are overwhelmed by the sheer number of atrocities. There is too 
much to see, and there appears to be too much to do anything about. Thus, 
our epoch's dominating sense that complex problems can be neither 
understood nor fixed works with the massive globalization of images of 
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suffering to produce moral fatigue, exhaustion of empathy, and political 
despair' (Kleinman &Kleinman 1996:9). 
In this conception not only are viewers limited in their capacity to feel care for those 
suffering when faced with too much pain, but they are also encouraged by this 
process to accept suffering as unfixable, a status quo which is applied only to distant 
others. Concern with the role of images in producing this state of what Feldman calls 
'cultural anaesthesia' (1994:407) has dominated discussions about the use of images 
for decades, to relatively little effect. Little evidence of this phenomenon has been 
produced, yet the persistence of the debate is testament to the way in which it taps 
into a concern at the heart of the practice of claiming rights through compassionate 
sympathy. 
The persistence of this concern is applied not only where images are concerned, and 
in fact it can be seen as inherent to the process of compassion itself. Moyn suggests 
that rather than seeing this compassion fatigue as a feature of a modern media 
process, an historical account suggests that basing humanitarian sentiment on 
emotional attachment has always been treated with concern. Whether the exact 
mechanism or terminology is described as compassion, sympathy, empathy or 
violence, all descriptions share a concern that emotion based on shared pain has a 
limit. A good example is Butler, a prominent sentimentalist of the seventeenth 
century, whose concerns about the limits of sympathy suggest that 'compassion 
fatigue is one of its permanent structural components and constitutive problems' 
(Moyn 2006:403). Seen in this light, the problem highlighted by scholars of the 
visual can be perceived  not as an issue with the style or number of images, but rather 
with the underlying process behind the use of images, that of compassionate 
sympathy as a form of political engagement. 
Criticism of emotional engagement with others based on pain, as a tool for political 
engagement, has not been limited to the field of visuals. As discussed above, this 
process of claiming rights through physical pain can now be seen  not only as the 
method for making claims through pictures, but also as a part of legal practice which 
favours pain over civil and political claims for rights. This process receives criticism 
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from many quarters. Famously, Arendt has described compassion as incompatible 
with politics (1990:86) because it implies a personal connection with one person 
where engagement with a class or situation is required (ibid:89). The 'awkwardness 
with words' (ibid:42) which she highlights as coming with feelings reflects the 
sentiments of others that emotions, especially pain, are incommunicable. However 
for Arendt this is a reason to distrust them, rather than to seek approximations such as 
images. Politics in Arendt's account should be debatable and understood, rather than 
simply experienced. To base politics on compassion is to invite pity, which for Arendt 
is the natural by-product of compassion, and is set up by the distinction between 
those who suffer and those who do not, and constitutes inherent power inequality 
(Arendt 2006:51). Primo Levi similarly sees pity as a product of emotional 
identification with suffering, and distrusts pity because we are encouraged to relate to 
an individual through pity, at the expense of understanding a regime: 
'There is no proportion between the pity we feel and the extent of the pain 
by which the pity is aroused: a single Anne Frank excites more emotion 
than the myriads who suffered as she did but whose image has remained 
in the shadows' (2000:39). 
Ticktin is critical of a similar sort of compassion based on suffering as a means by 
which to claim rights. Her study of 'regimes of care' in the asylum process suggest 
that when illness is used to cross borders, the political and regimental systems which 
are behind immigration are permitted to continue relatively unchallenged, thus 
stifling change and challenge (Ticktin 2011). For many theorists therefore. 
compassion is  a problem not only because of concerns with its limitations in 
producing consistent feeling, but also for the introduction of a politics based on 
feeling rather than engagement. 
In many critiques of compassionate engagement we see the juxtaposition of 
compassionate emotional engagement, with intellectual engagement (for example 
Barthes 1997, Sontag 2004) to the detriment of understanding. This juxtaposition is 
reflected in recent studies of images which either call for (Linfield 2012; Batchen et 
al 2012) or against (Azoulay 2008) an engagement with distant others based on the 
emotional response provoked by images. This approach as applied to images is based 
on a belief that images  must create an emotional response of shock and horror to be 
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effective, for example Barthes’ criticism of images which failed to make him shudder 
as being ineffective (Barthes 1997:76-77). Yet critics suggest that to do that, images 
often remove the wider contextual framework needed to understand a situation, in 
favour of portraying atrocity (Azoulay 1998:291). Critiques of this sort seem to 
suggest that emotional engagement actively prevents an intellectual one. This thesis 
suggests that in fact the relation between the two is not exclusive, and for activists 
working in the field of human rights emotional engagement is facilitated by a 
knowledge of wider frameworks which are causing abuses of rights. 
Critiques of this sort, and those of 'compassion fatigue' are similarly concerned with 
the failure of the type of emotional response to produce change or action,  either by 
apathy or by a shallow or limited engagement, and seek other ways to engage with 
rights to combat this. While theorists use the terms compassion, sympathy, and pity 
with a certain slipperiness, they are most conflated when dealing with the emotional 
responses to another's pain. The critics mentioned above may call this emotional 
response by different names, and illustrate some differences between pity, sympathy 
and compassion, but ultimately they share a concern with emotional responses to pain 
as a means to recognise rights. However, Rorty suggests that to recognise rights, one 
must first recognise the humanity of another (Rorty 2002:75). In asking for a 
humanitarian politics which is not based on compassion as it is understood by 
theorists above, we are really being asked to imagine a humanity which is connected 
not in shared pain, but in some other way. In this thesis I do not attempt to argue for 
the existence of a shared humanity or indeed against it. Rather, I hope to show how in 
human rights campaigns, an appeal is being made which is rooted in a practice of 
empathising seen to have a long history in both images and rights. In looking at the 
conscious construction of imaginative engagement, as well as the many forms that 
this takes in practice, I hope to show that the relations which people make with 
distant others which create moral proximity are at once more complex than critiques 
of compassion suggest, and also deeply involved with these expectations. 
Conclusion 
I have therefore sketched out what McLagan describes as a 'circuit of suffering' 
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(McLagan 2005), by which images come to be used in certain ways to claim rights. I 
have described a system of international law, originating from a particular cultural 
and historical setting that relies on exposure to maintain compliance from national 
states. Exposure has been shown to be enacted largely through rights organisations, 
whose campaigning work plays a huge role in creating the exposure needed to shame 
offenders, and the pressure needed to create social change. Use of images in 
demanding social change works on a similar model of exposure and public response 
that creates public pressure to change a situation, and this similarity in goal may go 
some way to explaining the importance of images in human rights movements. This 
process, from violation, documentation, exposure, public response, and pressure to 
change, is therefore the circuit in brief. It is not only a means by which rights images 
circulate, it is the system through which rights are protected.
McLagan's description of the circuit as one of suffering is apt. I have shown a 
preference in the practice of rights images for the use of photographs of people 
suffering. While I suggest that this is in part a feature of the nature of photography as 
physically biassed, it has been placed in a wider framework of rights both historically, 
with reference especially to Hume (1978), and recently with reference to Ticktin 
(2006), that recognises rights through biomedical notions such as ill health, suffering 
and pain. Seen in this light, the use of images of suffering as a means by which to 
elicit change fits more broadly into particular notions of rights and humanity, which 
will be picked up in the next chapter. 
Throughout the chapter I have drawn attention to the focus on creating emotional 
responses through pictures, showing how evidence is not  necessarily the primary 
goal of rights images. I would suggest that this emotional response is itself similar to 
the idea of empathy discussed in the introduction, at least in so far as it seeks to 
create a connection between people who are remote geographically, socially or 
culturally. However, the connection between people seen to be formed through 
images of suffering is one based on shared capacity for pain, and a desire to alleviate 
the suffering of another because you can relate to them through this pain. As the 
following chapter will show, AIUK staff are attempting to subvert this expectation 
that care comes through the alleviation of pain by grounding empathy not in 
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sympathy, as these pictures have been suggested to do, but in similarity. Ethnographic 
analysis of staff planning and disseminating campaign materials suggests that there 
are priorities and techniques that are in defiance of the accepted norms of rights 
images, as well as contradictions and disagreements within this defiance. In 
examining rights images in this way, through close ethnographic attention to the 
practices around them, I attempt to subvert expectations myself, expectations that this 
chapter has set up about where anthropologists should look for rights, and how rights 
are produced in Euro-American settings. The sometimes surprising approaches and 
opinions of staff at Amnesty suggest that while rights and image use for rights may 
have come out of a particular history, that history is still being written, and rights are 
still up for debate. 
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Part I
Producing Rights Images
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Chapter 4: People Like Us 
Figure 4a: Freed prisoner of conscience Htein writes the Figure 4b: Internal mail envelope. 
name of fellow prisoner Zarganar on his hand in 
solidarity. Photo By James MacKay.
 
This chapter introduces a broad remit within AIUK staff attitudes that seeks to 
'humanise' human rights through the use of images. Rorty suggests that the 
recognition of the rights of others is dependent on first recognising the humanity of 
others (Rorty 1999:75). He points out that rights movements have traditionally gone 
hand in hand with the recognition of humanity in the persecuted groups by those 
persecuting them. He points to the abolishment of slavery in the US as a journey 
towards recognising the humanity of black slaves by white Americans (ibid). This 
chapter explores what humanity looks like at AIUK, and how its staff seek to 
represent and foster a universal humanity. For many organisations and theorists, 
universal humanity has been rooted in the shared capacity for physical pain as 
described in the previous chapter. I focus on the planning stages of the AIUK Burma 
campaign presence at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe in 2010. A process is described 
whereby staff reimagine some of the norms of NGO imagery (discussed in Chapter 3) 
by grounding that humanity in cultural and social similarity, rather than on the notion 
of physical bodies. Thus staff call on what they term 'empathy', a term that I illustrate 
throughout this chapter as being based largely on identification with another through 
recognition of similarity, as a recognition of humanity and consequently the rights of 
others. In doing so, staff reveal certain beliefs about what it means to be human, and 
how this plays into empathising. I begin by describing the process by which ideas of 
humanity emerge and are deployed in campaign construction, including the 
compromises and limits to these productions. Through this I show that humanity for 
staff is rooted in similarity that will lead to empathy. I then describe the process by 
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which staff themselves undertake imaginative identification with distant others 
through images that ultimately justify their work and recognise the rights of others. 
This suggests that imaginative identification that recognises the humanity of others 
must be actively undertaken, even by staff, rather than occurring organically or 
naturally.
Picturing Humanity
The above envelope (4b) containing Image 4a and a selection of other images by 
James MacKay arrived in my pigeon hole one morning with a meeting request 
inviting me to 'talk about some pictures' for AIUK's summer actions, leading up to the 
elections in Burma. MacKay is now a well known photographer who works largely 
on Burma. The pictures were his portrait collection 'Even Though I am Free I am 
Not'31 which featured former prisoners of conscience bearing the name of prisoners 
yet to be released. His work has been shown in the Guardian and the Independent 
newspapers, among other publications. However at this point MacKay's work was 
relatively unknown in the mainstream press, and was published largely on his website 
and in publications for the movement to free Burma. Unlike most images used by 
AIUK  which come via the design team and the head of design Margaret's discerning 
eye, these pictures had come through campaign manager Valerie's acquaintance with 
James whom she knew from Free Burma Events in London. Within the Events Team 
this caused some ripples. Events are based with Design under the umbrella of Brand 
and Events, and a clan mentality between different teams was perhaps at work, but 
more pressingly was a concern over how they would look and whether they would be 
'on message' with AIUK's visuals. The term 'on message' is used a lot in Amnesty, 
especially in the Brand and Design teams, and though sometimes sounding like 
meaningless corporate-speak, it transpired that for staff it has quite concrete 
applications. The photographs were passed around the office via the internal mail 
system, and everywhere they went they created a buzz of excitement unlike any that I 
had previously encountered over pictures. Staff were talking about the pictures and 
showing them to each other. I struggled to understand what was more 'on message' 
about these particular photographs than others which had crossed our path. 
31 The collection is now a book entitled Abhaya: Burma's Fearlessness.
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In fact I was surprised that they were considered so appropriate when they seemed 
like simple portraits and not necessarily about Amnesty's work on Burma or human 
rights explicitly. I put this to Laura and she laughed and told me 'well what you think 
makes them not human rights is exactly why they're perfect pictures for this 
campaign. It's all about the human element Amy, and these have it' (Laura, in 
conversation, January 2010). The 'message' then can be seen as in some way relating 
to the idea of being human and having a 'human element'. In Laura's statement she 
separates human rights and the human element. Over my time at Amnesty it became 
clear that AIUK staff often see their remit as different from the 'keepers of the flame' 
approach which Hopgood found at the International Secretariat (Hopgood 2006). In 
his meticulous account of the IS's internal 'ethos' Hopgood highlights a focus on 
maintaining a kind of moral authority through detachment in  report writing (ibid:74). 
AIUK staff often spoke to me about their role as 'telling the stories, showing you the 
people, putting the human back into human rights' (Lucy Dunn (designer), interview, 
April 2011). For AIUK staff the IS 'do vital work, sure they do, we couldn't do what 
we do without their reports, but at the end of the day it's our job to make the reports 
come alive, it's how we get people engaged and we're good at our job' (Charlotte 
(campaigns), interview, July 2011). In reality AIUK staff and IS staff may work for 
the same organisation, but their remits are different, and it is not unusual for there to 
be disagreements between the two about the presentation of Amnesty campaigns. 
Since the UK section is one of the largest, its staff are given a large degree of freedom 
to work on their own campaign presentation without interference. This is not the case 
with other smaller sections who rely on the IS to design their campaign material, as 
discussed in Chapter 2. The UK section therefore is able to pursue this 'human' 
agenda in ways which are unique to it, and through workplace practices norms are 
established and learnt that impact on this agenda.
While working on the Summer Actions for Burma in 2010 this 'human element' was a 
frequently discussed aspect, and was always related back to the photographs, but in 
an unspecific way. It was more clearly articulated during a conversation between 
three of us who were putting together visuals for an image selection meeting. Two of 
us, being volunteers and relatively new, were corrected in our assumptions about the 
pictures by a member of staff. Meghan, a new volunteer and a photographer herself 
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passed over one of the James MacKay photographs because 'it was a bit boring', and I 
agreed. The picture was of a man standing in an office. We were corrected by the staff 
member working with us and told that:
 'I do see what you're saying I just think the office is ordinary in a good 
way, if you see what I mean, it's somewhere people here go, and evidently 
people in Burma go too, so you can see actually that people are the same 
where ever, doing the same things, just being people' (Mikey, in 
conversation, January 2010)
The human element then was defined for us as being focussed on mobilising some 
idea of universals, of similarity between distant others through the still rather vague 
notion of 'being people'. 
The idea of universal humanity, an assumed category by Amnesty staff over the time I 
was there, was often mentioned but never explicitly described or interrogated. AIUK 
use the strapline 'Protect the Human' on almost all of their merchandise32 and 
frequently make reference to the fact that 'we're all human after all' or express similar 
sentiments, the shared universal humanity being the grounding prerequisite for 
human rights. As the above example begins to show, staff see their role as telling 
stories about people that convey this humanity. During interviews I was able to 
explore this idea further with staff and found that people struggled to quantify what it 
meant to be human, but nevertheless maintained  its importance. Thus they engaged 
with one of the most frequently debated aspects underpinning human rights and 
exposed the difficulty with this assumption of what exactly links people together 
universally in ways which qualify them for rights. My point here is not to reopen 
debates about the universality of rights or humanity, but rather to examine how these 
ideas are used and dealt with by staff in the construction of campaigns, and in other 
ways in the workplace. I suggest that for staff, the idea of universal humanity which 
underpins much of their work is complex, problematic and knowingly constructed 
and deployed. In the following chapter I hope to demonstrate the way in which 
humanity is consciously and unconsciously imagined and produced by staff to close 
gaps with distant others. I examine the limits to this humanity, and suggest that it is a 
product of institutional practices which determine and influence the ‘Human’ in 
32 Protect the Human was the strapline at the time of writing. It has since been announced internally 
that it will be gradually rolled back.
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Amnesty's Human rights.   
The Category of Human and Human Rights
That universal humanity is a core belief underpinning universal human rights almost 
goes without saying. As one member of staff told me, 'it's in the name' meaning of 
course that you can't have human rights without a concept of human. The 'human 
family' which the UDHR descries includes people regardless of 'race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status' (G.A. Res 217A (III) U.N. Doc A/810 at 70 Art 2 (1948)) suggesting 
that to be a human is something beyond the cultural, geographic or physical 
specificities set out above, in short it is something universal, essential and pre-
cultural. It is on the basis of this humanity that rights are claimed, and more 
importantly that we care about the welfare of distant others, at least nominally. 
Extending moral responsibility beyond those in one's immediate family or vicinity 
has been a central question of rights since people first began conceiving of such a 
thing as rights, and there are have been many attempts to answer this in moral 
philosophy. These have normally been anchored in demonstrating that the similarities 
between people outweigh the differences. This traditionally focused on the shared 
faculty for reason held by all humans as described by Plato, and developed by Kant. 
However, as Rorty points out, it is not necessarily rational to extend your moral 
community in this way:
'Most people are simply unable to understand why membership in a 
biological species is supposed to suffice for membership in a moral 
community...because it would be just too risky...to let one's sense of moral 
community stretch beyond one's family, clan or tribe' (Rorty 1999:75)
Other theorists have also pointed to this contradiction inherent in a rationality 
explanation for the extension of right. Adorno suggests that we have a biological 
predisposition towards 'coldness' when faced with strangers which allows us to 
protect ourselves (2012:274). Where then can the recognition of rights be found if not 
in reason? Rorty goes on to suggest that the problem of extending the moral 
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community is not about allowing people to overcome their differences as people, 
rather it is the much larger task of recognising humanity in others (Rorty 1999:75). 
He points to the way that the category of human has been a sliding one, whereby until 
recently most white people did not consider black people human; though they may 
have been able to appreciate rationality in their actions, they were still not human 
(ibid). Human rights, in Rorty's conception, are not about recognising rights, but 
about recognising those whose rights have been violated as human. I would suggest 
that it is this element of rights which  Amnesty staff see their role as facilitating, this 
process of widening the scope of humanity to produce care for distant others, and 
they do that using images.
The concept of humanity and the related but differentiated category of person has 
long been debated by anthropologists and shown to be relative and shifting (see 
Carrithers, Colins & Lukes 1985), and the assumptions and exclusions of the Euro-
American context of liberal politics leading to rights are well known (Mehta 1990; 
Ong 2006), and have been critiqued in postcolonial discourse for their potential to 
replicate existing power dynamics under the naturalisation that the concept human 
implies (for example see Fanon 1963; Chatterjee 1993:18). Therefore how the 
category of human is imagined is a highly political issue. While more attention is 
given in anthropology to the concept of 'personhood' and to the various social 
imaginings of the individual and the self socially across cultures (White & 
Kirkpatrick 1985), the cross-cultural category of human has received less attention. 
This is perhaps because anthropology's traditional focus on the local precludes 
universals, however in the case of AIUK, local practices seek to produce universals 
which brings them firmly within the traditional boundaries of anthropology. Tsing 
points out that the study of the deployment of universals by different actors and 
agencies with different perspectives and agendas is an interesting and important way 
in to studying the field of globalisation (Tsing 2006:267). 
As Ticktin and Feldman point out, the concept of human is most visible in 
anthropology where it is least stable (Feldman & Ticktin 2010:11). In many recent 
approaches the boundaries between humans and other entities have been blurred, 
making clear where prior academic assumptions lie about what constitutes human. 
Haraway's concept of the cyborg questions beliefs about where technology and 
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humanity end (Haraway 1991), as also does Derrida's discussion on animals and 
humans (Derrida 1997). Studies which place human agency in the hands of objects 
through networks (Latour 2005) or in images through their use (Gell 1998; Mitchell 
2005) also reveal slippage and blurring which disestablishes the human as a discreet 
and measurable category, discussed in Chapter 1. Nevertheless for staff at AIUK  its 
existence is viewed and created as discreet and bounded.. This is true even while they 
seek to produce it at the campaign level, which would seem to suggests a certain 
inbuilt unnaturalness to the concept which is invisible to staff. Yet despite critiques, 
the idea of universal humanity continues to be evocative and important for human 
rights and other global organisations as is evidenced by its persistent use in various 
campaigns. Oxfam and Amnesty International are two of the highest earning charities 
in the UK33, have high visibility, and both include the word human in their straplines.
Figure 4c: Oxfam: Be Humankind
Figure 4d: Amnesty International: Protect 
the Human
NGOs and Human Rights organisations are seen as 'crucial in helping [to]constitute 
humanity as a real category of central importance' (Feldman & Ticktin 2010:14). The 
field of international agencies therefore is a locale where the term 'human' is often 
used with agendas and real political implications. As discussed in Chapter 3, recent 
literature on humanitarian agencies critiques their use of the term human as a largely 
biomedical category. This is constructed through the way in which organisational 
organisations target support and define need through physical discomfort (ibid). 
Increasingly, rights discourse and law is shot through with references to bodily 
integrity both in terms of defining torture (Kelly 2012:72) and demanding asylum 
(Ticktin 2006:36). 
This can be seen as having its roots in Enlightenment sentimentalism which places 
33 The annual income of Amnesty is £21,901,000 compared to Oxfam's £294,800,000 Source: 
Charities Aid Foundation (CAF). This places both within the top 50 highest earners in the UK 
charity sector.
102
'sympathy, compassion, and pity as its honorific concepts and emotions' (Moyn 
2006:399). In this concept of why people care about others made popular by thinkers 
such as Hume and Rousseau, the ability to relate to others is described as being 
rooted in a shared knowledge of pain, which allows us to sympathise with other 
people despite the inaccessibility of their individual feelings, and the apparent 
conflict with rationality. As touched upon in the previous chapter, David Hume, one 
of the leading proponents of sentimentalism, describes a process whereby people 
mirror each other, feeling pain vicariously: 
'Were I present at any of the more terrible operations of surgery, ‘tis 
certain, that even before it begun, the preparation of the instruments, the 
laying of the bandages in order, the heating of the irons, with all the signs 
of anxiety and concern in the patient and assistants, wou’d have a great 
effect upon my mind, and excite the strongest sentiments of pity and 
terror.' (Hume 1978:576). 
He explains that despite not being the object of this surgery, this excitement of the 
sentiment of pity spreads by contagion, that is, by mirroring the feelings of others that 
we observe from outward cues (ibid:605). In this sense we see in sentimentalism a 
rationale which places care about others in experiences of pain, thereby suggesting, as 
others have since Hume, that people are united through a shared capacity to suffer 
pain (Fassin 2005:372). 
The sourcing of humanity in pain is not unique to Hume, though he is its earliest best 
known theorist. Pain has long been used and discussed as a justification for the 
universality of rights. Amnesty International called it the 'common human 
denominator' (1973:17). Douzinas suggests that there exists a history of rights in 
which 'human rights are not based on the a priori free will of the subject, but on her a 
priori pain and suffering' (Douzinas 2000:354). It is into this tradition of recognising 
the rights of others through 'the recognition of  other people's misery and suffering as 
one’s own responsibility' (Bauman 1997:63) that Amnesty campaigns fit, albeit 
somewhat uncomfortably. I hope to show throughout this chapter that AIUK attempts 
to source 'humanity' not in pain, but in other ways, and in doing so staff attempt to 
subvert expectations about what links human beings.
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Closing the Gap: Pictures of People
 'Sometimes it's easy to be kinda disconnected and think 'that's just what 
it's like over there' but we want to show that they're just people like us, 
trying to get on with their lives, with jobs and interests and families. The 
pictures show people as people not as statistics or a vague idea, but as 
real people. The pictures close the gap and make you feel close to them' 
Lucy Dunn (Senior Graphic Designer AIUK March 2010)
Pictures of people, it seems, have been entwined with Amnesty campaigning since 
the very first campaign in 1961. The popular perception of Amnesty as a letter-
writing organization is only half the picture, the other half is in fact pictures. 'The 
Forgotten Prisoners' (Peter Benenson 1961:1) which was the newspaper article which 
launched Amnesty does not simply name its prisoners, it provides photographs of 
them. 
Figure 4e: Observer article May 1961
From the outset, pictures of the people Amnesty campaigned for were present and 
though often overlooked by the public as simply decoration, pictures of individuals 
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being campaigned for are seen by staff as playing a critical role in campaigning. The 
first letter appeal for South America in 1970s was followed closely by the first large 
scale picture appeal in 1979 by which Amnesty collected pictures of the Disappeared 
in South America34 and displayed them extensively to local people, government and 
back in the UK in order to garner support. It was the biggest picture campaign ever 
undertaken by a charitable organization and was an early example of photo-based 
campaigns which Amnesty sections have run as a main part of campaign practice 
since then35. Photographs of people are thought to have a quality of humanness which 
other types of images do not. One of the first Amnesty campaigners involved in the 
Disappeared campaign describes their use thus:
'What Amnesty decided to do then was enormous campaign, campaign of 
photographs which was very important because a name, a number,a story, 
is not a person it's when you see the photograph this person is like you or 
like anyone else...it could happen to anyone' (Virginia Shoppee, Amnesty 
Researcher, South America (October 2011 Amnesty When They are All 
Free). 
This approach fits more widely into a campaign strategy which involves using 
individuals as a 'way in' for the public to engage with human rights through getting to 
know various prisoners of conscience. AI uses an Individuals at Risk team to 
campaign on behalf of particular people who members of the public can 'adopt' and 
'get to know' and 'hopefully give a damn about a bit more than a random stranger 
because you can empathise with them' (Mikey, in conversation, June 2011). The use 
of particular individuals suggests not only the individualised notion of humanity 
common to Euro-American concepts of human, but also instinctively jars with the 
idea of the universalism of humanity which human rights relies on. Individuals must 
therefore be at once individuals but also universal enough to maintain the rationale of 
universality on which rights discourse depends. Individuals chosen by Amnesty, and 
indeed all photographs used to campaign, are selected to be 'recognisable to the 
34 'the disappeared' are individuals that have gone missing and are suspected dead or imprisoned for 
political reasons. This term was originally coined by rights groups in relation to practices of 
kidnapping political activists in South American countries where the practice of enforced 
disappearance is widespread, but now is used in many other contexts as geographically diverse as 
Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka.  
35 Examples include: Mexico Disappeared 1981, Control Arms Photo Petition 2007, Maternal 
Mortality Mother's Pictures 2009,
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public as members of the same human race' (Mikey, in conversation, June 2011). 
The approach Mikey suggests above, of humanising individuals, can be viewed as 
particularly significant in light of the wider field of rights practice that staff work in 
discussed in Chapter 2 whereby rights reports are produced that remove narrative in 
favour of 'facts' (Wilson 1997). Wilson demonstrates how the translation of crimes 
from complex and ambiguous, enmeshed in local specificity, class, and tradition, into 
the universal factual unambiguous accounts used in rights reports alters their 
potential meaning (ibid:150). Wilson singles out Amnesty's Urgent Actions (produced 
in the IS) as emblematic of this process for their scant information, normally 
containing only the name, category of victim and manner of murder (ibid: 143). He 
concludes that this removal of context ultimately leads to the same '...dehumanisation 
that justifies abuses...' (ibid:155). The 'humanising' of victims of rights abuses 
through images therefore represents a very different approach to representing victims.  
I will attempt to show throughout this chapter and the following chapters how staff at 
AIUK are engaged in practices that use images to re-subjectify victims of rights 
abuses, deviating from the expected practice of a rights organisation, deviating even 
from their colleagues in Amnesty's IS. In doing so staff hope to provoke empathy 
form those viewing campaigns, but as this chapter will demonstrate, they also do the 
very thing Wilson's critique accuses them of doing- they construct human rights 
through representing them (ibid:134). In this case it is not through the reduction to 
facts, but rather through the construction of particular visions of humanity. In the 
following section I go back to the James MacKay picture shown at the start of this 
chapter to demonstrate how AIUK staff select and deploy individuals, the 
characteristics that are considered desirable and acceptable in a universal person and 
how these are ultimately related to the likelihood of the public empathising with 
them. 
People Like Us
The James MacKay photographs mentioned at the beginning of this chapter were 
discussed by staff in a project group meeting in March 2010. We met for the first 
meeting of the project group in the 'creative room', so called because it is colourful 
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and filled with toys and objects to 'stimulate creativity'. In actual fact the room was 
chosen because it was going to be a long meeting and the sofas were more 
comfortable than the plastic uprights in other rooms. A small group consisting of 
Valerie and Amy S (both from campaigns) and Laura, Sally B-T and myself from 
events, met initially to discuss how these pictures might be used to form an action. 
The action was to be rolled out at summer festivals and to local groups to undertake 
on behalf of Amnesty. The group was a mix of three senior members of staff – Sally, 
Laura and Valerie – who were to lead the discussion, and myself and the other Amy 
were to record and take on a more administrative role. Despite having different 
focusses the two teams agreed on much about what the actions were to be and why, 
which struck me as unusual, since often the different priorities of different teams 
mean that considerable time is spent defining objectives and balancing agendas. 
Because summer campaigns are annual it seemed that a method and wider objective 
had been decided in the past and had now been assimilated into Amnesty's campaign 
canon. It was understood that we had to find someone or a subset of people from 
among these images who 'people would like' to campaign for, and that we would use 
this person or these people to form an action which would be participatory in some 
way. 
To prepare for the meeting I was asked to affix print outs of the photographs to the 
walls and provide a crib sheet detailing who the people in them were. I was asked to 
put down the following details:
iii) name
iv) job
v) family
vi) where the photo was taken for example whether it was in Burma itself or 
whether it was of a refugee in Thailand. 
vii)Name and job of prisoner being campaigned for.
These elements, having been highlighted as the important facts about the subjects of 
the photographs through their inclusion on the crib sheet, then became the main 
criteria for evaluation when talking about the pictures and may be seen to represent 
the attributes seen as relevant by staff. It was understood between staff that we were 
using the pictures, but that we would not be able to use many. The reason for this was 
not discussed during the meeting, but it was explained to me later that too many faces 
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to remember makes people less likely to connect and empathise with them. What was 
interesting about this meeting was no't the tacit understanding that individuals make 
the best campaign tools, which is fairly explicitly dealt with in Amnesty handbooks 
and briefings, but the decisions about what attributes these individuals should have. 
This element of campaign construction, the question as to who makes a good 
recipient of Amnesty’s attention, was not covered in handbooks. In this case it was a 
physical list which showed the priorities at work, but the question was also crucially 
worked out at the level of the meeting where the rationale behind these priorities was 
able to emerge.
Eventually the choice was made to focus on Zarganar as a political prisoner to 
campaign for, and this was based on several things. He is a comedian and Htein, who 
bears his name on his palm and whose image would feature in the campaign (figure 
4a), is an artist. The recognisable jobs of the two men were a main appeal:
Sally: I think we should go with Zarganar. The comedian thing works- 
there's a link to Edinburgh and he's such a normal guy, people will 
respond to that
Amy: Yeah I agree and Htein's an artist, there're loads of arty people at 
these festivals, they'll like that, easier to empathise with.
In the above interaction between Amy S and Sally not only is the crucial element of 
audience present, but a further assumption about empathy is put forward, namely that 
you relate to people like you. During the preparation for the meeting, and throughout 
the course of it, the focus remained on picking pictures which show a person who is 
recognisable through their familiar cultural characteristics. Their job, clothes, and the 
setting of the picture were all discussed. Htein was also chosen because 'the studio is 
a great backdrop for it' because 'it really brings home that he's not living a totally 
different life, only the Junta makes it different ' (Sally BT, in conversation, March 
2010). By the same token, pictures were rejected for being 'too rural' or 'too local'.
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Figure 4f: Cover and back page of Zarganar campaign leaflet
Figure 4g: Pages inside campaign leaflet showing Htein on the right.
Figure 4h: Zarganar, from Individuals At Risk campaign archives, AIUK.
When Amy spoke to me in an interview about the final choice, she used a term that I 
often heard during the planning of campaigns, that of 'empathy'. It was a word used 
by many others during the planning of this campaign and others, and from its use 
seemed to be intimately tied to the idea of communicating humanity. Staff would talk 
to me about 'putting the human into human rights' (Lucy, interview, July 2011) and 
similar sentiments in the same breath as talking about empathising with prisoners. 
Amy did not qualify this term with an explanation, but based on observations during 
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the meeting, and the focus on recognition and similarity, I took it to refer to the 
process highlighted in Chapter 1 that Kelly describes as 'imaginative identification' 
(Kelly 2012a:754). Through emphasising certain similarities, staff hoped to allow 
people to identify with those depicted, rather than 'sympathise' with them. Depicting 
humanity therefore has at its heart the aim to produce empathy between the audience 
and prisoners of conscience such as Htein. In this light, the focus on what was similar 
and recognisable visually makes sense as an attempt to forge empathy. The rationale 
behind the avoidance of sympathy is a subject of a later chapter, but is deeply 
entwined with the call for empathy based on similarity, rather than sympathy based 
on pain, which staff do not value. Of course this identification will always be 
imagined since they are based not on actual relations with a person, but rather are 
mediated by images.
The focus on similarity as crucial in the creation of care for distant others has been a 
feature of philosophical approaches to understanding morality since the 
enlightenment. Hume puts it thus: 'We sympathize more with persons contiguous to 
us than with persons remote to us: with our acquaintance, than with strangers; With 
our countrymen, than with foreigners.' (Hume 1978: 227). It is perhaps no great 
surprise then that staff seek similarity in their humanity, although the version of 
similarity is not as Hume describes, based on a contagion of pain and a shared 
capacity to suffer. Staff at the IS believe pain to be the uniting feature between people 
(Hopgood 2006:73), but for staff at AIUK people are being visually imagined as 
similar in quite different ways. In putting forward a version of similarity based on 
cultural and social tropes, staff can be seen as employing a very different notion of 
the shared basis of humanity. Rather than basing humanity on the 'sympathy' that I 
describe in the previous chapter as underpinning most accounts of shared humanity, 
staff here are attempting to subvert that norm by relying not on shared pain, but rather 
on a shared point of view. This distinction Moyn describes as follows: 
'Sympathy, of course, implies in Greek what compassion implies in Latin, 
suffering others' situations along with them. Empathy suggests a more 
internalised identification with such people's states, seeing things from 
their point of view or 'in their shoes'' (Moyn 2006:399). 
Staff therefore are undertaking a particular shift from the model of sympathy 
discussed in Chapter 3, that roots shared humanity in pain, towards a way of caring 
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for others that is not based on pain, but on similarity.
The idea of similarity between AIUK staff, and their perceived audience36 with Htein 
was paramount, but it was not the only way in which staff imagined that a human 
connection of empathy could be made. 'It's not just about making a person seem like 
us' Amy S told me after the meeting:
 'it's more about showing that the person is part of the world we all 
inhabit, it's not such a great divide in how you live your life- we all have 
family, but um, we're all part of this thing that maybe you could call 
globalisation but I don't mean it with a stigma I mean that the world is 
not such a big place really anymore and people share so much common 
ground now that they didn't, it's like, there's no excuse for some people 
being oppressed and others not'. (Amy S, in conversation January 2010)
What Amy S is talking about here is a form of cosmopolitanism (Hannerz 2007) and 
an assumption that people participate in a global society rather than simply a national 
one. However what AIUK is involved in through using images in this way is a 
deployment and active creation of the sort of global civil society that it uses to 
explain why people should care. Amnesty is therefore subscribing to and creating it 
simultaneously. As the following example will show, the desire to create this, and the 
projection of this kind of global human, is not without limiting factors, and the reality 
of the type of human amnesty put forward is the result of compromises at the level of 
production and 'friction' (Tsing 2006).
Compromises
During the meeting the need for similarity was tempered with a perceived need to 
'show it's still Burma'. Images to add to a second 'montage' poster were selected to 
show the occasional picture which showed Burma so that 'people will trust it'. 
Comments such as 'how about this one, it's how you imagine Burma' described the 
image below.
36 The audience is discussed in more depth in chapter 5
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Figure 4i: By James MacKay
Visually then, images must be at once familiar and at the same time contain an 
element of the exotic sufficient to make them appealing and 'real'. In the above image, 
compared to image 4a of Htein in his studio surrounded by artwork, we can see a 
more rural setting, with bamboo buildings and therefore figure 4i is more clearly 
marked as 'different'. Both images were used together with others in much of the 
campaign material to provide both difference and similarity. This is a difficult balance 
to strike and one that is familiar to anthropologists who share many of the same 
representational dilemmas. The balance between similarity and difference and the 
need to show difference without making it too exotic are certainly challenges which 
most anthropologists will have encountered. However unlike anthropologists, 
Amnesty staff are balancing the extra dimension of appeal. Staff in general see their 
job as educational, as telling the world about different situations and highlighting 
similarities to make us care, but there is also an element of conforming to what they 
see the audience as requiring to respond appropriately.
'people are freaked out when you give them something too unexpected, 
they expect the mud huts and starving babies and we can't completely 
avoid that or people think these guys Amnesty are campaigning for don't 
really need help as much as these other Oxfam guys, so we throw in a bit 
so that they know people are needing help, but we don't do a lot cause it's 
not fair' (Sam (Brand and Events), interview, August 2011)
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The idea of people needing help is very telling here. That some people need help is a 
crucial but undiscussed limit to the universal ideal of all people as equal which 
images seek to communicate, since the campaigning work which Amnesty does is 
based on people from 'here' acting on behalf of people 'there'.
The task of AIUK campaigns is not simply the academic delivery of information 
about a situation, it is also to push an agenda and for this sometimes the 'Amnesty 
style' of pictures must conform to a wider context of NGO advertising. For this 
reason the desired style must be adjusted, however in doing so reluctantly, staff yet 
again make clear the distinction they see between their organization and that of other 
organizations, and highlight the conflicting intentions and desires which go into the 
final product of human rights images. This sort of compromise as a result of what 
staff see as external pressures demonstrates that 'abstract claims about the globe can 
only be studied as they operate in the world' (Tsing 2006:6). In this case the desire for
global humanity, which staff wish to put forward and claim to believe in, cannot be 
realised. In practice universal ideals are tempered by local concerns, and in this case a 
concern that people will be 'freaked out'. This is an example of what Tsing calls the 
'sticky materiality of practical encounters' (ibid:1), and it acts as a limit to the spread 
of universals. It has been claimed that there is an inequality inherent in human rights 
which must be managed, that of the difference between the 'protector and protectee' 
(Ticktin 2011:261). For Amnesty this is clearly being worked out at some level 
through the need to maintain distance and limit the complete universalising of people. 
If we were all the same then there would be no need to protect others. Difference 
must therefore remain an element, and the vision of universal humanity must include 
this difference. The search for balance between similarity and difference is ongoing 
and is a feature not only of the production of campaigns, but also of the reception of 
campaigns by the public. It is discussed at length in Part Two of the thesis. 
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Being Human and Acting Humane
Figure 4j: Members of the public at Lovebox, taken by Simone. Used with permission.
The meeting having decided the type of person to be featured in the summer 
campaign the next step was to plan the 'Action' which would go with the pictures. 
Actions which form the basis of Amnesty's practice are a modern equivalent of the 
letter writing upon which AI was founded. They are tailored to each campaign but 
usually involve supporters signing a postcard, sending a text or email, or increasingly 
taking a photograph, all acting as a sort of petition to show numbers of supporters. 
Actions are usually taken on behalf of individuals, but often reference a law, 
government, or national situation. In this campaign a 'visual petition' was used which 
involved members of the public taking pictures of themselves to show solidarity (see 
images above). The images were to be presented to the meeting of The Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the hope being that 'seeing the supporters is 
harder to ignore than just seeing a signature' (Valerie, interview, April 2010). 
Pictures were collected by local groups and Amnesty staff and uploaded onto a shared 
Flickr account where they could be viewed on the internet by the public. As well as 
collecting members of the public's pictures, AIUK staff artist liaison Lindsay was 
brought in to collect visual signatures from celebrities to 'increase identification' 
between the public and pictures. Once again the underpinning assumption that seeing 
a picture of a person makes them more real than written or other testimony is behind 
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this action, this time in lobbying governments. Something about the way you look is 
thought to be engaging in a way that your name or signature is not. I hope to 
demonstrate that the way activists look is important to staff because of its role in 
creating imagined identification.
The visual petition was devised by Laura and involved people standing in poses 
similar to those of the people in the original pictures who were holding up their palms 
bearing the name of Zarganar. The idea behind having members of the public in 
similar poses was to 'show solidarity, and show we're in it together' (Laura, interview, 
June 2010). Another sort of visual gap-closing is at work here. While the image of 
Htein was chosen to be similar to the audience, now the audience are being made to 
appear similar to the pictures which AIUK have chosen, literally mimicking the 
images. This technique was used in other campaigns and was not unique to the 
Burma campaign. Masks and sign-holding have also been used by AIUK to create 
links between the public and the people being campaigned for. In the photograph 
below students were asked by staff to pose with the masks and signs for promotional 
material,  a further example of the mimicry at work in staff campaign design (see 
figure 4k below). The example below is more explicit in its intention to minimise 
differences between people. The signs say 'we are Rita', suggesting the idea of 
universal humanity. We are all potentially Rita. The merging of onlooker and person 
depicted in the image is a central feature of campaign practice, and will be discussed 
in greater depth in subsequent chapters where I look at 'corpothetics' (Pinney 
2004:193) and human rights practice. However for now I focus my attention on what 
this merging means to staff in their imagining of humanity.
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Figure 4k. Students pose for publicity shots at the 2009 'Festive Open House'. As part of the Greetings 
Card Campaign Christmas cards were sent to Rita Mahato in Nepal, a human rights defender working 
on woman's rights.
Not only are members of the public part of the same humanity, here they are looking 
the same. 'It helps with the idea that we're all the same when it comes down to it 
because it shows very clearly everyone together' (Hillary, in conversation, Dec 2010). 
The action focusses on similarity, but it also changes the focus from the individual to 
the collective. The original image of Htein is no longer unique, it is one of many 
pictures when viewed with the members of the public in figure 4j. In this way the 
public and the pictures are consciously brought together to form a wider 
representation, one which recognises them all as participating in a global humanity. 
The collage which was eventually made demonstrated this AIUK notion of 
individuals making up the wider whole. The clothes and settings for images were 
diverse, but the pose was the same, as were the names on people’s hands and the 
cause - to free Burmese prisoners of conscience. 
In Amnesty's visual practice, photographs of activists are a key aspect, and as I 
discuss in Chapter 6, images of people undertaking activist activities in countries 
with rights violations are held in high esteem by staff. James MacKay, whose images 
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were behind the Burma action, complained to me that he was uncomfortable with the 
way that making visual connections suggested that those 'braving real danger in 
Burma just seem the same as people who just got their photo taken at a music 
festival' (James MacKay, interview, April 2011). It could also be tempting to think of 
this as serving to elevate those taking action to the status of saviour, a common 
critique of media and NGO representation (Ignatieff 1999:288). Indeed images such 
as the one below which was sent to me after I had cancelled my subscription to 
Amnesty, with the aim of trying to win me back37, would suggest that visual practice 
is 'as much about imagining us as it is them' (ibid). However, having spoken to staff 
at length about these issues, I would suggest that while it is about imagining us and 
them, it is not to elevate those taking actions, but rather another aspect of imagining 
what universal humanity should look like through how it should act towards others.
Figure 4l. Leaflet sent to members who have cancelled their subscription to encourage rejoining 
Amnesty.
I spoke to Laura about the logic behind visual actions like this and she told me that:
 'there's an element of showing off I suppose, you do something good like 
Amnesty and you want to be seen to be doing it, and it helps us to show 
lots of people doing good and taking action ,it shows that it's as much a 
part of Amnesty as the prisoners, we depend on people joining in and, 
well, doing the right thing'. (Laura, interview June 2010)
37 I have been a member of Amnesty for over 10 years. I cancelled my membership at one point to 
see what the organisation's response to outgoing members was. I have since reinstated my 
membership. 
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People are therefore united both in how they look similar, and also in their actions 
being humane and caring through 'doing the right thing'. The recognition of this 
version of universal humanity has at  its core a prescriptive element which recognises 
humane actions as a crucial part of this imagined humanity. For staff, the notion that 
activists who undertake work on behalf of others are 'doing good' and 'doing the right 
thing' is a powerful motivator. Those I worked with regularly spoke about the 
importance of taking action to make the world better. Humane actions, for staff, are 
those that show care towards other humans, such as campaigning on their behalf. 
Laqueur suggests an increasing link between ideas of human being mobilised by the 
Euro-American narrative of humanism and ideas of the humane (Laqueur 2009:43). 
His notion of 'humanity as sentiment' is based on the joining of these two ideas to the 
extent that they are indistinguishable (Laqueur 1989). While he focusses on suffering 
and written narratives to produce this connection, the visual work of Amnesty images 
is producing the same assumption through similarity being coupled with a veneration 
of caring about others. A member of staff told me that she found activists 
'inspirational' because 'that's how it should be, not just looking out for yourself, that's 
the only way the world is going to change' (Lucy, interview, January 2010). Therefore 
visual similarity is not only about the removal of difference, it is also part of a 
process whereby staff imagine qualities that are desirable in this universal humanity. 
In Amnesty practice we see a belief that to recognise someone's humanity is to care 
for them, expressed by staff repeatedly to me in interviews and in day to day 
interactions. We also see a campaign strategy which seeks to increase this care by 
streamlining humanity into something similar, something which will elicit empathy 
and increase closeness. Through actions this is taken even further, as people are 
reminded visually of their shared humanity and their shared capacity to care 
simultaneously. The people in photos are like those being campaigned for and are 
taking an action of care. The illuminating symbolism of the candle has always been 
thought to illuminate rights abuses, but here we see a different illumination, that of 
supporters who are marked out visually and discursively as 'doing good'. Rather than 
naming and shaming abusers, the traditional fare of campaigns, those who are acting 
correctly are displayed and in displaying them AIUK express the assumption that to 
be human is intimately connected with being humane as represented by taking action.
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Talking To Pictures
Staff at Amnesty consider pictures of people to be an important tool for endowing 
humanity and closing the gap between their supporters and the people being 
campaigned for. They consciously select pictures which show humanity through 
similar attributes, and in doing so value certain ways of understanding what it means 
to be human, based on looking human and acting humanely. A particular relationship 
is assumed between the visual representation of a person and the response which an 
audience member is hoped to have - one of empathy. However this undertaking, 
which staff see as a means to engage less committed members of the public, is in fact 
taking place within the office between staff and images. In the case of Htein, his 
image was appropriated as culturally 'like us' in ways which would never become 
public, but were just as important. Staff therefore must undergo the same process of 
imagined identification that they plan into campaigns, at the micro level of the office. 
This suggests that while AIUK staff frequently spoke to me in meetings about all of 
us being human, in fact they must actively produce and learn 'empathy' through social 
practices. In the following section I discuss how Amnesty staff work to close the gap 
with distant others, and what this reveals about working in the field of global 
moralism. I also address the issue of gap-closing through pictures, and question what 
this means for the identification with distant others.
The image of Htein then, was selected for Summer campaigns, especially the 
Edinburgh Festival Fringe which is AIUK's largest Summer activity. This period of 
preparation was undertaken largely by the Design and Events teams which are based 
in the same corner of the open plan office. Despite other projects being worked on at 
the same time, much of the office conversation was focussed on Zarganar and Htein 
possibly because of the range of staff involved. Leaflets and posters were being 
designed, information being circulated to Amnesty representatives, and overlooking 
us all during this period was the first draft of the poster of Htein which was hanging 
in the centre of the wall 'for inspiration'. It is very common for Amnesty staff to put 
up inspirational pictures. The media team have a framed collection of hard hitting 
newspaper articles on their wall, individuals at risk have their individual pictures on a 
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map of the world, and most teams have at least one picture of Aung San Suu Kyi 
(ASSK). The Amnesty office is a very visual environment, and even though it is rare 
for people from outside the organization to visit staff areas, the advertising and 
branding of Amnesty is still very much in evidence for the purpose of 'fostering team 
spirit' (Mikey, in conversation, October 2010) and because Amnesty staff like it. 'The 
picture's a reminder of what we're doing, and it brightens up my desk' (Laura talking 
about her picture of ASSK). Most of the images chosen by staff are of  prisoners 
freed, or those yet to be freed, suggesting that the importance of pictures of people 
symbolises more than advertising, it is also about motivation. 
We had Htein's picture up on the wall, and while we were working on preparation for 
action it became common practice to nod or gesture towards the poster when talking 
about him. Staff started to talk about him as if he was there in the room, sometimes 
talking seriously about his campaign, sometimes jokingly asking what to get him for 
lunch. The leaflets once printed were discussed in a similar manner 'we'll put him in 
the Filmhouse, he'll like it there' (Mikey, May 2010) meaning that leaflets would be 
distributed there. This often quite jokey and affectionate way of referring to the 
images as people, and attributing personality to them 'he's an artist, he'll want to visit 
the galleries' (Jesse, May 2010) is interesting because it continues the ideas which 
emerged at the meeting to discuss the Burma image selection but seemingly this time 
unconsciously. Staff were not trying to appeal to a public here, but rather the same 
principles applied to the selection of visual materials are internalised into day to day 
interactions between staff. When I asked about it I was told 'didn't even realise I was 
doing it' (Amanda, June 2010) and 'it helps to remember that we're doing it for real 
people' (Jesse, May 2010). The same need to close the distance that Amnesty attribute 
to the public, is being undertaken in the office by staff. Like interaction between the 
public and the images of people, staff also are working on a version of Htein which is 
'like them'- a member of the team and an eater of Pret38 sandwiches. In doing so they 
have formed a relation with the picture which not only than demonstrates a belief in a 
shared humanity rooted in images, but also infuses the image with this same 
humanity.
38 Pret is an international sandwich shop chain. There is a branch on Curtain Road where staff often 
buy their lunch.
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Htein was not the only image that staff spoke to. Though not quite a daily occurrence, 
the practice of talking to pictures, especially those of prisoners or inspirational 
figures, was one that I noticed throughout my time at Amnesty. Sometimes this was 
as simple as members of design team talking to pictures on their screens and asking if 
they were 'happy' after a picture edit, as though it was a make-over given to a person. 
At other times it was more in depth, as with Htein, when staff would seem to form 
relationships with the pictures. One of the meeting rooms contained a display of 
photographs of trade union leaders. On several occasions I was in meetings where 
favourite trade union leaders' pictures would be asked for advice on a tricky problem 
or decision, in a joking manner. The conversations in these instances could go on for 
quite a long time. While it was only a few members of staff who I ever saw initiating 
these conversations, everyone in the room tended to join in offering their own version 
of what opinions the picture might have on a given subject. In the case of the trade 
union leaders, the pictures were not all of distant others. In fact a member of staff's 
picture hung in the collection with others from around the world. This was not only a 
practice of connecting with distant others, though in the instance of Htein it did that, 
it was also about inspiration.  
Initially I found the practice of talking to images in the office confusing because staff 
who were engaged and knowledgeable about human rights surely did not need to be 
reminded that they had an obligation to distant others. They knew about it, they 
planned campaigns around it and they used techniques to engage others with 
precision and self-awareness. It also seemed quite irrational to talk to a picture that 
quite clearly was not able to talk back. David Morgan, in his study of the use of 
religious images in American households, recounts a similar surprise at the use of 
images. In his study he suggests that in the American mid-West. Roman Catholics 
and Protestants seem to distinguish themselves by the former's use of religious 
images and the latter's aversion to it. In practice however religious images are used 
just as widely in the homes of Protestant Christians as in Catholics’ homes (Morgan 
1998:152). He suggests that there are significant social and performative elements to 
the experience of religion and religious images (ibid:24). For now I will deal largely 
with the social element, although the performative and physical elements emerge in 
Chapters 8 & 10. Morgan describes how people display Jesus in their living rooms to 
make him, as one respondent told him, 'part of our home and family' (ibid:165). They 
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act in certain ways towards these religious images that allow them to practice their 
faith on a domestic level, as a family (ibid). While Amnesty staff's attention to images 
takes place in an office, rather than the home, there are some similarities in what is 
being achieved through these practices. They too are undertaking a social interaction 
with images at an everyday level, but rather than doing so to support their faith in 
their God, staff undertake these conversations with images to support their faith in 
their work.
The practice made more sense in light of later interviews with members of staff when 
we were able to talk with more candour than in the office, when some of the 
difficulties of working in the field of human rights were made obvious. Many staff 
expressed to me a frustration with being 'stuck here' doing campaign work rather than 
being out in the field. Jonathan explained: ‘Working on cases of people you don't 
know and for results which are hard to measure is hard work, sometimes I just think I 
wish I was doing something more hands on’(Jonathan, interview, August 2011). He 
went on to describe a feeling of guilt:’ I'm in one of the richest places in the world 
asking people to care about someone in prison and I half expect people to be like hey 
man why should I listen to you, and why should they, it's not like I've been to half the 
places’ (Jonathan, interview, August 2011). During more intimate discussions staff 
confessed to doubts about the effect their work was having, and a need to have faith 
and believe in the work.  
Working for Amnesty is in many ways like working for any large corporation. Much 
of the work is the repetitive- events, advertising, raising money. Yet the staff's own 
image of the charity is very important to them as I discuss in Chapters 5 & 6. In some 
ways it is more important for staff to close this gap between themselves and the 
people on whose behalf they work, than it is to do the same with the public. Staff 
need to 'keep in mind why we're here' (Jesse, in conversation, June 2011) in an 
environment where the daily concerns of running a business threaten to overtake the 
concerns important to staff, that of human rights. The inspirational images are a self-
confessed part of this process of keeping wider concerns in the forefront. I would 
suggest that talking to these pictures serves a similar purpose. A member of staff 
described the process of chatting to trade unionists, when asked, as 'a bit of fun with 
colleagues', suggesting that the social element is important. I never saw anyone 
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talking to pictures when they were alone in meeting rooms or break- out areas, 
though it would have been clear to see since the open plan and glass-heavy office 
leave few places to hide.
In talking to images staff not only close the gap for themselves, they also perform 
that gap-closing and engage other members of staff in the process. In asking for 
Htein's opinion they forge a link with the person they are campaigning for, and in 
doing so go some way towards alleviating the anxiety which Jonathan discussed 
above about being geographically absent from much of their work. They help others 
in the room to do the same by making these connections conversationally, making it a 
social undertaking. This suggests not only an awareness of the need to construct and 
produce identification with and care for others, but also demonstrates that while staff 
believe themselves to be outside of the need for these projects, their unique role in 
working in global spheres but with a very local remit makes it even more important 
for them to close the gap.
While staff use images to forge connections with distant others, the medium of this 
connection is photographs and staff have little or no interaction with the people 
themselves. Staff therefore project these emotions and desires onto photographs. 
Mitchell encountered a similar relation between art historians and the pictures they 
study whereby despite knowing them to be paintings, the historians 'frequently talk 
and act as if the pictures had feeling, will, agency and desire' (Mitchell 2005:31). 
Staff at AIUK can be seen to do this too, but with the added caveat that while 
Mitchell's historians presumably know that a painting is a painting, to Amnesty staff 
the line between photographic pictures and people is much less clear: the 'stigmata of 
personhood' (ibid:30) makes staff interact differently to how they do with pictures of 
landscapes or inanimate objects, or with paintings and other non-photographic 
portraits. The fact that the people represented do exist makes this relationship even 
more charged with emotions. The outcome of this is that  images used by Amnesty 
can be seen to have agency in as much as they are producing action and emotion in 
the public through their place in networks of intention and signification generally. 
An expansion of the work that images do is needed to account for this human type of 
agency which staff project onto photographs of people  in their office interactions. 
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Here images are not simply active in social life: as Gell suggests, images can be  
displaced through human agency (Gell 1998:12), and they are treated as living 
breathing people. Mitchell's term 'animism' captures something of this process: he 
suggests that we see some pictures as possessing personhood, rather than just agency, 
through relations which people have with them (ibid:32). In this case Amnesty staff, 
through their production of a universal humanity, have expanded this category to 
include pictures. In the office, pictures are allowed to take part in office interactions 
and are active in constituting relationships and giving meaning to their international 
work through their role as animated and 'human'.  
This suggests that in thinking about visual narratives which feature photographs of 
people we must consider the special status that photographs of people have. Rather 
than seeing them as simply visual representations, or conflating them with those they 
represent, pictures of people must be understood as something else. They are used in 
social ways, which give their narratives particular potency, through their 'animism'. 
When planning this Burma campaign, Amnesty staff imagined that people would 
relate  to and empathise with distant others through images by imaginatively 
identifying with their similarity exemplified in images containing visually familiar 
cues. They had little thought of their own experiences of relating to the images used. 
However it transpired that staff too undertook imaginative relations with the 
photographs on this campaign and other pictures around the workplace. Rather than 
simply having empathy as staff imagined, that is, recognising universal humanity by 
seeing the world from the point of view of another, staff actually spoke to the 
photographs, creating a social space for bringing their collective imagined version of 
that person into being through the images. Therefore empathy as staff imagine it 
when planning campaigns does not account for the social nature of interacting with 
pictures, and relating to distant others, that takes place in their own practice.
It is important to emphasise the imagined nature of this version. Staff may have felt 
closer to Htein by talking to him, but if anything they were closer to the photograph. 
Htein remained in Burma and not contactable, and it remains very much an imagined 
identification. Throughout the process of campaign design I have shown how staff 
relationships with images, and the way in which these images are used serves to blur 
the distinction between people and pictures of people. Staff plan campaigns as if 
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there is no gap between the representation and the represented, and the result is that 
the gap between people and images closes in their approaches to imaginatively 
identifying. The closeness that staff hope to achieve between the public and distant 
others is also taking place between people and pictures. This blurring is present in the 
way that staff talk about pictures when selecting them in terms of the image rather 
than the person behind it, and it is present in the actions which demand intimacy with 
the image.However it is most clearly present in the social office practices whereby 
staff talk to and about images as if the latter were conscious. This way of relating to 
images may not be unique to Amnesty staff because there are examples throughout 
visual ethnographies of a blurring between people and pictures (see Pinney 2004; 
Morgan 1998; Mitchell 2005). However to put it down to something innate to images 
of people is to devalue its social significance in this particular workplace, where 
maintaining an experience of globalism in the midst of local practices is clearly 
important to staff. In later chapters, the types of experiences which members of local 
groups and the public have with images are explored and suggest that while the same 
blurring between people and images occurs in these different settings, and appears to 
be a feature of how people imaginatively identify with others through images, it takes 
different forms and to different ends (see Part II of the thesis). 
Conclusion
Throughout this campaign, staff were working on the assumption that there is a need 
to forge a link with distant others in order to provoke action from the public. Rather 
than using more obvious methods of suffering and guilt, staff at Amnesty describe an 
'amnesty style' which I have shown can be traced back to Amnesty's first appeals, 
rooted in individuals and the use of portrait-like photography. The belief that showing 
a person's picture is a key aspect of communicating their humanness to the public is 
unquestioned and forms an important aspect of campaign design, as the Burma 
summer campaign shows. While it is true that to be able to communicate, humanness 
staff believe a picture is needed, it is not simply physical characteristics that make up 
this humanity. Staff on this project selected images which conveyed cultural 
characteristics recognisable to their audience and by extension to themselves. In this 
way, Amnesty imagery subverts expectations of physical determinism normally 
associated with photographs of people and represent a notable shift away from 
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grounding humanity in shared pain, discussed in the previous chapter, towards what 
they call empathy. However in doing so, staff run the risk of reducing complex stories 
and biographies to a set of visual and cultural tropes, thus defining humanness in 
these limited terms. The actions which were used in this campaign expand the 
concept of humanity somewhat. Though remaining focussed on visual similarity 
between supporters and prisoners, staff also introduce, through the use of images of 
activism, a prescriptive element to humanity. Humanity, in this version, is linked 
through a shared capacity to care for one another.
Despite this quite detailed approach to planning campaigns and related actions to 
produce appropriate empathy, in practice staff related with people in the pictures 
through just that, their status as pictures. In this way staff constructed the personality 
of the person depicted based not just on how the image looks, as staff planned, but 
also through social interactions around the physical image, particularly by talking to 
the picture. This suggests that the process of empathy that staff hope to achieve 
through pictures is in fact deeply shaped by the material fact of the image itself and 
the social practices that surround it, an issue that is picked up in more detail in 
Chapter 9 where performances of images are discussed. This is relevant not only for 
understanding how images work on people, but also suggests that the concept of 
empathy needs to be opened up to account for the role of the social in producing 
experiences of others. Throughout the remainder of this thesis these ideas are 
explored and teased out in more detail in order to produce a clearer account not only 
of how images work in human rights campaigns to support and create types of 
empathy, but also to reveal how imagined identification can lead to the recognition of 
the rights of others. The next chapter picks up these ideas of imagined identification 
to describe the ways in which 'the public' who the campaigns are intended for are 
imagined and produced by staff. While staff pick people who are 'like us' to feature in 
campaigns, they have a complex notion of what that 'us' entails. Therefore as well as 
imaginatively identifying with distant others, staff undertake other imaginative leaps 
into the lives of others in terms of their audience, and try to guess how they will 
respond to the individuals selected for campaigns. 
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Chapter 5: Imagining Audience
From: Amanda.willis@amnesty.org.uk
To: amy.johnstone@amnesty.org.uk
10/2/10
Subject: International Women's Day Exhibition
Hi Amy,
Can you begin to put together a list of images we can use for the exhibition of women in the human rights field we 
discussed earlier. Have a look through our pictures and try to pick pictures of women people will know and find 
inspiring.
Thanks,
Al x
From: amy.johnstone@amnesty.org.uk
To:  Amanda.willis@amnesty.org.uk
Subject: Re: International Women's Day Exhibition
Hi ----
Yes that's fine. I'm not sure what you mean by 'women people will know' though. Is it just the people coming here 
who need to know them, cause I doubt that will be a problem. They know more than me! Shall I try Margaret for a 
list of pics?
A x
From: Amanda.willis@amnesty.org.uk
To: amy.johnstone@amnesty.org.uk
Subject: International Women's Day Exhibition
The people coming in here (staff, other organizations using the auditorium), but try to imagine what the public 
will recognise as well – the caring not committed. Sometimes regional offices and local groups like to show these 
exhibitions- means we get our money's worth :) Try Margaret, and try Lyn as well for the placard pictures- think 
we have some already printed. Let me see the long list when you have it and we can talk about it.
Al x
The above emails are part of a chain of correspondence used with permission.
The above email was from my manager about an exhibition for International 
Women's Day (IWD), the first exhibition that I had led on, and I was keen to make a 
good impression and hit the right tone for the images that I chose. For this reason, 
and also because of my position as a researcher, I was keen to pin point exactly what 
'the public' mentioned above entailed. I had heard the term 'caring not committed' 
several times but was unsure what it meant and where it came from. Knowing that 
Amnesty UK has on-going market research (a fact that is reasonably well known in 
the NGO circles) I expected there to be documents and sophisticated strategies for 
identifying and reaching the appropriate 'public' for my display. Rather what I found 
was that despite these documents existing, I was advised against using them. As 
Amanda put it, 'all that stuff is fine, but it's so much to get through- it's easier if we 
just have a chat about the sort of people we want to come and what they respond to' 
(Amanda, February 2010). It is this institutionally-held knowledge, which rests with 
individuals rather than on documents, that Amnesty relied on to explain and imagine 
audiences for their work. This works against and with market research. By adding to 
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each other and sometimes contradicting one and other, policy and practice at AIUK 
have a confusing relationship. It culminates in particular assumptions and practices 
around imagining audiences that impact on all elements of campaign design. 
Having discussed in the previous chapter an approach to humanity that seeks to 
ground it in 'empathy' based on cultural and social similarity, this chapter fleshes out 
the 'us' who are mobilised in 'People Like Us'. Staff work with specific ideas of who 
their desired audience is, and in a sense undertake the same imaginative process to 
'get inside the head’ of the audience they target as they hope to mobilise action from 
that audience. This chapter deals specifically with the interplay between top down 
ideas of 'new audiences', and staff's own ideas about audience, which play out 
through ingrained practices and dialogues between staff. I use the example of the 
International Women's Day exhibition to suggest that alongside a genuine move 
towards making content 'accessible' and 'relate-able' to non-traditional Amnesty 
audiences there is still a practice of planning campaigns around audiences who are 
'people like us'. Through looking at the limits to the AIUK’s imagination of 
audiences, I show that staff limit potential audiences through assumptions about who 
is interested in 'doing good', and therefore who can participate in the moral economy 
of Human Rights Campaigning. 
The chapter is in four sections. It begins by describing a conflict between 'real' 
researched audiences and the one discussed in meetings. It then goes on to show a 
further form of audience that exist in embedded institutional practices. The chapter 
reflects on the limitations which this places on the public who can potentially engage 
with campaigns. Section three deals with some of the reasons for this conflict 
between audience policy and practice, and specifically how AIUK staff conceive of 
'doing good', and places Amnesty's approach in a wider context of changes in how 
charities are expected to operate. Finally I reflect on some of the repercussions of 
imagining audiences, and specifically how this functions in AIUK's practice to block 
potential engagement and limit those who can participate.
Imagining New Audiences
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Audience is notoriously difficult to plan for and to define, however in everything we 
do we work with an audience in mind. Whether it is me writing field notes for no 
audience other than myself, or someone planning a large scale concert with press, 
celebrities, and ticket holders in attendance, imagining an audience is impossible to 
get away from. Looking at what these audiences that we hold in mind are can give us 
valuable insight into the aims and approaches behind any production. In human rights 
organizations this is also the case. Sam Gregory of Witness39 even went as far as to 
suggest that human rights campaigns are '...created for audiences as much as about 
topic' (Gregory 2006:198). This rather extreme suggestion did indeed feel like the 
reality for my exhibition on Women Human Rights Defenders. Working at AIUK I 
had access to images of hundreds of women human rights defenders through the 
ADAM database- the IS's collection of images from all sections- and also from 
AIUK's own collection of people who have been photographed for the bi-monthly 
Amnesty Magazine. To limit this seemingly endless list, the criterion used was 
mainly one of audience. Since the images themselves had been used previously and 
had therefore passed the other criteria of aesthetics and 'newsworthy' content, we 
were thinking largely about how they would be received. It is therefore a useful 
example of an event where audience became one of the key issues in its creation. 
Due to pre-empting who the audience were, and trying to guess what they would 
relate to, it was hard to even put together a list of 20 women (the minimum required 
to fill the space) from the vast collection. This was because of considerations about 
whether audiences would recognise and empathise with people 'so unknown in the 
mainstream' (Lindsay, February 2010). At the same time however, I was being 
encouraged not to lose the legitimacy of the campaign, or pander to mass appeal over 
substance, with my choices of images. These two positions form the basis of AIUK's 
imagined audience. Staff are in the difficult position of having to appeal more widely 
and therefore cater to different knowledge levels from those that they had worked 
with in the past, while at the same time maintaining the level of rights authority for 
which the organisation is known (Hopgood 2006:73). As the following account will 
highlight, it has not happened completely harmoniously.
On the 4th February 2009 I presented the following list to a project group made up of 
39 Witness are a major human rights advocacy organization www.witness.com
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Amanda (HRAC Events), Sally B-T(Events Manager), Lindsay (Talent Liaison), 
Margaret (Head of Design), Laura  (Events), and Mary (Campaigns). The list 
included these names:
Aung San Suu Kyi
Gil Won Ok & Ellen van der Ploeg
Jenni Williams (WOZA)
Martina Davis-Correia (Troy Davis' sister)
Jung Chang
Dina Meza (Journalist)
Nawal El Saadawi
Sunny Jacobs (death row survivor)
Yakin Erturk (UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women)
Wai Hnin Pwint Thon (Daughter of Mya Aye)
Rebiya Kadeer (Business Woman, former POC)
Monika Borgmann (film maker)
Anna Politkovskaya (journalist)
The list was my first attempt to put together visuals for the exhibition. The group of 
people at the meeting represented a rather uneven cross section of the various 
departments, but was fairly representative of the range of departments usually 
involved with public campaign events. The campaigns team in this case requested the 
assistance of the events team to come up with a 'public encounter strategy' (i.e. an 
event) to support a campaign objective, and the creatives from the design team were 
there to manage the look of materials and events. In this case the campaign context 
was very well known to the project group members, being an annual celebration of 
women's rights held over the week of International Women's Day (8th March  
2010).The group had worked together on previous years’ IWD campaign events. 
IWD is therefore one of what Amnesty call their 'calender days'- days that they 
celebrate every year such as anniversaries (ASSK's birthday, the opening of 
Guantanamo Bay Detention Centre) and UN observed days such as Human Rights 
Day (10th  December). IWD is, as the name suggests, observed internationally and 
takes many forms but is usually associated with 'women's freedoms and rights' (IWD 
website 9/3/12), and this is the role it plays in AIUK. It is seen as a chance to 
celebrate women rights defenders, and a vessel to communicate some of Amnesty's 
own gender-related campaign objectives. In this case leaflets about 'Maternal 
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Mortality', a cross-organizational call for more attention to the high death rate during 
childbirth in many countries, would be circulated at the events. This year, as the 
initial email above suggests, there was an internal focus on accessing a wider public. 
IWD was seen as a good opportunity for this because of the 'uncontroversial and 
accessible' (Mary, in conversation, February 2010) nature of women's rights to a 
British public. However as the meeting got underway it became apparent that while 
the idea behind IWD events may seem uncontroversial, the introduction of 'new 
audiences' was anything but that for Amnesty staff. The transition between what was 
done in previous years and what was being attempted this year was not a smooth one, 
but was one which is very revealing about how AIUK staff see the organisation and 
its audience. 
The push towards wider audiences was described to me as happening 'gradually then 
suddenly' (Amanda, interview, March 2010). By this I understand her to mean that 
while the research on widening audiences had been going on for years (8 years, as I 
later learned) and had been a topic of conversation during that period, it was only 
since the internal circulation of the results of this research that it had actively entered 
the practices and policies of Amnesty's work. The results took the form of an 
Audience Policy Document produced by Adam Hackman's Brand Team and 
circulated by upper management through meetings, online, and in presentations. It 
came with the clear objective for 2009 that staff would be expected to build on these 
findings and access new audiences. The Policy Document was the result of a massive 
project undertaken by the Brand team with the help of external market research 
companies 2CV and  SHAW over 8 years. Unfortunately the document and the full 
findings of the project cannot be reproduced in full because of issues of 
confidentiality. I have been given permission to make reference to it and to reproduce 
material in summary. The work undertaken on the project involved building a 
database of AIUK's membership through interviews over the phone, and focus 
groups. This was to create a profile of members. This was then compared with 
potential members, who were selected through random sampling techniques, and 
interviewed to create a profile of potential audiences. The focus was on knowledge 
and motivations, and the aim was to identify people who might be interested in 
Amnesty, but were not yet members. It was also to devise techniques to access these 
audiences based on their profiles. Specifically the document identified a category of 
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potential members it called 'caring not committed' (CNC). These were described as 
educated, professional, 18-30 years old who had relatively little interest in politics 
and little knowledge of Amnesty, but were financially stable enough, and 'caring' 
enough to be likely to sign up for Amnesty if more informed about it. Despite this 
specific demographic profile in the research, this category came to be used by many 
staff in a different way, to mean the 'new audience' generally which, as opposed to the 
old audience, meant everybody not already involved with Amnesty. I however, being 
new and an outsider took the documents as writ and used them as a guide when 
producing the list above. I did this because I was keen to 'get it right', but also 
because the audience research and resulting Audience Policy were very much in the 
current vernacular of AIUK when I began work there in late 2009, and indeed still 
were when I left in 2011. I therefore focussed my research on women who had made 
significant contributions to human rights, and with whom we had had some contact  
in the past and so were likely to have their images on file already.
AIUK had no central filing system at the time of my research, so finding images 
involved searching databases created by various teams for various reasons. These 
reasons included events, publicity, and where I found most of my images- magazine 
files. I was also given temporary access to the highly organized ADAM database of 
images run by the IS which is a collection of images from all the sections organized 
by country and campaign headings for use by Amnesty staff for their publications. 
These images together make up a rather disorganized canon which perhaps quite 
accurately reflects some of the differences within the organization. The ADAM 
images, though generally professionally-taken images were very journalistic and in 
the end through collaboration with my manager, it was decided that they just 'didn't 
fit' with AIUK's much more portrait style photographs. The images which AIUK staff 
routinely use are taken either by regularly-used contracted freelance photographers, 
or by members of staff themselves. Therefore they tend to be quite similar in style, 
which made it easier to find images that 'matched' well enough to be used in an 
exhibition. Of course the use of AIUK's own images limited the selections to only 
those woman human rights defenders (WHRDs) with whom Amnesty were directly 
involved a lack of resources for funding photography meant that there was an inbuilt 
contradiction to the project because the aim of reaching new audiences had to be met 
using materials which were produced for different audiences and for different 
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objectives. This contradiction, or limiting factor, which I discuss in more depth at a 
later point in this chapter, is one of the key ways that the audience is limited in its 
potential to be as diverse as staff hope. The images on file had all been vetted and 
decided as suitable for use by others in the organization, and therefore met the criteria 
put forward in Amnesty's Photo Policy which will be discussed in Chapter 6. For the 
purposes of my display I was to be selecting largely on the category of audience, with 
of course consideration of the topic, that of women human rights defenders. The 
produced list was a product of the limited material available, meaning that most of 
AIUK's images were of serious, but relatively unknown WHRDs and of my own 
consultation with the audience policy which suggested that the caring not committed 
(CNC) would have a university level of education and a basic knowledge of world 
affairs and would therefore be able to interpret to some degree what the notable 
activities of the people depicted meant in their global and local contexts. 
Figure 5a: Agendas were printed for each attendee at the meeting. My agendas tended to have few 
notes on them detailing different individuals' responsibilities for tasks. This level of note taken was 
high greater than usual, and reflect the level of debate in the meeting.
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The first meeting of the project group took place in F2, one of the glass-sided 
meeting rooms in the HRAC. As mentioned, the group was one largely made up of 
staff from the events team with input from other teams, and I therefore knew 
everyone there beforehand, a rare thing for me only three months into my time at 
Amnesty. I entered the meeting fairly confident that the list produced fitted in with 
the objectives of the IWD events, the new audiences especially. However it was not 
long into the meeting before my notes looked like figure 5a. The journey to this 
scrawled and scored paper was an enlightening one in revealing how exactly AIUK 
imagines and relates to its audience. The list included human rights defenders from 
all over the world, such as Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK). She seemed a perfect choice 
to me, someone that the educated public would recognise due to regular news articles 
during the previous year, and who was heavy weight enough make the exhibition still 
appealing to the core membership. However the list that I devised was not the list 
which staff felt the ‘caring not committed’ would respond to, and this came down to a 
fundamentally different idea of the audience being catered for. On my first list, half 
of the names were rejected as ‘too unknown’. Sally opened by suggesting that: 'if 
people don't regularly follow news they won't know who they are' (Sally, February 
2010). Staff were positive about the list though, and generally liked the names on it, 
but just were unconvinced that they would be suitable for the audience. It was hardly 
surprising that they would like the names, considering that they were all Amnesty 
supporters, and people with whom the organisation had contact. However it was more 
surprising that the audience imagined was seen as so different in tastes to the staff:  
'yeah but would your average Joe working in Tesco really care about a woman he's 
never heard of in Africa' (Lindsay, February 2010). The rest of the room seemed to be 
in agreement with these statements, which as far as I could tell were based on some 
secret version of audience to which I was not privy. They certainly did not meet my 
expectations from the Audience Policy, which called not for your 'average Joe', but 
for university-educated young professionals, with no particular background in rights, 
but a knowledge of world affairs, in other words a fairly specific category, compared 
to the 'average Joe'. 
As the meeting progressed, and the version of audience discussed was increasingly 
forming in a very general and vague way, people nodded and suggestions were made:
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'I'm trying to think about myself before I got involved with Amnesty and what I would 
be interested in... probably put some of the big names in- Anita Roddick, Annie 
Lennox' (Lindsay, February 2010). The audience being put forward was not the one 
from which I took my cue on the report, but rather the staff interpretation of what the 
basic term 'caring not committed' might mean, namely uninformed and uninterested 
in unknown human rights defenders. The belief that people would not be interested in 
people like Jenni Williams, a tireless campaigner for rights in Zimbabwe, suggested 
that staff imagined their audience to be 'not committed' in a very full sense. The 
choices made suggested that the person whom staff imagined attending would have 
no knowledge about international affairs at all, and no interest in encountering new 
information. This was clearly not the Audience Policy description, yet staff were 
totally in agreement with each other. It was interesting to me that the team generally 
agreed on the audience, yet I could not see where this version was coming from.
Staff decided which people were appropriate human rights defenders based on what 
they thought was most appropriate to an imagined audience's frame of reference, in 
order to increase potential empathy, yet there was also reluctance: 'I suppose we'd 
better cut out the first woman in trade unions- but I really hate to' (Amanda, February 
2010). Staff acknowledged that there was an audience to consider, and that this 
audience had different points of reference to themselves, but they were not keen on 
having to change the content to take that into account, as one staffer said to me about 
changing her campaign content:
I know we have to think about what the public will like as well, at the end 
of the day we need them to think this is important- these are people I care 
about or respect or whatever, but I hate when we don't tell the full story 
just because other people don't want to know. (Laura, in conversation, 
February 2010)
Staff therefore equated new audiences with a lessening of campaign content. They 
had created an audience that they thought 'didn't want to know', and reluctantly made 
adjustments to their content accordingly. However I as I have tried to suggest, this 
'dumbing down' as one staff member called it, was not what was being asked for.  
As the meeting went on I started to understand where these opinions were coming 
from that seemed at odds with the official policy, and at odds with the 'usual 
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audience' for Amnesty. They were only very slightly a response to previous events. 
Mention was made during the meeting of previously used celebrities and images, and 
how people reacted to them in terms of atmosphere on the day, and of feedback 
which people gave online through the Supported Care Team, and discussions of 
previous international women's days, and other related events. But this was less 
important because the move towards new audiences was just that: new. Comments 
like Sally's highlight that the audience was considered new: 
Last year we had Wei Hnin (daughter of a prisoner of conscience) speak 
at the conference and she was great, people really listened to her. But that 
was a different sort of thing, it was for members not for the general 
public. (Sally, February 2010)
To Sally it was not possible to use the same people as had been worked with 
previously because this was the general public, whereas previously it had been 
members. Therefore staff were unable to rely on their previous tactics because they 
considered this audience such as new thing that it needed a new approach. As I 
discuss later in this chapter, few staff had actually read the audience policy 
documents. Instead, information had filtered along the grapevine, meaning that words 
like 'new' had been passed along, but their exact meaning in this context was not. 
Staff had created, in their attempt to make things new, a version of audience that was 
not just a little new to Amnesty, but also was new to everything surrounding 
Amnesty's work. Audience was largely based on a shared assumption of what staff 
thought the 'new audience' to be, different to official documents and the 'target 
audience' we had put down, it now seemed nominally, on the project proposal. The 
imagined audience was one which due to its lack of previous involvement with 
Amnesty was thought to have no knowledge about campaigns or world events. For 
example there was an assumption that non-members who did not know about WOZA 
(Women of Zimbabwe Arise) would not want to see a picture of the WOZA's leader. 
AIUK's relationship with audience is complex, with on the one hand a desire to reach 
out and involve new audiences, a desire which is pushed by Audience Policy 
mandates, while on the other hand a lack of understanding and resistance of these 
policies among staff, meaning that policies are not always read. This leads to a 
confused image of the audience they are in fact aiming at and to their belief that they 
are being asked to dumb down campaigns to the imagined disengaged, which 
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understandably causes resentment. What we are left with is a composite audience 
based vaguely on 'real' data of research and experience, but tempered and shaped by 
staff to form an imagined audience. It is this imagined audience that shapes the 
eventual attendees and viewers. 
Audience is a concern at every level of campaign planning both overtly and in subtle 
ways. Every campaign action has to be approved by management through the 
application of a PIP (project implementation plan) and on this form staff are asked to 
define their target audience, the number of people targeted, and how they are 
expected to take action on behalf of Amnesty. I was involved in writing several PIPs 
during my time at AIUK and in general was advised to 'just put the sort of people 
who will come' and 'put caring not committed, they love that'. Some AIUK staff 
therefore see their completion of the form as an afterthought. Audience is to some 
extent considered by events staff to be built into the sort of event, rather than the 
reason for having the event, and as such is added in to the form casually after the 
event has been planned. However this is not exactly how all staff see it. When talking 
about campaigns people regularly anticipate responses such as those that I 
demonstrated with the IWD exhibition. This was also the case for other events such 
as music festivals chosen to reach particular kinds of people and where the actions 
chosen are selected with these people in mind. It is more an aversion to perceived 
corporatisation implied by standardised PIPs and audience categories that makes staff 
avoid using and accessing them, and makes them appear as an afterthought. The use 
of an audience therefore happens outside of that formal process, through discussions 
in meetings like the one above, and through institutional practices which have at their 
heart an idea about the sort of people AIUK appeals to and should be engaging with. 
The imagined audience that results is a very different and confused one. The 
following section looks at the way in which staff ignore their own imagined audience 
in practice, to illuminate what the 'old audience' looked like.
Institutional Audiences
The audience that Amnesty imagines above- one which will not have any background 
knowledge on rights, is present in planning meetings. It influences content, but only 
137
in so far as staff are willing to acknowledge that this audience, the imagined 
disengaged, might be viewing completed campaigns. However after the content 
production the planned audience was less visible and more problematic. There we see 
the input of what I would loosely call the 'institutional audience', institutional in that 
it is a feature not of the imagination, but of a practice which shows bias towards 
certain publics. The IWD exhibition was put up in the hall of the HRAC in 
Shoreditch. It was up during the IWD events and was advertised in the Amnesty 
Magazine (received only by members), the 'What's on at Amnesty' Mail-out 
(subscriber based), and the Amnesty Website. This is standard practice for advertising 
most HRAC events. The decision to publicise in these areas was not taken in a 
meeting but by the project lead, and no one mentioned anything further. What was 
interesting to me was that despite us having put considerable effort into pitching our 
images to a wide audience, little or no effort was put into reaching out to this 
audience through channels different from those used for previous audiences. In fact, 
as I discuss later in this chapter, the people viewing the exhibition had very little 
resemblance to the audience discussed in the planning meeting. Was the discussion in 
meetings merely lip service? Could I have used my initial list rather than changing it 
again and again? I do not think so. It is more the case that Amnesty advertised in 
familiar avenues because that is what has been done before. It is 'the way we've 
always done it'. Even though the idea of new audiences had permeated into the 
vernacular and some stages of planning, it had not yet entered the practice at every 
level. 
At some levels Amnesty still practise campaign design with an underlying 
assumption that their audience will be people very much like themselves- people who 
get the magazine, check the website, and enjoy certain pastimes, as their old 
imagined audience was. The very decision to have a photographic exhibition assumes 
a certain level of interest in photography and/or human rights. The images used came 
from a canon of Amnesty's own images which were created for the 'old audience', the 
one with which staff are familiar. The target audience has changed but the habits and 
tools of campaigning have not. At a fundamental level, Amnesty staff still act with 
assumptions about what makes an enjoyable event, and what methods we can use to 
reach out. Obviously this varies among staff, and different staff members have 
nuanced ideas of audience. Younger members might be more inclined to use the 
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internet, whilst certain teams are more comfortable with new social media 
technologies. However what I am talking about is institutionalised through its 
invisibility to Amnesty staff, through the networks of advertising, and through the 
choice of events. 
This invisible assumption of audience interest based on staff’s own interest is a 
crucial part of the traditional Amnesty practice of catering to their own fan base- 
'preaching to the choir' (Hillary, in conversation, June 2010), as one staff member 
told me, was fundamentally the problem identified in the audience research. I spoke 
to many members of staff about what they had done before the introduction of the 
Audience Policy in 2009, and the answers were surprisingly similar. Staff had used 
themselves as a template for audience, and planned campaigns around their interests. 
Well it used to be all about getting a real commitment out of our 
members, rather than joining up loads of new people. Then we didn't have 
to think that much about what they would like, we just knew, it was the 
same things anyone here would like. (Dan, April 2010)
The decisions made about where to circulate advertisement for the exhibition clearly 
reflects this approach. Staff themselves generally read the Amnesty magazine, check 
the Amnesty What’s On, and read the publications used to promote an exhibition. 
This approach to circulating information is reflective of the approach mentioned in 
Dan's quote above, that of inspiring and retaining committed members rather than 
going for mass appeal. In practice, therefore, staff work to this old audience that is in 
fact themselves.  
According to the internal Audience Policy Document, audiences regarded Amnesty as 
alienating through being part of an intellectual elite. For example its relationships 
with certain key newspapers are deeply ingrained. At one point during my time there, 
an entry came in from the UK based Daily Mail newspaper for the media awards, and 
a staff member came up to check with me that I'd logged it correctly because 
apparently the idea of the Daily Mail being involved with Human Rights was so 
unthinkable. Expectations about the sort of people who would be involved in 'do 
gooder' activities such as charity are still believed to be people with a similar 
background to staff. The table below is a very crude account of the demographic of 
Amnesty members, although it accurately reflects many of the decisions made about 
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campaign mode and circulation at the practical level. The interests and preferred 
newspapers are still very much part of the strategy for planning and distributing 
materials and events. Amnesty membership data defines the demographic thus:
Education Nearly half of Amnesty members have been educated to University/Higher Degree 
level 49% University/Higher Degree 
33% Postgraduates16% Secondary/Sixth Form 2% Elementary/Primary
Preferred Newspapers / Periodicals Nearly half of Amnesty members read  
49% The Guardian 34% The Observer 
31% The Independent 26% Radio Times
Interests 
75% Reading 41% Cycling / running / swimming / walking 46% Overseas Travel 73% Classical 
Music 53% Cinema 30% Environmental concerns 66% Gardening
Figure 5b: Statistics except from Amnesty Market Research 2009, used with permission
Despite the focus on other audiences identified, AIUK still create campaigns towards 
their own member base through ingrained practice. This member base is shown above 
statistically, but known to AIUK staff instinctively through years of experience. It is 
there in the reluctance to change images to fit other audiences, it is there in the 
vagueness of the new audience being described as the 'caring not committed' which 
though defined on paper, is little understood in practice. The newspaper that AIUK 
works closely with is the Guardian, and the choice of events fit in with those 
experienced by university education lectures and exhibitions. In the case of my 
exhibition the content was moderated, but AIUK has not fully accepted the need for 
changing everything, because practices are so institutionalised. What occurs is a  
mixture of imagined audiences: the mysterious 'everyman' who AIUK does not really 
know how to imagine, and the familiar Amnesty member audience. The result is an 
unhappy union and an audience with severe limitations in its imagining. There is to 
some degree an underlying class element to these distinctions which cannot be 
ignored. However to call it elitism would be an unfair account of how staff operate. 
Social distinctions that operate in the lives of staff outside Amnesty, like their choice 
of leisure activities or newspaper, mean that they have a relatively closed sphere of 
experience, and so are left to imagine audiences with little personal experiences to 
back them up. This is discussed later in this chapter where I speculate on the reasons 
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for staff assuming that new audiences are completely disengaged ones.
I witnessed the result of this unhappy union between imagined and institutional 
audiences through the exhibition I had worked on. Being anxious to see how it was 
received, I spent a considerable amount of time in the exhibition space talking to 
people and watching people. The reality was that the people who viewed it most 
were staff. Reception staff keep a count of people in and out of the space and gave 
me the visitor numbers, which revealed that at least 90% of people visiting were 
staff. Many members of staff sought me out to say how much they liked it, but also to 
ask why  I had not used their particular favourite WHRDs. Often their suggestions 
were the very ones that I had removed from my original list. One member of staff 
told me: I love the idea, but did you think about Yakin Erturk, she'd be great in 
something like this, sometimes it's worth digging a little deeper, there are some great 
women out there (Eulette, in conversation, March 2010). Perhaps that proves that the 
original list was essentially an Amnesty List, but the lack of any other significant 
audiences for the exhibition suggests this might have been the right approach. I asked 
the visitors (the few that there were) if they were Amnesty members, and all replied 
they were. This was typical of the response I got: 
Oh yes I always come to the Amnesty's events they're always so 
interesting, and while I'm here I can buy something from the shop, but I 
do wish you didn't use these famous radio and TV people- they aren't 
really helping human rights. 
This visitor’s comment suggests that despite all of our work to make the exhibition 
appealing more generally, the failure to make sure that those people heard about it 
resulted in the exhibition being attended mainly by existing fans of Amnesty's work, 
many of whom did not actually like the changes we had made to the type of people 
featured.
Of course the exhibition was to be used by other regional offices and so perhaps it is 
unfair to consider it only in this context, but the regional offices are still Amnesty 
offices, with shared staff and practices. It was clear to me however that people were 
coming to the exhibition because they had heard about the event through AIUK's 
traditional channels and were not responsive in the way staff hoped they would be to 
the recognisability of the people chosen. In fact the very aspect they had hoped would
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be inclusive was the very thing that the real flesh and blood audience found 
alienating. This shows that there may be two ways in which the process of imagining 
audience limits its potential. The removal of  unknown images was limiting to the 
real audience, hampering enjoyment and potential for greater engagement, and the 
institutional practices embedded within the organization limited the potential 
audience to only people most likely to have the above response. This was hidden 
from staff because the system for measuring effectiveness is largely limited to 
counting the number of people taking part in a campaign action or attending an event. 
Exhibitions are the exception to the collecting of numbers, because they are in a 
public place and it cannot be determined where attendance at other events in the foyer 
overlap with exhibitions, and because their impact is also imagined to be on people 
using the building for meetings and external events. Therefore my own attention to 
the attendance was much greater than that of other staff, and allowed me to observe 
the limited attendance and demographic of visitors.
Therefore by imagining audiences, both the conscious and practice based ones, the 
potential for that audience is limited. In creating a template of what a person will 
respond to and catering to it you limit appeal elsewhere. In choosing to create a photo 
exhibition Amnesty have already limited their potential audience to those interested 
in photo exhibitions. In imagining what an audience will respond to in terms of 
content, Amnesty is  again placing limits on the potential audience. This occurs too 
by imagining that audiences will only be interested in mainstream celebrity human 
rights defenders and only exposing the audiences to those. Furthermore, little can be 
done to evaluate whether people will indeed be put off by the more heavy weight 
human rights information because people are not given it in the first place. In this 
way both the assumptions about what people are interested in, and the 
institutionalised practices of advertising lead to a limiting of the potential of 
audience.
'Doing Good'- Attributing Morality
Where then was Amnesty's elusive audience coming from? Why did it say one thing 
in reports and do another in practice? The audience research project carried out over 
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8 years by 2CV was a major undertaking. It involved systematic interviewing of a 
representative core of Amnesty's member base, as well as focus groups with non-
members. Its aim was to identify and categorise audiences and potential audiences. 
The term 'Caring but not Committed' was coined by the 2CV study and was used to 
describe the very group I thought I was catering to. It was a widely used phrase in 
Amnesty at the time. Everyone talked about accessing the 'caring not committed'. 
This was the audience identified through research based on qualitative and 
quantitative studies: a real life group of people. Yet the IWD project was being aimed 
at somewhere else entirely. It was being imagined for 'the average Joe in Tesco', who 
did not fit that profile, and was nowhere to be found in the data. One answer came to 
this question at a later date when in conversation with Lindsay after the meeting. In 
replying to my question about why we were pitching the images so generally when 
we had been aiming for the 'caring not committed' she replied:
People who aren't involved with Amnesty don't always know very much 
about human rights, we have to make it accessible so we don't exclude 
people. I used to be easier when we could just think about what would 
interest us and our friends and family. Now we have to try and think like 
all sorts of people- it's not easy. (Lindsay, interview, May 2010)
The use of themselves as a template was something that I remembered from my 
previous work with Amnesty in 2007 as a volunteer, and is similar to the discussion 
about the importance of similarity in Chapter 4. I asked other long serving members 
of staff about this 'old way' of campaigning, to try and understand why the new 
audience policy was such a departure. I was told:
Yes it did used to be very different. It wasn't all about all this popular 
stuff, we knew lots of people who were members, certainly from the 
London groups, we knew what they wanted because we could talk to them, 
we were friends' (Dan, interview May 2010)
Therefore  previously staff had not really needed any idea of audience, because they 
'were friends with' those they hoped to attract, and indeed were their own 
demographic, and were already very familiar with it. It seemed that in trying to 
imagine what it would be like  not to be involved with Amnesty, staff were imagining 
that they would have to be disengaged in other ways too. Staff imagined 
disengagement quite widely to include not reading the news, or recognise ASSK. 
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There is an assumption among staff that that is the only reason you would not be 
involved with Amnesty, because you just did not know about the issues. 
The lifestyle and background of many Amnesty members which I encountered during 
life history interviews might account for this assumption. Most Amnesty staff had a 
'key story', a life experience, which brought them to Amnesty. For Margaret it was 
growing up in apartheid South Africa, for Laura it was an experience of the poverty 
among aboriginal Australians:
I suppose I knew I had to work in something like this from when I was 11 
years old. My dad became principal of a school in a very aboriginal 
area- there was only me and one other white girl and I understood for the 
first time how some people have much more than others for no right 
reason. Little things like the holes in their shoes, if they had any at all, 
compared to my shiny shoes. I was ashamed and I stopped wearing 
shoes.
Most of the staff were involved with Amnesty from their student days or earlier, and 
most staff are highly educated (at least to undergraduate level according to staff 
survey 2010). It is conceivable that they just do not know many people beyond this 
world, and for that reason when they imagine not being part of it they move from one 
extreme to another. Laura explained to me in a later interview when I asked her about 
people she knew who did not know about human rights: Most of my friends work in 
Amnesty or other charities, it just happens, you share interests and you work together 
on such intense projects- I don't know anyone who doesn't know about human rights 
(Laura, interview May 2010). Obviously staff have friends outside Amnesty as well 
but the point  here is that staff assume that it is not people they know that are these 
'new audiences', even though I am sure that many of the people they know do not 
regularly take action for Amnesty or are not members. The assumption is that the new 
audiences are different, and from a different background. Amnesty staff have a strong 
sense of their own identity as members of Amnesty, and the new audience is 
imagined in opposition to that. The new audience is imagined as everything that the 
old audience is not. As one staff member told me: 'It's impossible to hear these 
stories and not be moved. Once we can tell people the stories, once they know, they 
have to act' (Mary, in conversation, July 2010). The assumption here is that if you are 
not involved it is because you do not know about it, and it is based on the rather 
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narrow social world that staff members live in.
Another feature of the fuzzy understanding and implementation of audience policy is 
to be found in the quite frankly overwhelming volume of research produced. Over 8 
years of research a mountain of paper can accumulate, and in the case of Amnesty's 
Audience Policy this was certainly the case. Even though the research when you 
finally get into it is clearly thorough, and has much useful information, for example 
suggested methods for reaching people, the things that put people off Amnesty (an 
image of snobbishness, high demands on time) and the things that they prefer (online 
participation), it is too dense to absorb for most busy working people. I spoke to my 
manager about the apparent lack of attention which staff paid to the policy details and 
she told me: I always tell myself I'll get on top of the material when I have time, but 
that's just it, when do I ever have the time? (Amanda, interview, May 2010). Another 
member of staff described the hope that staff would read the document as 'wishful 
thinking' on the part of the team behind it (Gary, in conversation, May 2010). The 
result  is that things get buried in administration, and a general idea comes out 
through conversation between staff members rather than through the document. I 
asked Amanda what she knew about the document and she told me that most of what 
she knew came through Laura. When I spoke to Laura she had not actually read the 
document 'fully' herself, but had had a long conversation with Adam about it, and had 
been to the briefing. Even just in this small section of the office we see a transmission 
of information between staff, getting more distant from the original document. 
The introduction of new audiences represents a fundamental shift in Amnesty's 
approach to campaigning. Hopgood's ethnography of Amnesty's research office in 
London highlights a difficult tension between the way in which staff see themselves 
as a moral authority, and the techniques of advertising and the competition between 
charities in a field flooded with charitable options (Hopgood 2006:17). I experienced 
this same tension, in this case expressed through uncertainty about the document 
when it was launched, and the above unwillingness to fully integrate ideas from the 
report into a daily practice of imagining audience. Staff I worked with expressed a 
distrust of the shift towards commercial marketing which they saw the document as 
representing:
It's fine doing these studies, I know it's useful, but I don't think we should 
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drop everything just because Adam says do this or do that to get new 
people. We know our jobs, we work for a charity not for a bank, it's not 
all about the bottom line getting people to sign up (Josie, interview, April 
2010)
This is probably linked to Amnesty's perception of itself as more 'good' than other 
organizations, and less likely to employ 'tricks' of marketing. From discussions with 
staff it was clear that there is a considerable pride associated with working for 
Amnesty:
I used to work for a private company doing marketing, it was by 
accident, it was just what I did when I was done with uni and didn't know 
what to do next. Then Amnesty took us on for the Small Worlds Tour to 
do some collaborative work and I realized I didn't want to be doing what 
I did, I wanted to be doing something worthwhile, I wanted to be working 
for Amnesty (Lindsay, interview, January 2011)
Other organizations are often seen in this way as being less moral than Amnesty, in a 
perspective which conflates the goal of an organization with its practices. It is 
assumed that because Amnesty aims to do charitable 'good' things with its money 
then its means will reflect this. This is not totally untrue of course, but one 
assumption does not necessarily follow the other, and certainly it does not prevent 
Amnesty from using many of the marketing techniques employed by other sectors. 
Despite having a marketing department, there is still a reluctance to admit to being 
involved in marketing as it is seen as deceptive and manipulative, whereas Amnesty 
prides itself on truth. I had several long discussions about this with informants which 
suggested that while they were happy that happened, they would not admit to it 
themselves. That's something for Adam (head of Brand and Events) and Margaret 
(head of design and publishing) to think about, we just do the work and they do the 
marketing (Emma, interview, May 2010) when of course all elements of campaign 
involve marketing, and thinking about audience is routine. However it has to happen 
off paper in discussions for people to accept it, so that it can avoid the stigma of 
marketing, and consequent concerns with manipulation. 
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Recognition and Audience
The audience that staff imagine and use as their basis for campaign design combines 
with the practices already in place which favour a different audience, namely the 
audience in Amnesty's image. Having discussed the coming together of these versions 
of audience and the effect on a particular exhibition, I now turn to the things which 
these different versions of audience have in common. Throughout the experience of 
planning the IWD exhibition, the issue of recognition was constantly at stake. This 
occurred more subtly in Amnesty's recognition of different people as potential 
audiences, and their lack of recognition for others as discussed above. There was also 
a more overt reference to recognition whereby Amnesty staff equate recognition of a 
person as being a crucial part of a wider process of relating to and acting with or for 
someone. The assumption that people would be able to identify with celebrities and 
people whose names and faces they knew, even though in all likelihood they have 
little in common with them, can be seen as showing that staff view their audience 
whether it is new or old, as unlikely to relate to people they do not know, or who are 
from a less recognisable cultural background. This is a reflection of the planning 
techniques that were present in the Burma meeting discussed in the previous chapter. 
In that instance, recognition was also at stake, but it was the recognition of similarity 
based on 'normal' looks and activities. In both cases an assessment of the ability of 
people to empathise with others is being made. The outcome of this is a focus on 
similarity and familiarity rather than difference, the implication being that empathy is 
essentially an experience of recognition. 
It also assumes that the audiences are unlikely to want to learn new things and so the 
information is tailored to be in line very much with what or who they already know. 
The images chosen seem to display people that are already known, and settings that 
are familiar. This approach to audience is quite surprising considering the nature of 
Amnesty's work as primarily about disseminating information. I would suggest that 
this apparent contradiction is undermined when one considers the relationship 
between text and images, and that it reveals something fundamental about the 
approach of Amnesty staff to images. The campaign content which accompanied the 
images in the form of the information boards around the room, and the plaques which 
went with each image were discussed in a very different way to the images. They 
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were written by the editorial staff in the design team, and though I was not personally 
involved with the process I was present for many of the face to face discussions 
where the text was treated as something rather sacred that could not be 'dumbed 
down' in the same way that the images were seen to have been. 
Conversations suggested that the integrity of the written words and them having an 
educational quality 'you must tell people about' and 'don't shy away from that, even if 
it's unsavoury' were quite unlike the conversations about what people would know 
and what people would like. I asked Margaret about this later:
The pictures have to be recognisable because they are seen, and we want 
them to be noticed. You notice familiar things. They are the first thing 
people see and they have to be appealing to lure people in. Once they've 
come over and had a look we can give them more hard hitting 
information. (Margaret, in conversation, April 2010)
Images therefore are seen here by Margaret as being  a means not of transmitting 
information, but of catching one's eye. Images then are like a honey trap, and have to 
be kept sweet, which to Amnesty means recognisable celebrities. The role of images 
is therefore not seen as necessarily an informative one, rather they are to be 
appealing. This makes sense in light of the ways in which staff spoke about 
photographs of people discussed in the previous chapter. Staff spoke of images as 
'humanising' and 'making it personal'. I asked designer Lucy about it in more detail 
and she explained to me that the images used by AIUK are primarily photographs 
because:
 '...they make you pause, make you care, they give the emotional 
connection. Sometimes we use info graphics and often artwork, and they 
do the same to grab attention...but there's nothing like seeing someone 
for making you care about them' (Lucy, interview, March 2010) 
This suggests that rather than seeing images as a lesser form of communication, as 
might first be suspected from staff attitudes to them and to text, images are seen as 
doing different work to text. Both forms must be eye catching, but only pictures of 
people have the potential to provoke emotion, to create empathy. This goes some 
way towards explaining the use of familiar people. Staff imagine that similarity is 
behind caring about others, therefore they want to ensure that this caring is not lost in 
names and faces that are new.
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The Audience and Producer
Dornfield suggests that considering the importance of audiences in production can be 
a way of:
 'rethinking and bridging the theoretical dichotomy between producers 
and consumption, between producers’ intentional meaning and audience 
members’ interpreted meanings and between production studies and 
reception studies' (Dornfield 1998:12-13). 
In Amnesty's case I would suggest that we can see a blurring of the lines of 
distinction between the organisation and its audience. Despite a top down pressure to 
'bring in new audiences', Amnesty staff are reluctant to familiarise themselves with 
the literature and cannot fully imagine these new audiences. This reluctance, I have 
suggested, is symptomatic of underlying assumptions about who is likely to be 
interested in being involved with human rights, which Amnesty staff see as part of 
'doing good' where good is assumed to be accessible through knowledge about 
international affairs. The outcome of this reluctance and these assumptions are that 
the audience which Amnesty staff are imagining are really people very much like 
themselves. The channels which they use to communicate to audiences are those to 
which they themselves relate.
Studies of production have tended to focus on the difference between producer and 
audience. For example Hall's seminal work on Encoding and Decoding suggests that 
there are two discreet groups involved, one encoding and one decoding (Hall 
2006:196). In this conception, producers encode meaning into their product, to be 
decoded by a separate group who receive the material and who decide its eventual 
meaning (ibid). However what we have seen with Amnesty is that even when trying 
to imagine different audiences, staff fall back on practices which favour a certain 
audience- that of themselves, the people they know. To a certain extent this is 
inevitable. Anthropologists, more than anyone, know about the difficulties of getting 
out of one’s own world view and entering into another's, and this is all the harder 
when done through imagination rather than participant observation. This idea is 
picked up in greater detail in Chapter 7. For now I am interested in how studies that 
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favour a producer/consumer model like Hall's might overvalue audience. Fiske points 
to Hall’s model as separating text and reception, so that those decoding the text are 
given all of the agency in determining its meaning (Fiske, 1987:64). Audiences are 
increasingly seen as of key importance in determining the meaning of cultural 
products. While I do not argue that more attention needs to be paid to the interpretive 
contexts as well as to the production of media and cultural artefacts, I wish to 
highlight below some of the hidden ways in which this is limited. This is especially 
relevant when considering Part II of this thesis where the focus is on local groups’ 
uses of images. 
In a number of well-known accounts of the production of media, audience is a central 
criterion in determining choices made regarding production  (Ang 1994:368; Bignell 
2004:263), suggesting once again that the audience is in a powerful position. To some 
degree this is what AIUK staff exhibit. Staff did after all change the content of the 
IWD exhibition to meet perceived audience demands, demonstrating the concern 
with tailoring campaigns to audience as Ang and Bignell suggest. However in this 
case we saw that the audience that attended the exhibition were members of Amnesty, 
not the imagined audience. Underlying assumptions held by staff also created 
unintended limits to who could access the material. Therefore suggesting that while 
interpretation by audiences might be a key way that meaning is made, there are limits 
placed on them before that stage that curtail their power. While audiences may have 
an important role in interpreting and giving their own meanings to campaigns, and 
ideas of audience are used by those planning campaigns, it is important not to 
overestimate the power of audiences. In the case of AIUK, the power which Hall 
attributes to audience was limited by the version of audience used, and the version 
used was limited by practices in the organisation. In reality staff paid little attention 
to the real audience that attended the event, suggesting that actual audiences have less
power than might be imagined. The second part of this thesis is concerned with these 
'real audiences' and offers insight into how these issues of audience interpretation 
play out in practical settings.
This use of imagined audience, impacted upon by institutional practices, as a limiting 
factor on potential audiences is in many ways not surprising. Other studies have 
shown how creating audience can be self-fulfilling. Hayden shows how in trying to 
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locate authentic indigenous audiences this category is created and the producer finds 
what they are looking for (Hayden 2003:128). This is much like how Amnesty staff, 
in imagining and practising different types of audience, produce an eventual 
exhibition that is limited in both who attends, and how they encounter it. The use of 
imagined audiences is inevitable when you cannot have access to those people you 
are targeting through direct interaction, and much like Anderson’s imagined 
communities they will always be collections of generalisations because of this lack of 
first hand knowledge (Anderson 1983). While AIUK have resources which they can 
use to inform their imagination, these resources have been shown to be unappealing 
and inaccessible to many staff. However saying that this process is inevitable is not 
helpful, because it does have real world consequences which are made all the more 
notable by their moral implications. The limited imagined audience is putting up 
blocks to potential participants in a moral activity. Amnesty staff are imagining who 
is likely to be interested in what they describe as 'moral work' but they are restricting 
access to that moral work. In thinking that people are unlikely to be interested in the 
work of Amnesty, they assure that they will not develop that interest. There are 
exclusions at the level of campaign planning that keep human rights in a certain 
social setting. 
Conclusion
I know that staff at Amnesty would be horrified to think that they are keeping human 
rights in the family, so to speak. The job of campaigning organizations is to spread 
awareness, and Amnesty's latest mandate is to spread it wide. However Amnesty staff 
are limited by the resources at their disposal and the pressure for results in a 
competitive NGO market means that people do not have time to develop new 
practices. Many of the staff care passionately about rights and do not want to be held 
to ransom by a mainstream agenda, and so they continue to work in the way which 
has had best results in the past. The point I make here is not that Amnesty staff are 
making mistakes, but that there are difficulties in processing new ideas about 
audience which is having effects on potential real life audiences. 
Rights campaigns therefore are based, to a large degree on imagination. The imagined 
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identification with distant others that rights are based on, itself hinges on imagined 
identification between staff and audience. Staff imagine how people will empathise, 
based on similarity and recognition, and in doing so reveal interesting ideas about 
why we care for distant others. This chapter highlights, however, that the way staff 
want a campaign to work is not necessarily an accurate representation of how 
campaigns are run. Their ability to identify with others is impacted by various 
conflicting practices and policies inherent to life in a large organisation. Therefore 
while the previous chapter dealt mainly with staff intentions and aspirations for 
campaigns, in this chapter we have seen described some of the practical aspects of 
working on rights. The next chapter attempts to bring these ideas together through 
attention to omissions in campaign visuals by design and in unconscious ways, to 
suggest that beyond grounding humanity in similarity, Amnesty seeks to remove 
certain violent types of suffering from visual narratives.
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Chapter 6: Gaps and Silences 
While Chapter 4 dealt with pictures selected by AIUK to create ideas of universal 
humanity, this chapter focusses on those people and places conspicuous by their 
absence in campaign material. Chapter 4 linked a practice of using portraiture and 
individuals with a move away from a style of humanitarian photography that focusses 
on physical bodies and biomedical claims for rights. In this chapter I focus more 
explicitly on what and why staff exclude that results in producing this 'Amnesty style' 
of visual culture. Specifically, I highlight the example of the topic of rape as 'too far', 
to show a broad practice that seeks to remove images considered 'too violent' or 
painful from a majority of AIUK material. Staff cite 'dignity' as the reason behind 
their omissions of violent or painful images, and in doing so put forward a certain 
vision of what kind of violence is less dignified and more appropriate. The dignity of 
those represented is shown to be part of a wider set of concerns linked to issues of 
audience recognition and limits to empathy, both of which impact on the removal of 
images of suffering from visual practice. Visual narratives put forward by AIUK 
campaign materials therefore sanction particular ways of relating to others, as well as 
revealing assumptions about violence and victimhood, and enshrining those 
assumptions in visual practice.
I begin with the example of a campaign for women's rights that featured no pictures 
of women. The campaign, La Mariposa, juxtaposed ideas such as rape and abortion 
with positive imagery of butterflies. This is used as a starting point to examine 
absences in campaign materials more generally. Through attention to archives and 
policy documents, a picture emerges of campaign design which focusses on ideas of 
dignity, defined as an absence of suffering and the avoidance of showing graphic 
images of human rights violations. I balance this 'official line' with participant 
observation which suggests that alongside this line a largely unacknowledged fear of 
'compassion fatigue' drives campaign design. Ideas about limits to what the public 
will relate to, and empathise with, impact on campaign design as much as adherence 
to the ideals of dignity. This suggests that ideas of dignity and empathy are in fact 
very closely related for staff. These concerns are also behind further examples of gaps 
particularly the lack of pictures of perpetrators. I finish with an example of a set of 
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images depicting suffering which were used as an exhibition, focussing on the 
surprisingly positive response of staff to the images. I use this to discuss tensions 
which staff experience between policy and practice on the one hand, and concerns of 
truth and censorship on the other. I use these concerns to draw conclusions about staff 
self- image which emerges through the contrast between idealised practice and actual 
practice.
Hay Festival: a 'Tropical Paradise'
Figure 6a: Members of the public make butterflies at the Hay stall. June 2011
In May 2010 I was rather unhappily running the Amnesty stall at the Hay festival. I 
was unhappy on the one hand because it was my birthday and I was spending it on 
my own in Wales, but a larger part of my discontent was due to an altercation with an 
angry member of the public that morning which went something like this:
Me: Hi are you interested in learning more about Amnesty or our current 
campaign for women's rights in Nicaragua? 
Man: Yes I know all about that I've been a member for years. The Nicaraguan 
campaign is to change the laws surrounding abortion after rape because of the 
very high numbers of rape and sexual exploitation tolerated. What I want to 
know is why on earth are you here making butterflies- it looks like a tropical 
paradise in here- where does rape come into this? 
His criticism was not the first of its kind, nor would it be the last. Over my two weeks 
at the Amnesty stall at the Hay Literary Festival in Wales I counted over thirty people 
who were unhappy about the use of such a 'vague' symbol to tackle such a serious 
154
issue. Thirty people out of over three thousand visitors is not a particularly high 
number, but since I was running the stall difficult inquiries were sent to me, and 
therefore I got very used to these conversations. I explained repeatedly and in a 
mantra-like way the rationale for the action: the family nature of the Hay Book 
Festival, the symbolic currency of butterflies as freedom in Nicaraguan tradition, the 
importance of sending something to support women in a large scale protest which 
would be arresting visually and so on, all of which I had been briefed on at Amnesty 
UK back in London. The gentleman in question listened to me and then left 
apparently still disgruntled saying 'well I don't know why you have to make it look so 
nice- it's a horrible thing, it really is, and there's no point hiding the truth ' (member 
of the public, in conversation May 2011). After he left, one of the stall volunteers 
came over to me and said 'god, you think it'd be obvious why we aren't going make a 
stand full of rape and abortion' (Rita, in conversation May 2011). At the time I 
agreed, but the conversation stayed with me, and I began to wonder why it seemed so 
obvious to us that we would not go about it like that. The campaign was about those 
issues after all, and even if the law protects the anonymity of victims of sexual 
abuse40, there are many women human rights defenders working in Nicaragua who 
are prisoners of conscience on related issues of women's rights. Looking around the 
stall that I had helped to create, it struck me as quite significant that we were not 
showing the usual pictures of individuals, and that we were filling a room with 
butterflies for a campaign against sexual exploitation. Even more significant was that 
we had all assumed that there was a logic to campaigning in this way.
I got involved with planning the Hay stall fairly far on in its development. It was 
AIUK's first year having a stall at Hay-on-Wye, a small village in Wales with a well-
known annual book festival which attracted over 200 000 visitors in 2010. The 
campaign itself, that of Nicaraguan women's rights, was an IS priority for the year. It 
was passed on to the UK section because the theme of abortion made it difficult to 
campaign on in other sections, where abortion has a different legal and social status. I 
was told that the decision was made at AIUK to launch it at Hay because the context, 
that of a literary festival, was thought to be appropriately serious for the content of 
the campaign. The butterfly theme too had been given to AIUK by the IS, and had 
40 Victims of rape in England and Wales are entitled to anonymity under the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act 1992 
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been a suggestion from a women's group in Nicaragua, though privately staff in 
AIUK questioned how much prompting from the IS might have been involved. My 
role was to manage the running of the stall, and I was present for the planning 
meetings where the shape of the stall and consequently the butterfly campaign it was 
launching was discussed and finalised. I was aware therefore of the relative freedom 
which the UK section had to develop the butterfly theme as they wished. Butterflies 
were being asked for, but how they were procured was open to AIUK creativity. I was 
aware also that there were individuals whose details were sitting with the IAR team 
from Nicaragua who might have been used. However, the suggestion that we might 
use those individuals in this campaign was not raised at any of the meetings. This was 
the only campaign that I worked on over my two years at Amnesty which had an 
action not centred on an individual or individuals, yet the choice to work in this way 
was never discussed. This suggests something of the accepted nature of omissions in 
campaign design, that they are not so much intentional omissions, as much as part of 
a culture and practice within the organisation that does not allow for their inclusion. 
My own complicity in the omissions suggests also that staff become used to or 
socialised into these practices. 
Discussions mainly focussed on the logistics of getting butterflies made and sent out 
to Nicaragua, and the appropriate size, format (e-butterflies were also used)41, and 
method of display on the stall. At the time I did not question this approach, assuming, 
as the staff I spoke to afterwards also did, that 'we can't show rape victims, it's not 
fair, legal, and anyway what would we show?' (Amanda, interview, June 2011), and 
not wondering why a women's rights campaign featured no women. Even the website, 
which was not connected to Hay, but was for the wider launch of the butterfly 
campaign, was without photographs and displayed an unusually positive imagery, 
even for Amnesty. This assumption of appropriateness underpinned AIUK's work on 
this campaign without ever really being openly discussed. Unlike during previous 
meetings and projects where images and approaches were cast aside after extensive 
discussion as those pictures described in previous chapters had been, in this case the 
pictures or individuals were simply not sought out in the first place. The decision to 
exclude them was taken early on but was never given voice, and in this way was itself
41 An e-butterfly was a template that could be decorated online and emailed directly to Nicaragua. 
This was an attempt to get around the logistical difficulty of posting such a large amount of 
campaign material without it being intercepted.
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a silence. Not only were women absent visually, but the reasons behind their omission 
were themselves absent. This double silence in campaign etiquette needs to be 
unpicked in order to understand AIUK practice.
Figure 6b: The La Mariposa Butterfly Campaign Web Page. 
Defining Dignity: Amnesty's Photo Policy and the Images of Pain
I was aware that Amnesty had a Photo Policy document, but had never consulted it in 
my capacity as a volunteer at Amnesty. Speaking to other staff I found that few of 
them had actively consulted it, but most 'had it somewhere'. In fact it is given to all 
new staff in their induction packs upon starting work at Amnesty, but like many 
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documents produced by AIUK and the IS, was lost to most staff among the multitude 
of information documents available to staff. Nevertheless I was keen to consult it as it 
might have some information about why certain things were appropriate to use 
photographs for and others not. When I found the document it was very short, and I 
was told by the archivist Jonathan that 'it's pretty obvious stuff, mostly it's just used by
staff to give photographers, freelance designers and all that' (Jonathan, July 2011). 
The implication here that staff know this information already, or intuitively, once 
again a reference to the silence around this sort of decision- making. Interestingly 
when I did read the document I agreed that it was something most staff would not 
have to be told: it was the bare bones of the approach to images which I had seen 
over the past two years, and it echoed my own assumptions when constructing the 
Hay campaign. This suggests that staff and volunteers, like myself, become used to a 
certain approach to visual practice by seeing it regularly.
Figure 6c: General Principles of Photography document used by the IS and AIUK.
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General Principles on use of photographs in  Amnesty International Materials
We strive to uphold certain standards in our use of images of individuals, groups and 
practices in all AI materials (e.g.; documents, reports, publications, websites, campaign, 
action, recruitment and fundraising materials).
These can be summarised as follows:
1.1 The overall balance of photographic content (in any AI report, document, website, 
etc,) should portray human dignity and positive action in the face of human rights 
violations.
1.2 The reality of the effects of human rights violations should be depicted where it is 
appropriate (e.g.; to the aims of the particular Campaign / Action) and does not 
infringe the rights or dignity of the subjects. There should be no photos included 
purely to shock or disturb.
1.3 The security and rights of individuals portrayed in photographs should be protected 
and up held by all concerned (e.g.; the photographer, researchers and users of the 
image)
1.4 Every effort will be made to ensure that photographs of individuals are not published 
without their knowledge and consent.
1. Every effort will be made to ensure that individuals in photographs are identified, 
or not, according to their expressed wishes.
2. Content will not be manipulated in images used or published by AI, although 
images may be cropped and rescaled for editorial and design purposes.
In this policy the largest and most acknowledged gap in Amnesty's visual practice is 
rationalised in a few short sentences. The 'reality of human rights abuses' is to be 
shown only when it is appropriate and 'does not infringe on the rights or dignity of 
the subjects'. I had rarely seen explicit images during my time at Amnesty, especially 
not used by AIUK. I looked through all the campaigns on-going over the two years I 
was at AIUK and found only one instance of explicit imagery. The 'Terrorism and 
Human Rights' campaign used videos of simulated torture featuring actors to 
demonstrate the tools used by interrogators in facilities like Guantanamo Bay. In this 
instance it was of key importance to staff that they were actors, so 'it's not the same 
as using someone who is a victim' (Mikey, interview, July 2011). It was also pointed 
out to me that in the 1.30 minute video of water boarding, only 30 seconds of it 
actually featured a person, the rest was water. In no other of the ten campaigns during 
this period did images of the 'reality of human rights abuses feature'. All other 
campaigns used a mixture of AIUK's preferred pictures of people, and occasional 
other illustrations and photographs.
Figure 6d: Screenshot of Waterboarding Ad. Taken from www.amnesty.org.uk/content.asp?
CategoryID=10228
Jonathan described the policy as 'familiar' and 'not necessary for staff ' because the 
terminology used is so integrated into daily practice at Amnesty. Buzz words such as 
dignity and empowerment are so common in the staff vernacular that until reading the 
document I had not really considered their specific meanings, which are as absent 
from staff discussion as they are from the document itself. Like the exclusion of 
pictures from Hay, these words are assumed knowledge for staff, and remain 
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undiscussed and silent in meaning. Their meaning comes out of office dialogue, 
which links the ideas of 'human dignity' and 'positive imagery' with particular types 
of images. Rather than a definition of human dignity, there exists a visual depiction of 
what staff think dignity should look like, broadly linked to the types of imagery 
characterised in Chapter 4 depicting individuals who are visually similar to their 
audience. The absence of hard and fast rules or discussion means that the picture that 
emerges is not interrogated by staff as other ideas are.
As Rosen points out in his recent book Dignity: it's History and Meaning, dignity has 
been neglected in philosophical studies of human rights despite its seemingly central 
position in the field (2012:4). The UDHR opens with the claim in Article 1 that 'All 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and in rights' (1948), yet like in the 
case of Amnesty's use of the term, a definition is sorely lacking. Rosen suggests that 
the concept of dignity has 'no coherent meaning of its own' but is 'merely a 
receptacle' for contents supplied by other convictions (Rosen 2012:6). This would 
seem to be supported by the wealth of definitions that exist in social and political 
theory (see Rosen 2012 for an account of these). Recent well known approaches to 
defining dignity such as Dworkin's account of dignity as 'living well' (Dworkin 
2011:13), and Waldron's approach to dignity as coming from rank, and increased 
numbers of 'high class' people (Waldron 2012:15), are not so much at odds with each 
other as they are musing on completely different approaches to reconciling dignity 
and morality. Yet the continued importance of this founding feature of rights is 
evident not only in its inclusion in legislation (see Rosen 2012:63-90), but also its 
regular deployment by rights organisations42. For Amnesty, dignity appears not just in 
policy documents like the one above, but also in campaigns such as Demand Dignity, 
and is a regular feature of the language used in materials. In the following section I 
hope to highlight a working definition of rights that emerges as visual practice 
accompanying use of the word.  
During interviews with staff the idea of dignity was regularly brought up by them in 
relation to Amnesty's images. People often brought pictures to show me which they 
felt summed up Amnesty's approach to visuals and labelled them 'dignified', but when 
42 For example: Human Rights Watch reports 'Denied Dignity' 2009, 'Dignity on Trial' 2010, 'Dying 
for Dignity' 2014; Amnesty International campaign 'Demand Dignity'.
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pressed often did not have specific qualities in mind. More often they said that the 
images gave the 'feel of dignity' (Rachel, interview, January 2011). Jonathan, a friend 
from the Knowledge Management team, brought the picture below which shows 
people protesting with the Hay butterflies, as an example of the 'right' sort of picture 
for Amnesty to use.
Figure 6e: Protest in Nicaragua using Amnesty Butterflies. 
Jon: When I saw this I thought hey save that for Amy! It's just the sort of picture 
we should use. 
Me: Oh yeah, how come this picture?
Jon: Well it's got it all hasn't it? It shows people in Nicaragua protesting, 
standing up for themselves, that's what Amnesty's all about right? And in the 
picture you  see the butterflies our supporters made all round the world and sent 
out there, it's like, you can see all at once, how human rights should work- us 
with the resources helping people to do it for themselves.
The same approach to images took place in practice during selection for campaigns. 
The word dignity is used in connection with certain images so often that without 
proper explanation they become the epitome of dignified simply through practice. 
These images are relatively diverse in appearance. The portraits of trade unionists 
from around the world that hang in one meeting room were often described as 
dignified, as were pictures of women holding 'healthy happy' babies used for the 
Maternal Mortality campaign; prisoners’ pictures were considered dignified when 
they were in portrait style, but one of the favourite types of pictures to be described in 
this way were images like the one which Jonathan highlighted above, pictures of 
activism. Dignity in this way was visually and discursively linked with the same 
pictures that staff had discussed in relation to empathy. When I questioned staff 
161
further about how these two might be connected I was told that 'well you empathise 
more with dignified images because they remind you that there is a person not just an 
abuse' (Mikey, interview, July 2011). During interviews that I conducted about Hay 
preparation, the expression 'it's more dignified' was often used to explain the butterfly 
imagery used for the display. This suggests, as Mikey does above, that not only is 
there something undignified about being seen in a situation of violence, but also that 
it is undignified to show it. Certain styles of image therefore become linked with 
these words through a combination of discussion and practice.In this way, the idea of 
dignity persists and becomes linked with some styles of imagery but still remains a 
relatively undefined concept. 
The definition of dignity comes most to the fore when it is seen to be threatened, in 
other words the times when images or approaches are considered by staff not to fit 
the criteria, and here a clearer picture emerges of how staff conceive of dignity. 
Dignity was most often discussed in relation to the pictures which were considered 
not suitable, and to some extent come out not as a positively constructed narrative 
like the ones above, but rather through the removal of the undignified from AIUK's 
visual practice. Most glaringly this involves removing images of suffering and pain as 
I am suggesting. It is glaring because these images are most commonly associated 
with the work of INGOs through the campaigns devised largely by humanitarian 
organisations discussed in Chapter 3. It was this area which more than any other 
aspect of visual practice was assumed knowledge among staff. Regularly during my 
time the images of suffering were cast aside from the images submitted for being 
'victimising' or 'disempowering', but most commonly these ideas presented 
themselves when staff discussed images in the media and those used by other 
organisations. During one conversation, staff discussed a TV advertising campaign by 
Save the Children in which a baby called Aisha is shown starving, then at the end of 
the advert is shown healthy with a call for more funds to help 'vulnerable children 
like Aisha'. The advert sparked much discussion around the idea of dignity among 
Amnesty staff. One such conversation took place over lunch:
Ellie: Has anyone seen the new STC advert, it was on last night? 
Absolutely disgusting the way they show people like that just to get 
money.
Charlotte: yeah I saw that, I dunno at least it has the baby well again at 
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the end, that's a step up surely, bit much though, I agree
Ellie: Yeah but to show someone obviously in so much pain, it's just not 
right, it's so undignified, it's like as long as there's money coming in who 
cares about showing the people who get it respect
This conversation mentions a crucial issue for staff when thinking about dignity, that 
of suffering and specifically pain. A close examination of AIUK materials reveals that 
few images of visible physical pain or suffering have been used over the past ten 
years, despite the issues campaigned for often being closely interlinked with torture 
and physical harm. Lucy who works in design explained to me in an interview that: 
'We try to avoid violent pictures and things that are too painful, it's not that we're 
hiding anything we just want people to be shown in ways which are empowered 
rather than in their most vulnerable moment' (Lucy, interview, June 2010) and she 
went on to tell me that she had never used an image of violence or pain in her three 
years at Amnesty. Lucy also told me about submissions that she had recently rejected 
from use in campaign material. They had been submitted by a coalition of which 
AIUK was a part, and on whose behalf AIUK were producing materials. She told me 
that the worst of the pictures included dead babies, and many of the pictures were 
showing people in distress and obvious physical pain. She showed me some of them, 
but for reasons of confidentiality they cannot be reproduced here, and efforts have 
been made to disguise the individual and organisation involved (Lucy, summary of 
material from interview June 2010). However Lucy's rejection of these pictures, and 
her characterisation of the 'obvious pain' of the people featured, highlights the sort of 
images omitted. 
Viewing someone as a victim, it was explained to me by staff, is a problem because it 
leads to pity, and therefore inequality (Mikey, interview, July 2011). As Rachel put it 
'it's not dignified to be a victim is it?It makes people seem desperate and unable to 
help themselves, that's not the kind of human rights defenders I think of, I think of all 
the ways people are still dignified in the face of all of that ' (Rachel, in conversation, 
June 2011). This aversion to showing people who are vulnerable is itself a move to 
try and manage the sort of imagined identification that is produced. During my time 
at Amnesty I often heard the word pity used with disgust or distaste. Pity was 
considered the epitome of the unequal relationship with others, and a word often used 
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to describe the sort of advertising campaigns like STC used above. Staff very clearly 
associated violence images and images of suffering with a likelihood of producing 
this sort of response, as was evidenced in comments like that of Ellie above, where 
she links the showing of people in pain to a lack of respect. In many ways, the 
removal of violent images can be seen as an attempt to remove the relationship of 
pity from campaigns. In this light we can see the project to forge recognition, 
discussed in the previous two chapters, as in fact part of an attempt to create 
imagined identification in a way that staff see as equal and dignified. However this 
attempt to control the sort of relation formed by the removal of violence, comes with 
its own set of inbuilt hierarchies that, while avoiding pity, create new and limited 
ways of relating to others.  
During interviews with staff they explicitly linked the absence of suffering and 
violence to their approach to images. Like the tag of dignity, these unwanted images 
are themselves tagged with terms like 'undignified,' but most tellingly with 
expressions like 'too violent', 'too painful' or simply 'not appropriate’. In branding 
certain images as not appropriate, staff at AIUK are involved inadvertently in creating 
a hierarchy of pain and victimhood which betrays ideas about suffering and its role in 
society. Anthropologists generally identify at least four types of violence: direct 
political, structural, symbolic, and everyday (Bourgios 2001:6). Where direct political 
refers to violence administered by authorities or those opposing them, structural is 
historical political-economic repression such as social inequality (see Galtung 1969; 
Farmer 2001), symbolic is normalisation of inequality such as racism or sexism, and 
everyday refers to interpersonal and domestic expressions of violence (see Scheper-
Hughes 1992). It is generally considered by academics that these types of violence 
are not mutually exclusive, and are not exclusively physical acts of violence 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992:162). In these ethnographic approaches to violence we 
find methods and attitudes which legitimise or normalise different types of violence, 
shaping its meaning and practice (Kleinman & Kleinman 1996:2). Suffering is not 
only physical, and physical suffering is not always a result of physical violence, and 
suffering as anthropologists conceive of it is not universal but socially and personally 
specific (Das 1994; Kleinman 1988; Morris 1991). 
When staff at Amnesty labelled images as 'too violent' they spoke only of physical 
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bodily violence of the direct political sort which is an image of violence very specific 
to the social context in which Amnesty works. Staff link 'too painful' almost 
exclusively with physical discomfort, and while many of the images used by AIUK 
very clearly evidence other types of violence such as the structural violence of 
disenfranchisement and poverty, in fact these images are celebrated for their ability to 
'show the situation without compromising people' (James, in conversation, August 
2011). The 'Poverty and Human Rights' campaign used a selection of still images and 
videos that were explicit in showing the poverty and conditions in which people live  
as a result of businesses such as Shell destroying economic resources, as well as 
cultural and spiritual ones. These images are in many ways images of suffering 
showing people suffering poverty and discomfort and the violence done to them by 
businesses. Despite this they were celebrated by staff who so often told me that they 
wished not to show images of suffering or violence. For staff, certain types of 
violence are more appropriate than others, just as certain suffering is more palatable. 
Specifically violence  of a physical nature and images that depict people in physical 
discomfort are considered less appropriate than violence that is structural, whose 
symptoms are more visible in an environment than on people's bodies.
Most broadly AIUK therefore removes bodily suffering and considers violations to 
the body to be the most undignified, suggesting western liberal notions of bodily 
integrity as important (as discussed in Chapter 3). While AIUK's policy of 
'humanising images' and the associated removal of undignified suffering can be seen 
as a departure from other NGO's physical determinism, in fixating on and removing 
this type of suffering they leave it conspicuous, and ensure its continuing importance 
in how staff conceive of suffering. 
Exceptional Violence: 'Rape is too far'
Within the conception of violence and suffering that AIUK image policy condones 
(physical violence) and ignores (structural and symbolic violence) there are further 
specificities of appropriateness suggested by the silences in images. They also emerge 
through gaps and the discussion around them. Discussions with staff about the Hay 
materials afterwards suggested that 'it's too sensitive' and that 'it's not right' to show 
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pictures of women in a campaign about abuse of women because 'you instantly think 
whoever you see has been a victim of it even if they haven't so you don't see them as 
empowered' (Mikey interview, July 2011). This suggests that seeing women who you 
think have been raped or abused is likely to make you view them as victims, in a way 
that seeing torture victims does not. In the case of torture campaigns, there is rarely 
any visual evidence of torture in materials, the victims are shown after the fact, and 
are a central tool of 'humanising campaigns' as discussed in the previous chapter. The 
implication here is that some forms of victims are more vulnerable than others, and 
some less dignified. In effect this creates some violences, specifically rape, as an 
exception, marked as outside the acceptable limits of what might be shown, and in a 
category of their own. In her recent piece on the role of rape in humanitarian 
campaigns Miriam Ticktin talks about discussions held by MSF around the question 
'should women be treated as special categories of victim who need more protection?' 
(Ticktin 2011:259). In Amnesty this debate is reflected in the decision not to include 
any photographic materials with the Nicaragua campaign. It is a separate category, 
separated by its visual omission. 
The existence of debates about which Ticktin writes suggests that the category of 
rape as a form of violence is considered an exception not just within Amnesty, but 
that it is also part of a broader attitude to violence and acceptability. Certainly the 
omission of images of rape is shared across NGOs and media publications within 
Euro-American contexts of production. Azoulay provides a history of images of 
atrocity in which she found '...one image was absent from the various sites- 
newspapers, photo albums, television programs- in which images of horror are 
shown: the image of rape' (Azoulay 2008:217). While much is known about instances 
of rape for example  the Bosnian rape camps are widely documented (see Allen 1996, 
Salzman 1998), there are no pictures of the act as there are photographic documents 
showing torture. Rape is therefore a violence of visual exception, in almost direct 
contrast to the way that it has been increasingly brought into other discourse (see 
Azoulay 2008:217-222 for a history of this), and it remains relatively hidden visually.
We may ask then what is it about this form of violence which makes it exceptional. 
Violences that have sexual elements, such as in Abu Ghraib, are not censored, and 
there is little debate about the potential for them to be titillating or to exacerbate 
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interest in this sort of abuse. These are the issues often cited in regards to images of 
rape. For Azoulay the lack of images of rape represents a taboo which prevents it 
from being a common reference, a condition she describes as essential to 'mustering 
agreement on the need to prevent and stop it' (Azoulay 2008:269) which she sees as 
directly related to the singling out of women as different (ibid:281). She calls for rape 
to be returned to visual discourse in order to redress this taboo which separates it 
from torture and other rights violations  and makes it a women's issue (ibid:281). This 
is quite reflective of the debates Ticktin discusses, which suggests a strong movement 
in the NGO world to give rape a place within other physical violences rather than 
separate from it. Certainly for staff who I questioned on the issue of rape there was an 
exclusive focus on women as victims of rape, and Amnesty as an organisation have 
produced comparatively little material about male rape.  In fact, as Stemple points 
out, male rape has received almost no attention in the field of human rights despite it 
being widespread as an act of war (Stemple 2009:606) which she suggests creates 
and maintains an impression of women as victims and men as perpetrators (ibid 612). 
The issue of rape viewed in this light therefore is actually an issue of the creation and 
acceptance of certain gendered victimhoods. 
Therefore we can see Amnesty staff's decisions and practices around the use of 
images in the Hay campaign to be a reflection of a conscious project to remove 
certain types of 'undignified' violence from the visual narrative of their organisation. 
However it is also an exception within that. While torture victims are shown as 
individuals, rape victims are rarely shown even after the fact because there exists an 
unconscious acceptance that rape is a violence that is less dignified than others. That 
it renders less dignity, and requires more protection in its victims, comes out through 
discussions about the omission. Therefore the omission is a reflection of pre-
conceived ideas about the nature of violence and victims, which are in a sense 
perpetuated by its removal. The desire to protect victims of rape is itself ensuring that 
the category of rape is exceptional, and its removal, as Azoulay suggests, reinforces 
its exceptional status. This is compounded by a practice concerning rape that focusses 
on the rape of women, therefore suggesting further separation from violence more 
generally into the category of 'violence against women', but also reinforcing a notion 
that female victims are more vulnerable than males ones. It is important not to point 
to AIUK staff as the cause of this, but rather to see their approach to the 
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representation of rape as part of a wider social phenomenon that entails certain 
expectations about the nature of gender and violence. 
Overwhelming Images and Limits to Empathy
At the end of the day you see something horrible and you look away. We don't want people to 
look away do we?
(Jesse, in conversation, April 2011) 
When Ellie spoke out against STC's advertising earlier in this chapter she was not 
alone in her harsh criticism of the marketing techniques of mass media and most 
especially of other NGOs, specifically those working in development. Every morning 
a volunteer in the media team looks through all the major newspapers and major 
online sources of news and picks out articles relevant to Amnesty's work which then 
get posted on the intranet for staff to read. I was told by Rachel, one of these 
volunteers, that the collecting of articles was 'to keep staff informed on debates and 
news which will impact their campaigning' (Rachel, in conversation, January 2010). 
They also served to provide fodder for many a conversation over the coffee machine 
during staff breaks, and while more often these conversations were about the content 
of the articles, there was also a strong tradition of critically assessing the journalism 
and presentation of rights issues in the mass media. While critiques varied widely, the 
harshest criticism seemed to be reserved for 'shock tactics' of physical suffering and 
images of vulnerable people in short, the same aspects which are not present in AIUK 
materials. Other NGOs were subject to yet harsher criticism because 'they should 
know better' (Gian, in conversation, September 2010). The complaint that staff made 
was not simply about the content of the images being undignified, but also the 
volume of these types of images and their ubiquity. Comments like 'this again' when 
looking at a UNICEF flyer, and of the same flyer 'wasn't this the picture they used 
last year' (Charlotte, in conversation, March 2011) suggests that as well as the 
content of the images, staff take issue with their over-use. In these conversations a 
further narrative emerged which was related to but separate from the issues of dignity 
so often put forward, which was concern over the effect of these images not on the 
subjects but on the public. For staff there was an ever present worry about the public 
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being 'overwhelmed' with so many harrowing images that their effect would be 
deadened and people would be less moved by them. This concern seemed to feed 
directly into AIUK's image policy which is a backlash against this type of advertising, 
but is also a response to it on a much more strategic level. 
I found that in practice, staff attitudes to dignity and empowerment often came in 
second to worries about reaching an audience and eliciting a response, specifically in 
the context of a market already over-saturated with images of suffering. The quote 
from Jesse at the start of this section is from a discussion amongst a group of us 
taking down an exhibition of human rights photo journalism, which had been up in a 
meeting room for media awards judging. It was the first time that I had heard that 
particular argument put forward about an image, but it would not be the last. The 
image in question was a particularly explicit image from Robin Hammond's 'Lost 
Souls Sudan' which showed a mental health patient naked and shackled43. Whilst 
taking down the pictures the four of us involved were discussing their merits.When it 
came to this picture everyone agreed that it was 'very important' but 'we could never 
use something like that, it's too upsetting for the general public' (Mikey, in 
conversation, April 2011). It was decided by those present that it was fine for a 
newspaper (it had been featured in The Times on 9/1/11) but that:
Mikey: it's different, people are reading it anyway, if it's an ad for a campaign 
people just turn away from something like that.
Jesse: yeah totally, maybe if the newspapers weren't always showing pictures 
like this then we could but what can you do? At the end of the day you see 
something horrible and you look away...
Mikey and Jesse disapprove of images not in general, but specifically because of a 
visual context of which they think leads to 'compassion fatigue' on the part of the 
viewer, which normalises violence and suffering through the use of images and 
diminishes people's ability to care. This phenomenon is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 3, as a continuing concern associated with politics based on emotion. This 
attitude never found its way into interviews or meetings where dignity and 
empowerment were discussed. It suggests that dignity and image policy are in fact 
deeply involved with marketing pressures which staff are put under due to the visual 
landscape they work in. These pressures are specifically the perceived limits which 
43 This picture could not be reproduced in the thesis due to copyright issues but is available at 
http://www.robinhammond.co.uk/mental-health/project/south-sudan/south-sudan-slideshow/
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an overabundance of images of pain places on the audience's ability to empathise 
with images of suffering. 
In Chapter 3 I highlighted that many theorists are concerned with the same issues of 
so called 'compassion fatigue', and that these theories suggest that a process of 
desensitisation is at work when people are faced with repeated images of suffering 
(Feldman 1994; Kleinman & Kleinman 1996; Sontag 2004). Staff at Amnesty are 
shown above to have concerns similar to those theorists, namely that the lack of 
dignity in these pictures can be attributed to their being shown too much and 
normalised. However as I have tried to show throughout this thesis, there is little 
knowledge among staff about how campaigns are received. Even the very audience 
that staff work towards is imagined and sometimes deeply at odds with the audiences 
that turn out for campaign encounters. Neither do staff themselves exhibit any signs 
of losing their ability to care about others, though they are faced daily with images 
from various news sources on the intranet, often containing pictures of pain. Staff are 
therefore not basing these concerns on research into the reception of images, or on 
experience of themselves. They are once again imagining their audience, and judging 
the audience’s ability to empathise. In Part II of this thesis I reflect on the relations 
that those involved with Amnesty campaigns form, and their responses to the 
suggestion that 'compassion fatigue', while not being a myth as some have claimed 
(Campbell 2012), is a simplistic notion of the way in which people interact with pain, 
pictures, and distant others. In fact many of those involved with taking action found 
pain and suffering to be important components of the process of recognising the 
rights of others. 
During my own campaign work I was advised to remove a picture from a leaflet 
advertising a short film because it showed American soldiers in  the Guantanamo Bay 
detention centre. I was told that it would 'confuse' people to see American guards who 
inflict torture on prisoners, because there is some support for soldiers in the UK, and 
they would not be able to connect to the detainees with such sympathetic perpetrators 
visible. Images used by Amnesty rarely show the perpetrators of human rights abuses. 
Perpetrators are silent figures to be imagined by the audience, or ignored altogether. 
Academics have accused some NGO campaigning of depoliticising human rights 
situations by failing to represent the complex international and national situations 
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which lead to abuses, in favour of simple narratives of pity/suffering without any 
attributed cause (Azoulay 2008:291), thus making it seem inevitable that some 
countries have these problems. The removal of perpetrators would seem to be a 
removal of context and cause in campaigns, but I believe that it is in fact part of a 
process of managing imagined identification that staff see as crucial to the project of 
rights campaigning.
Rather than simply wanting people to forget that there are real human actors and 
political motivations for abuses, staff are managing a much more complex set of 
potential problems with empathy. These are the changing roles of human rights 
perpetrators and the resulting problems which that causes for issues of empathy. 
Kristyan who manages the Israel/Palestine campaign explained that:
'...narrative is everything, our job is to control the narrative, make it 
make sense, it can't just be this group is wrong, this group is right, it's the 
actions which we judge not the people because next week those same 
people could also be suffering violations of rights abuses and how can 
people sympathise with them if they see them as baddies'. (Kristyan, 
presentation, May 2010)
This is another example of perceived limits to empathy. The public are once again 
imagined to have a limited capacity for empathy,in this case limited by the idea that 
some people might not be deserving of empathy because of their prior actions. In 
such cases the same priority is given to words to present the more complex relation 
that was seen in the last two chapters. The text which went alongside the Guantanamo 
image assigned some measure of blame in its explanation of who was in Guantanamo 
Bay detention centre and why. While it was alright for the text to explain the role of 
the American military in Guantanamo, the pictures were not appropriate because they 
are seen to produce empathy of the wrong sort, that of identification with the 
perpetrators.
The gaps and silences, then, can be viewed as both an attempt to reduce the effects of 
continual use of disempowering tropes of victims and suffering, and an attempt to 
market effectively in the face of this growing apathy. While staff may use the term 
violence relatively narrowly, this first use of the photo policy can be seen as a way of 
reducing what Kleinman refers to as 'social violence' (Kleinman 2000:231) which is 
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the effect socially of overexposure to images of suffering at a distance (ibid:3). Some 
academics suggest that there is a process of desensitisation which overexposure to 
images facilitates, and which normalises the suffering of distant others and reduces 
politics to disengaged pity (Boltanski 1999:3; Ignatieff 1998:293). Amnesty staff 
make similar claims about the effects of images. The concerns about making people 
appear as victims, and about compassion fatigue, can be viewed as a response to 
social violence even if it is not framed in those terms. Because of the entrenched 
association of violence with pain, staff do not use those terms, yet their goals are the 
same. 
Seen in this way, the links between the practice highlighted in Chapter 4 of 
'humanising' rights victims, and creating empathy, begin to emerge more clearly. If, 
as I have claimed, staff are reacting to concerns about the effect of representing 
people in the undignified situation of pain or suffering, then we can view the focus on 
humanising in this light, as a further response to these concerns. Specifically, it is a 
move to return people to the position of being human and therefore empathetic 
through visual practice, after the indignity of violence and abuse threatens that status. 
In an interview about dignity I was told by Rachel, a member of the campaigns team, 
that: 'I don't think images of people in pain are dignified because you can forget that 
they are still people, you look away and feel horror and you don't see them really' 
(Rachel, interview, August 2011). Her succinct comments on this matter reflect what 
other staff told me in conversations and interviews, and what is being suggested 
throughout this chapter. Physical pain is viewed as essentially undignified because it 
is dehumanising and precludes empathy. Empathy therefore remains at the heart of 
this practice of silencing visual depictions of violence. 
What appears to be a concern with the vague idea of dignity is in fact a more precise 
concern with not only the compassion fatigue mentioned above, but also something 
more fundamental. It is a concern with violence as dehumanising, and an effort to 
return to humanity and consequently to render people recognisable in a way that pain 
cannot. Arendt suggests that when a person is in a position that requires them to claim 
rights, they are equally in a position that destroys their humanity:
'The paradox involved in human rights is that such a loss coincidences 
with the instant when a person becomes a human being in general - 
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without a profession, without citizenship, without an opinion, without 
deed by which to identify himself...[and]loses all significance.' (Arendt 
1990:302)
Her claims seem to reflect the opinions and practice of staff at AIUK who also view 
the abuse of rights as dehumanising, though only where this pertains to physical 
abuse and discomfort. Arendt also pre-empts some of the visual aspects that staff 
focussed on in Chapter 4, such as occupation and place in the world. This suggests 
that staff hope to rehabilitate those aspects of humanity which Arendt describes as 
lost through rights abuse, through their visual practice. 
Therefore the characterisation of concern with compassion fatigue among staff as 
simply a marketing worry, is not an entirely fair account of the motivations of staff. 
There is a more philosophical endeavour at work that is concerned with restoring 
humanity in the wake of pain. It would not be accurate to suggest, however, that 
marketing played no part in these practices. As the previous two chapters have 
highlighted, the goal of empathy is balanced carefully between a desire to be fair and 
empowering in their representation of victims of rights abuses, and a desire to create 
campaigns that appeal to the public. Both these aspects are important to staff and are 
certainly not mutually exclusive but they do sit in a difficult relationship to each other 
because of the apparent conflict between empowering subjects, and using images of 
those subjects for the purposes of marketing.
When Gaps are Filled: Exceptions to the Photo Policy 
Every year AIUK is involved in Photomonth, an East London based festival of 
photography. The AIUK Photomonth events follow roughly the same format every 
year. There are two panel discussions on current themes in human rights 
photojournalism and two exhibitions in same building, one of media award winners 
from the photojournalism category and one to tie in with current campaigns. In the 
2010 Media Awards, Giles Duly's portraits of acid burn survivors, as one of the 
runners up, automatically qualified them for the Photomonth exhibition (below). 
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Figure 6f & 6g: Giles Duley, Acid Burn Survivors. Amnesty Media Awards runner up 2010.
I knew from participation in the judging meeting that these photos had generated 
strong opinions among the judges, only one of whom came from within AIUK. The 
others were Carlos Reyes-Manzo (photographer), Rebecca McClelland (New 
Statesman Picture Editor), Simon Bainbridge (BJP Editor), and Camilla Brown 
(Photographers Gallery). I was interested to know how they would be received by the 
rest of the staff. The pictures (figures 6g & 6f) show survivors of acid burns, often 
disfigured, in black and white portrait-style photographs. Such images were certainly 
not the norm in the AIUK exhibition space which Amanda and I curated well within 
the guidelines of the photo policy, and with an awareness that staff work there and 
see pictures every day. For that reason there was an emphasis on Amnesty's favoured 
'positive pictures' of human rights defenders, campaigners, and success stories. I had 
expected that the pictures would generate as much debate as they had in the judging 
meeting, even possibly some complaints because of the interview emphasis on 
empowered individuals rather than suffering bodies. However I was surprised to find 
that among staff and the public there was  great interest in and enthusiasm for these 
images, more so in fact than for the Robin Hammond 'Toxic Jeans' series which 
actually won the awards. There were obviously exceptions and nuances to the picture 
approach, of which I had previously been unaware, that allow gaps to be filled in 
certain circumstances.
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The exhibition involved very little in the way of planning, because the judges having 
selected the winners and runners up we were bound to show the pictures they 
selected, which is why the content was different from usual. While the exhibition was 
up (14th Sep- 2nd Oct) it was therefore quite a talking point among staff who are used 
to seeing particular styles of images, often from their own campaign archives. I 
received emails from several members of staff saying how important they thought the 
Duly images were, and how it was 'good to see something hard hitting' (Claire, email, 
September 2010). I observed other staff members taking more time to look at the 
Duly images than the rest of the exhibition and was party to several conversations 
about how they 'really catch your eye', and they 'make you stop and think' (staff 
members in conversation, September 2010). The issue of scars and pain did not seem 
to come up. Eulette from the media team was particularly supportive of the pictures 
and her reasoning is as follows:
 I think we should be showing pictures like this. We can't coddle people 
just because they don't want to see something we have to really wake 
people up- this is real, this is what happens, this is what we're up against. 
(Eulette, in conversation, September, 2011)
In some ways her opinions seem in direct conflict with the policy which explicitly 
condemns shocking viewers and with opinions of staff in interviews who brought me 
pictures of protests. I would have considered Eulette as a minority counter to the 
mainstream opinions had there not been such widespread support and interest in these 
pictures among staff. 
This positive response by some staff to the use of these images suggests that there is a 
more complex relation between images of suffering and photography, one which 
hinges not on the content as dignified, but on the way images are expected to be 
consumed and on concerns about the public reaction to them. Staff found it 'a relief 
almost' to see pictures so explicitly portraying the harsh realities of human rights in 
the form of physical mutilation. I asked Veronica why she thought there was such a 
disconnection between normal practice and this exhibition, and she suggested that:
 'it's not that staff always want to show only the positive side of human 
rights, sometimes I think we all find that difficult, trying to find a positive 
angle to horrible situations, but in this case it's a one off, it's ok, there's a 
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reason to show these pictures and it's a relief almost...' (Veronica, 
interview, October 2010)
This suggests that while staff defend and believe in the photo policy, it is not the only 
consideration. Rather it is seen as a duty by staff to deliver the right visual practice 
which is positive and dignified. 
The assertion by Salil Shetty that Amnesty International is the 'world's conscience' 
comes with certain responsibilities. For staff at AIUK there is a moral imperative to 
construct a narrative which is at once dignified for subjects, and a campaign style 
which is dignified. Staff are interested not simply in Amnesty looking good, but see it 
as their responsibility to 'set an example' (Allen, May 2011) to other organisations 
about what ethical imagery looks like in an attempt to construct a version of what 
they see as an ethical discourse on rights. Lucy spoke about this in more depth to me 
during an interview and while she was speaking more broadly about campaigns, her 
sentiment could easily be seen in the picture policy.
Well it's because we're so famous that we have to be careful about how 
we campaign- we have a lot of visibility and if we, a human rights 
organisation, can't even stick to our principles what hope is there. If I 
start using cheap tricks to get support we lose our credibility but worse 
we condone that sort of thing. (Lucy, interview, July 2011)
Dignity is something which is worked at, even if the practices appear natural, and are 
so ingrained that staff act unconsciously, the intent behind them is as much about 
Amnesty's dignity as it is about the dignity of those being represented. This was 
reiterated to me in an interview with a senior member of staff. She told me that 'we 
just don't see ourselves as that sort of organisation. We try to do the right thing. It's 
not just our outcomes that matter, it's how we get there...' (Sandra, interview, June 
2011).
Amnesty's dignity is important because of the responsibility they see themselves as 
holding. This responsibility is tied to a self-image of being important, and of being 
good. As discussed in previous chapters, this self- image is important for staff identity 
and morale. The narrative of compassion fatigue, and marketing advantages involved 
in the image policy, are not discussed in those terms because they are a threat to that 
self-image. I would speculate that this is because it seems too calculated and seems to 
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be putting the audience’s desire not to be upset by brutal images over breakfast above 
the broadcasting of 'harsh realities' as a form of censorship. I found that staff on the 
whole preferred not to talk about the practical decisions about getting a campaign 
noticed. 
When I asked my supervisor if she thought that audience sensibilities were important 
in planning the Hay festival and the lack of pictures she said 'you make it sound so 
seedy, it's not Mad Men or anything' (Amanda, in conversation, August 2010), 
making a connection to the very corporate world portrayed in the series Mad Men. I 
answered that it was 'all advertising of a sort'. Her reply that 'but we're not selling 
human rights are we' seems surprisingly naïve, and reveals the level of disdain with 
which techniques of marketing are discussed, despite being used regularly. For staff 
at Amnesty, the idea of marketing is closely linked to the idea of manipulation, and 
when it comes to absences from campaigns this manipulation amounts to censorship 
in the eyes of staff. Dignity is a much more desirable way to present these ideas: it 
does not interfere with staff identity because it retains the notion of 'doing good', yet 
it allows for certain removals that might be otherwise classed as censorship by staff. 
Dignity therefore has very many levels within the organisation, from the desire to 
restore people to dignity in the face of abuse, to the dignity of the organisational 
practice. There is a balance to be struck between the priority of a dignified 
representational approach, and the fear that by thinking explicitly in terms of appeal, 
staff are not making this their priority. I would suggest however that one does not 
cancel out the other, and that it is possible to think simultaneously about appeal, and 
about a fair and dignified campaign approach. Indeed this is how staff tend to 
operate, balancing the two with consideration. However this fear of marketing 
prevents staff from acknowledging this. They continue to see marketing as 
undignified and are not keen to acknowledge that some decisions to use or remove 
images are taken with this in mind. This suggests some of the difficulties facing 
charitable organisations where means and ends are deeply intertwined.
Dignity and Rights
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Dignity, as I have suggested, is often seen as a key component of human rights- both 
as they exist legally, and through the sort of public campaign constructions of rights 
as an idea that this thesis is concerned with. For staff at AIUK it was sited as the 
reason behind many of the decisions made about campaign images specifically. As 
this section has attempted to demonstrate, the version of dignity that staff speak of- 
that which is concerned with agency and empowerment, seems to suggest the version 
of dignity put forward by many well known philosophers in support of rights that 
equates it with respect and autonomy (see Rosen 2012; Dworkin 2011), setting it 
apart from other humanitarian ventures, that are less concerned with empowering 
representations (see Chapter 1). The visual practices around the concept suggest 
further nuances to this- namely that for staff agency and empowerment are impeded 
by physical suffering more so than any other representation that may be associated 
with rights. In the case of the Hay festival staff structured the campaign around rape 
and abortion, but excluded these from the visual elements of the campaign materials. 
In this way staff hoped to distinguish themselves from humanitarian organisations 
such as Save the Children, who they did not consider to have a dignified approach to 
campaign visuals. In doing so staff members suggest that there is in fact some 
distinction between a rights based visual practice that is concerned with empowering 
representation and a humanitarian one where physical suffering plays a key role. 
However, a close examination of the practices around selecting and designating 
images as dignified suggests that there is in fact more than the dignity of those 
depicted at stake, and that in fact the distinction between rights based visual practice 
and humanitarian is actually less clear than might be imagined. The strong focus on 
empathy that staff displayed in Chapters 4 & 5 is evident behind the gaps and silences 
discussed in this chapter. As I have outlined above, an important feature of the 
practice of using 'empowering' 'dignified' images is actually related to a visual 
strategy that allows for forming connections of empathy with distant others. The 
removal of pain and suffering is not only about dignity, it is also about making the 
victims of rights abuses relate-able and appealing to a viewing public. Staff concerns 
with compassion fatigue and limits to empathy suggest that empathising with people 
is in fact contingent on them having dignity. To be able to empathise with someone 
we must view them as dignified full human beings, and staff members suggest that 
the pity and alienation that pain entails inhibits this. This has clear links to attempts to 
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construct humanity discussed in Chapter 4. Seen in light of the 'humanising' project, 
we can view the removal of pain as at least in part an attempt to make people more 
'like us' and relate-able. 
To see this as the only concern staff have would be unfair. Discussions referenced 
throughout this chapter however show that there is considerable slippage between 
ideas of being a rights organisation with the need for empowerment and dignity that 
entails, and the practice of constructing campaigns that mobilise people to action 
through empathy. Rather than trumping empathy, dignity has been folded into the 
concept, through staff claims that people can't relate to undignified images. This is 
particularly relevant when considered in light of the position Amnesty occupy as a 
rights organisation. If humanitarian campaigns are to be differentiated by a focus on 
'tugging at the heart strings', as I have suggested in Chapter 1, then the emotional 
appeals made by visuals at AIUK are not so far removed. While empathy is distinct 
from sympathy in many ways, not least in the ways that staff emphasis in this chapter 
in their discussions about pity, both are appeals based on identification of slightly 
different sorts. This is quite markedly different to the context of rights work described 
by Wilson discussed in Chapter 2 that emphasises rights as a legal construct of facts 
and unemotional calls for justice (1997). Rights campaigns, framed in the way AIUK 
frame theirs clearly deviate from this and align themselves much more closely with 
the emotional appeals that may be expected from humanitarian or charity 
organisations.
How then can we account for this blurring of campaign practices towards the 
humanitarian within an organisation that is so famously and explicitly concerned with 
rights? Firstly to question the expectation that in fact AIUK are as concerned with 
rights as their mandate suggests. While staff members take pride in the dignity of 
their organisation, as discussed earlier in this chapter, they rarely refer explicitly to 
rights as their mandate refers to them- in a legal sense. During my time at AIUK I 
rarely heard staff discussing rights, except in the most general sense. Staff members 
in AIUK are rarely legally trained, and in fact most staff members have professional 
backgrounds outside of rights. My supervisor worked for Oxfam prior to her 
appointment at AIUK, and already knew several members of staff from her time 
working there. Lisa, from HR, told me that in hiring they look for experience 
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working in campaigns across the not for profit sector rather than knowledge about 
rights per se (Lisa, Interview, October 2010). It is perhaps inevitable then that there is 
some overlap between the approach of Amnesty and that of other organisations not 
concerned with rights. Amnesty are unique in that they are a rights organisation 
employing the techniques of identification normally associated with humanitarian 
approaches, however, as Part 1 of this thesis has shown, their approach is not an 
appeal for identification based on sympathy as is the case for many humanitarian 
organisations. Rather, AIUK staff members have blurred the lines to produce a novel 
style of campaign imagery that is humanitarian in some senses through its appeal to 
identification, but applies empathy rather than sympathy to this, thus distinguishing it 
from many humanitarian organisations. In part two of this thesis I will reflect on how 
successful staff members have been in carving out the campaign niche of empathetic 
engagement.
Conclusion
I have identified several gaps and silences which are created through Amnesty's 
approach to pictures, including the absence of violence and images of suffering, the 
absence of images of people in campaigns deemed 'too sensitive' such as the 
Nicaraguan Women's Rights campaign, and the absence of images of perpetrators. I 
focussed on these gaps and silences because they are prominent and most revealing 
about AIUK staff attitudes and motivations. There are of course many gaps and 
silences which I have not discussed. I have used AIUK’s photo policy and formal 
interviews to suggest that the sanctioned and ideal approach to photos as seen by staff  
makes dignity paramount, and I have also discussed the assumptions about violence 
suffering and their relation to dignity. Campaign preparation suggests that in reality, 
ideas of compassion fatigue play a much bigger role in decision- making than staff 
acknowledge, and that concerns about audience reception are inextricably linked to 
decisions to use positive imagery, rather than simply decisions based on dignity. Rare 
occasions when these campaign 'rules' are broken and gaps are filled, suggest that 
staff harbour concerns that they are 'sugar coating' campaign images. Tension 
therefore exists between empowering images and the idea of truth. The narrative of 
dignity allows these less desirable aspects of campaign to be discussed and presented 
as more palatable. While they are of course an aspect of Amnesty's moral 
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undertaking, they also cover the concerns of compassion fatigue with a gloss which 
does not threaten the self-view of staff. Part of the reason therefore, for dignity being 
relatively undefined within AIUK is the plethora of interests and concerns which the 
terms cover and the tension between disparate ideas behind the gaps and silences in 
AIUK's work.
That concludes Part I of this thesis. In this part I have put forward an account of how 
images are conceived of and work in AIUK, to argue that images are the product of 
both assumptions and intentions during the planning stage, which shape the ultimate 
outcome. A visual practice has been described that staff see as 'Amnesty style', that 
has been shown to have a focus on positive imagery of individuals, and the removal 
of pain and suffering from visual material. I have attempted to show how this fits into 
a broader goal of creating a particular type of empathy between audience and 
prisoners that is rooted in similarity and identification. Part II looks at how these 
campaign expectations play out in new contexts of engagement after campaigns have 
been launched. I was particularly interested in the imaginative relations that members 
of the public formed with distant others through images, as this was a central issue of 
image use by staff in Amnesty. I begin by reflecting on the processes of circulation to 
explain how and where images move, and I destabilise the categories of production 
and reception to show that in fact images are constantly under production. This paves 
the way for a discussion about interactions with images that suggests that they are 
used and act in ways very different to those imaged by staff during the planning stage.
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Part II
Circulation & Reception
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Chapter 7: On the Campaign Trail 
Figure 7a: Inside Poster Power flyer featuring images used in the exhibition designed by artists for 
Amnesty sections around the world, over the past 50 years. A full slideshow of images is available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2011/apr/03/amnesty-international-posters-in-pictures.
Amnesty's 50th anniversary 'AI @ 50' (28th May 2011) brought with it a new set of 
campaign objectives. Rather than focussing on a specific region or issue the AI @ 50 
objectives were centred on 'raising the profile of AI' and increasing membership. 
Local and student groups were encouraged to arrange events and activities which 
demonstrated 'the legacy of AI' and to choose from current campaigns such as La 
Mariposa, the Death Penalty or Corporate Accountability for campaign actions. The 
AI @ 50 campaign was therefore unique in its focus  purely on 'getting the word out' 
about Amnesty, and meant that activities were not centred on content, but rather on 
visibility for the organisation. To launch the campaign the IS collected and collated 
copies of historical and contemporary Amnesty posters from around the world to 
produce an exhibition called 'Poster Power'. Despite the fact that all posters had been 
designed for Amnesty International there were issues of copyright associated with 
some of the images which prevented their use, meaning that posters were selected 
largely by availability as well as to 'provide a broad geographical and artistic 
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spectrum' (Margaret, in conversation, June 2011) and to be shown by AI offices 
around the world. The exhibition was reproduced at AIUK for use by UK-based local 
groups and was printed and mounted for exhibition at the HRAC in Shoreditch, 
where it was to begin its journey. After that the exhibition was packaged up and sent 
to groups who requested it, and was shown in different venues by different groups 
throughout the UK.  
I use this exhibition as a way of charting and understanding campaign distribution 
and circulation. As a physical set of materials that I was able to travel with through 
distribution in different contexts throughout the UK, the Poster Power exhibition 
provides a way in to the complex processes of circulation and distribution of 
campaign materials by AIUK. The blueprint devised by AIUK for the exhibition's 
distribution suggests some of the expectations and methods used more generally for 
distributing materials, such as the role of local groups, the organisation's move 
towards the use of online social networks, and the 'right type' of media attention. I 
highlight an approach at AIUK that seeks to homogenise and unify through 
circulation, often at the expense of internal differences in opinion. This desire for 
unity and homogeneity is in contrast to the actual practices and avenues of circulation 
which I observed in practice, both internally and within local groups. The actual 
distribution and circulation as shown by following the exhibition suggests that 
distributive context and the agency of distributors has the potential to change and 
alter campaigns, so that campaigns 'in practice' are very different from campaigns in 
planning. Distribution is therefore an important and overlooked aspect of campaign 
production, or rather re-production. The result of these divergent visions of 
circulation is that campaigns are diverse undertakings, with many different meanings 
and agendas working simultaneously. These are compared to ethnographic examples 
from Law (2002) and Tsing (2005), who demonstrate very different outcomes to 
projects with diverse interests and goals, one failed and one successful. I suggest that 
ultimately the disconnection between AIUK and local groups is what allows for the 
campaign to be successful. 
The new members that are attracted to Poster Power, and eventually join up to 
Amnesty are not necessarily those the original plan hoped for. Instead we see social 
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'networks' 44 that form around images. In looking at the actual methods of circulation 
and audiences attracted by local groups at Poster Power exhibitions and events I 
would suggest a pattern emerges in which communities of interest form around AI 
activities. Thus AIUK campaign materials move in particular spheres much like 
Nash's description of 'cyber bubbles', where online communities form around 
interests between like minded people (Nash 2010:4). Groups form of similarly 
interested people through the techniques of marketing employed by local groups to 
suit their contexts. However despite seeming to limit potential join ups, they also 
allow the expansion of the organisation into untapped territory within them, and thus 
fulfil the criteria of Poster Power, albeit not as staff had planned. 
Planning and Promoting 'Poster Power'
Figure 7b: Poster Power exhibited.
The exhibition ran at the HRAC from the 6th - 31st May 2011, and from the 4th  -  11th  
April 2011at the Guardian offices, also in London. Before the artwork even arrived at 
the HRAC it was already the centre of a flurry of marketing activity. AI @ 50 was a 
44 While the term network has obvious connotations with actor network theory in light of the premise 
of this thesis, use of social network to describe events here is a deliberate choice to pre-empt 
discussion later in this chapter about the different roles of actors in networks, and the different 
types of agency possible. 
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confusing campaign for many staff who were more used to 'issues based' work with a 
clear objective of changing policy or practice at home or abroad. While AI @ 50 
organisation was situated in the campaigns section, I was told privately by a member 
of that team that it was 'better suited to marketing'. That is not to say that staff were 
unhappy about the campaign. On the contrary, the fiftieth birthday of Amnesty was 
for most staff a time of pride and accomplishment, but the focus on 'bigging up' 
Amnesty was for some staff quite difficult to work with. For that reason and because 
of excitement generally about Amnesty's 50th anniversary, when the exhibition was 
proposed it was very popular among staff and became the focus of much energy and 
planning among the teams making up the working project: Campaigns, Events, and 
Design. For the design team this involved changing the layout and look of the images 
to look 'more AIUK and less AIIS', an objective discussed previously which runs 
through the relationship between the design team at the IS and the one at AIUK and 
reflects the desire in AIUK for a unique and centralised version of themselves and 
their campaigns. For the Events team it involved planning the launch of the 
exhibition, and the right 'feel' for the 'celebratory nature' as compared to other 
campaigns, and finally and most importantly all teams were involved in promoting 
the event through their 'own channels'. The choices of promotion and the outcome of 
this planning determined that a particular audience attended the exhibition in much 
the same way that promotion of the IWD exhibition did, however in this case the 
objective of self-promotion and wider audiences meant that rather than AIUK's own 
staff being the only ones to enjoy the exhibition, it was promoted and planned in 
ways which attracted a different clientele. 
Usually when an exhibition opens at AIUK the marketing is minimal45 and the 
opening itself usually 'piggy backs' onto another event such as a panel discussion or 
film screening. The Poster Power exhibition was different because rather than 
promoting a further campaign such as the exhibition of Palestinian Wall Art which 
was hanging prior to Poster Power, this exhibition was an end to the campaign 
objective of raising AIUK's profile and celebrating the legacy, and so the opening 
itself was the event and attendance the objective. The number of people in the space 
however is limited by fire regulations, and because the event is based in East London 
45 Please see 'Imagined Audience' chapter for a discussion about AIUK methods for advertising 
exhibitions.
186
for a set length of time (determined by the exhibition program for the year). That 
meant that while AIUK staff in the various teams involved had a general remit to 
attract attention to the organisation widely, there were limits to this in practice as far 
as the exhibition went. For that reason the plan was to use the exhibition at the 
HRAC as a 'springboard' to attract wider 'well placed' coverage which could spread 
and generate interest for the exhibition as it travelled around the country. The 
exhibition therefore was to act as a smaller version of an AIUK model for campaign 
distribution which starts with AIUK events to support and launch campaigns which 
are then promoted regionally by local groups. After a meeting between key members 
of staff from the teams involved, the following strategy for promotion was devised. 
The intended audience of the exhibition was to be 'high brow' 'London types' because 
of the limitations of space and location, but also because of the relative influence of 
this audience on the public. In this way staff at AIUK see certain people as 
gatekeepers, with access to wider publics from which they themselves are excluded.
I was told that to ‘start small and selective’ could often yield the widest campaign 
result. This audience was different from both the 'new audiences' of the Audience 
Policy, and the imagined audience staff worked with in the past which was based on 
their own social circles. 'Arts and Media types' however were not a new area for staff 
to work with. AIUK regularly collaborate with local personalities, newspapers, and 
other arts outlets and companies in London to host and create events programs. 
In this case a key relationship with the Observer, the newspaper which first ran Peter 
Benenson's letter effectively creating Amnesty as we know it, was utilised to promote 
the exhibition. A full colour supplement was published containing images from the 
exhibition and a history of AI. Other key distributive areas were very similar to 
AIUK's usual avenues for HRAC events promotion discussed in Chapter 5. A feature 
article was placed in the Amnesty UK Magazine, AIUK social media including 
Twitter and Facebook were used to create online 'events', it was placed on the AIUK 
website, and in What's On local events sections in publications such as TimeOut and 
listings in London press, 'what's on' sites generally, and arts specific sites. However 
as the following examples will show, even familiar distributive practices are not as 
streamlined as they seem. There is always an element of inspiration and interpretation 
to campaign dissemination, even at the first stage in AIUK.
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Staff designed a 'high brow' opening event for the exhibition and had a target 
audience of 'arts and media types'. This was reflected not only in the planning and 
outlined audience discussed, but most noticeably in the choice of promotional 
activities and the event for the opening night as they played out in practice. The 
exhibition opened with a private view wine reception, to which some high profile 
stake holders and many members of the press were invited. The hope was that the 
latter and the local celebrities would write about and blog about the event. In that way 
the private view was considered to fit the remit well: it bolstered support among 
members (albeit a select number) and it attracted wider audiences through press 
coverage. This suggests a very particular view of how campaigns are to circulate, one 
that values wide circulation, and sees the process as filtering outwards from 
influential gatekeepers.
The private view appeared on the AIUK website despite it being a closed event. 
When I asked the Event Manager Amanda why, she said that she did not know, and 
directed me to the web team. The web team sit in a different part of the building to 
the rest of the marketing team, and are seen as quite independent least because of 
their 'technical wizardry' (Amanda, in conversation, May 2011). Emerson told me 
that the event had been put up because they had been asked to make the exhibition 
'high brow', and he thought that publicising the exclusive event would generate some 
curiosity among those who had not been invited, making it seem more 'exclusive' and 
therefore desirable. Amanda had thought that having an event on the website which 
people could not attend would have the opposite effect, that of making people feel 
alienated from the organisation because they were doing 'exclusive things', however 
'at the end of the day the web stuff is his domain, I'm sure he knows what he's doing' 
(Amanda, in conversation, May 2011). This suggests that within the broad unity of 
AIUK staff, there are hidden elements of diversity in opinion. Despite different ideas 
about how to enact a campaign, there is an understanding among staff that unity is 
important, and so concessions are made to the broad common goals.
This example of different ideas about how to realise shared distributive goals was not 
the only time that staff took different directions with campaigns. During the La 
Mariposa campaign, two staff came into friction about using churches as an outlet for 
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campaign materials because of the campaign theme of abortion. One member of staff 
made a decision not to contact a church group she had worked with because of the 
'sensitive nature' of the campaign, which was later overturned by the another member 
of staff. While there are strategies about campaign practice, these are reimagined by 
individual staff and teams such as Emerson in the web team and because they 
reinterpreted the remit at each stage of advertising. The logic and practice of 
distributing information and campaigns is therefore not a coherent system, it involves 
interpretation and creativity and can have different meanings in different parts of the 
AIUK building which determines how they are carried out in practice. There is, in 
effect, a constant reimagining and reproduction of campaigns. So while staff are keen 
to unify and create coherence, the different perspectives and practices within  the 
building betray a range of differing versions of the same campaign. Like Law's 
account of aircraft building as made of many stories, all about a seemingly different 
aircraft (Law 2002:5), a campaign, even within AIUK constitutes many differing 
versions of what it is.
The private view and subsequent during which the exhibition hung in the foyer 
attracted much more attention than previous exhibitions I had been involved with, 
suggesting that the model AIUK had devised for attracting attention through highly 
placed members of the media and arts industry had been successful in widening 
interest in the art exhibition. During the duration of the exhibition, over 600 people 
viewed the images hanging in the HRAC gallery space in the foyer. This was a 
significantly higher number than other exhibitions. The private view itself was 
considered by staff to be a 'big success' both in terms of turn out on the night, with 
most people who had been invited actually attending, and also in terms of coverage 
after the night with five blog articles, celebrity tweets and a number of local press 
articles about AI and the exhibition. I was present at the private view and it was my 
job to pour wine, give out canapés, and answer questions about AI's work and the 
artwork being displayed. Most people seemed informed about Amnesty's work more 
generally and this certainly was not a 'new audience' but that was not the intended 
audience for that event. The 'high brow' as it was conceived of vaguely by staff in 
practice consisted of cheese from a superstore’s garage and wine from a local store 
round the corner from the HRAC, but people were happy to mingle with each other 
and indeed many seemed to know each other already. 
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I overheard one conversation between two people whom I did not recognise 
discussing various arts events 'on the calendar' for that month and both seemed to be 
invited to many of the same events. Of course the closed nature of invitees to the 
private view was never in question, however in the following weeks I spoke to many 
visitors in the foyer and found that they were either Amnesty supporters already and 
were interested to see the posters because of that, or they had prior knowledge of 
Amnesty which seeing the publicity for the event had 'rekindled'. One man told me 
that 
'I've always kept my eye on what Amnesty are doing, but never made the 
effort to really engage, if you see what I mean, but I thought 50 years is 
really something and these show that beautifully. If you have any 
information about joining you can give me...'. (member of the public, in 
conversation, May 2011)
In this instance and in others during that month the attendees were not entirely new to 
Amnesty, but rather 'on the fence' as staff would say. The exhibition therefore 
attracted those who already had an interest in Amnesty's work in ways which other 
events at the HRAC had. When I asked Amanda about this she told me that 'Each 
event has a different audience in mind, the HRAC Events rely on people coming to us, 
so normally those events have a bias towards people who know Amnesty, it's 
important to solidify existing interest as well as attract new interest ' (Amanda, in 
conversation, May 2011). I was told by Amanda that reaching out into new 
communities was 'notoriously difficult' and always being worked on, as testified by 
the huge amount of work that staff put into the audience policy. I was told by a 
number of staff members that the groups do it better: 
 '...local groups do most of that, though there's more we can do ourselves 
now that we have online actions, the meetings and events run by local 
groups are still vital to how word gets out, without their efforts getting 
into local papers, holding fund raisers and doing all the street work to get 
signatures and email addresses we wouldn't be able to function'  (Bina, 
interview, January 2010)
In the UK there are 270 local groups and 128 student groups which staff see as 'our 
main resource for spreading campaigns- however much we do here will be nothing 
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compared to what the thousands of people in groups can do to raise awareness' 
(Bina, interview, January 2010). They are often considered the best way into new 
communities because 'they all bring with them their own connections- in schools, 
churches, universities- communities we can't really access from London' (Bina, 
interview, January 2010). This reflects in some ways the idea of gatekeepers 
mentioned earlier in this chapter. In both cases staff see others as able to reach 
beyond their own access, however rather than celebrity, values for large scale of 
reach, these groups are valued for diversity in reach. There is a hope therefore that if 
staff put in the groundwork at the HRAC by compiling appealing campaigns and 
publicity, generating widespread media coverage, and providing resources, then 
groups will be able to take campaigns to new places and to new people outside of the 
staff’s range of access, thus expanding the reach of AIUK materials and campaigns. 
The imagined relationship between the two is relatively undefined, with a vague 
notion that local activities will be able to function better and become more noticeable 
if supported by gatekeeper activities such as articles in mainstream media and 
celebrity endorsement. The reality of local group activities discussed in the following 
section suggests that in fact there is little correlation between this groundwork  and 
the way in which groups operate.
Reproducing Campaigns: Local Groups and Circulation
At the HRAC I took down the exhibition finally at the end of its run and carefully 
packaged the pictures in bubble wrap for its storage and eventual transportation to 
local groups. When I packed it up it was still in pristine condition having been 
untouched on the wall since its arrival at the HRAC. When I next encountered the 
exhibition it was several months later when I was visiting a friend in Belfast and 
offered to help out at his university group's exhibition of the posters. I arrived at the 
university where the exhibition was to be shown before the pictures themselves had 
been hung. They were noticeably worse for wear since I had last seen them with folds 
and fraying around the corners bearing the marks of its journeys around the country. I 
almost could not recognise the exhibition that I had packed up so carefully a few 
months ago. As well as physically changing through its travels the exhibition also 
seemed different in this new context because of how the local group had approached 
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the exhibition. 
Here the exhibition was part of an arts festival but rather than the glossy adverts that 
AIUK had produced, and the wine and cheese approach, this group had presented the 
exhibition as a birthday celebration with balloons of different colours and cake, and 
those attending were all bejeaned students from the university. I interviewed member 
of the society Chris about his group's approach and he told me that 'yeah we saw 
pictures of the exhibition in London but that's just not very us' (Chris, interview, 
October 2011). This concept of what is 'us' for a local group I found to be very 
important to how they construct and imagine the campaigns that AIUK produce. In 
the student and local groups I did work with, as with this university group in Belfast, 
the idea that campaigns must be changed to reflect the group's interest and identity 
was paramount, suggesting that while AIUK produce campaigns to be distributed by 
local groups they are in fact re-appropriated in ways which remake them, and 
therefore distribution of campaigns can be seen as another stage in their production. 
In his account of the failed attempt to build the aircraft TSR2, Law discusses how 
there was never in fact one version of the aircraft. Instead everyone involved was 
working on quite different versions of the plane (Law 2002:5). He uses the example 
of a pinboard to suggest that the relation things have with each other is not linear, like 
a story, but assembled and overlapping (ibid:189). Eventually these differences could 
not be reconciled and the attempt to build the plane was abandoned. This is in direct 
contrast to a similarly factitious attempt to make holistic a diverse set of interests, 
exemplified in Tsing's account of environmental activities in Indonesia. In this 
account we see different groups brought together over a community-managed forest 
(Tsing 2005:246). Despite their often contradictory differences in opinion about why 
the forest needed protection, their collaboration was productive (ibid). In both cases, 
there was only a loose central object. In practice it was networks formed around a 
loose set of goals that constituted the final outcome. Some degree of unity was 
required, that held everything together in what Law describes as 'fractious coherence' 
(Law 2002:2), and what Tsing describes as 'collaboration with friction at its heart' 
(Tsing 2005:246). For Tsing it was this combination of unity and friction that allowed 
the movement its success. They had a common cause, but it was the existence of 
multiple stances that gave the movement wide appeal- there was something for 
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everyone (ibid:252). I suggest that something similar takes place with AIUK 
campaigns and local group interpretations. 
Campaign circulation at AIUK can be viewed as a similarly diverse set of interests 
and intentions, brought together under the loose goal of increasing awareness and 
membership to AIUK. The remainder of this chapter discusses how these divergent 
approaches under this loose shared goal are able to function, like Tsing's 
environmentalists, productively to circulate campaigns. I focus on the importance of 
local specificity, and appropriation in order to put forward the notion that campaigns 
are in fact very diverse and constantly reproduced, and it is this ability to adapt to 
local circumstances that in fact gives them the wide appeal that has allowed the 
organisation to grow over the last 50 years. However this appeal is not without its 
limits, as will be discussed later in this chapter, however I would suggest that these 
limits are the very things that allow campaigns their circulation and popularity. 
Local groups with whom I worked  re-appropriated campaigns in many different 
ways including the visual and material look and feel of a campaign through the use of 
homemade posters, badges, and visual displays like demonstrations. These took the 
focus away from AIUK's 'too corporate' or 'generic' materials to campaign foci which 
used local situations such as Glasgow's focus on local asylum cases and speakers 
from the local immigrant population, or new approaches to current campaigns which 
re-imagined their intention through the eyes of local groups with local interests. The 
need to change a campaign ran across the groups. In a conversation I had one evening 
with members of the Goldsmiths University Amnesty group, the group at my local 
university which I occasionally attend, they explained that for them, changing 
campaigns and taking ownership was about 'asserting ourselves' and 'feeling like it's 
really ours so that we care about it more' (Ros, in conversation, September 2010). 
For Amnesty group members who are not being paid to campaign, motivation is of 
key importance, and this was often mentioned in the same breath as an ability to take 
control over campaign materials. Of course often groups were not even aware that 
they were making changes to the original intended dissemination of campaigns 
because there often was not enough knowledge of AIUK's intentions and practices for 
groups to see their own interpretations as just that- interpretations. This suggests that 
in part, groups were able to function in locally practical ways because of a 
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disconnection between them and AIUK. 
There are also practical elements to changing campaigns such as appealing to a 
different set of people than AIUK designed the campaign to appeal to, which was the 
case with the Belfast group. The exhibition ran as part of the arts festival Feile an 
Phobail (community festival) and was advertised in the student press and through the 
student union, the arts festival's own advertising materials and through an afternoon 
of poster-making by the group who handmade posters to be hung around campus, 
each one unique. The posters used elements of the AIUK poster template and 
guidelines they contained the logo, and used AIUK's trademark Ariel Black font, 
as well as images from the website and flyers provided by AIUK. They were unified 
in a broad sense, but were local versions. The posters were versions of the original 
documents provided by AIUK but taken apart and put back together to create 
something new, the way groups take apart campaigns and create new directions and 
forms for them. 
Figure 7c: Example of a poster used to promote the event in Belfast.  
In this case the original remit of celebrating Amnesty's 50 th anniversary was 
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interpreted by students as an occasion warranting a party which took place after the 
opening in a nearby bar. While so similar to AIUK's wine reception, in some ways the 
event could not have been more different in terms of feel and audience. The 
exhibition space was filled with colourful balloons and streamers and there was 
music playing through a stereo, the attendees were students and the focus was on 
dancing rather than conversation. I asked Chris about this approach and he said 'it's 
just a case of what people will be willing to come to, I think most people respond to 
the idea of a party more than they do to an exhibition, by combining the two we can 
attract people and still get the message across' (Chris, interview, July 2011). His 
assessment of what people will like is of course based on a different idea of who will 
come to Amnesty activities than that at AIUK, therefore mobilising imagined 
audiences once again, but different ones. In this way Chris and the others in the group 
do exactly what AIUK hope and that is to attract different people to Amnesty 
campaigns, and the number of people who attended as well as the number of new 
members to the organisation suggests that it was a successful method, however the 
way they do it is by making significant changes to the look and feel of campaign 
materials.
The same exhibition was also run in Hull where I was able to visit and compare the 
approach taken by the Hull group with that of Belfast. Once again the group had 
individualised the campaign with their own flyers and advertisements consisting of 
black and white text documents. I was told by a member of the group that 'no one's 
that good at all that creative stuff' (Enid, in conversation, December 2011). The 
group is relatively new and closely associated with churches in Hull, and for that 
reason the event, which was an exhibition held in the Hull Historical centre, was 
attended by many church members. The exhibition itself saw the posters attached to 
boards put up around the room because they could  not be directly affixed to the large 
glass walls. The day I attended, most of the other attendees had either heard about it 
through their churches or were visiting the historical centre for something else and 
had just 'stopped to see what was on'. The exhibition was the same as used by AIUK 
at the HRAC and Belfast but once again felt completely different and had a very 
different audience. The Belfast group had added information to their pictures about 
the work done by Amnesty in the countries which the posters were from, giving a 
broad overview of Amnesty, while in Hull the group had used an individual at risk 
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(IAR) and made the campaign focus on controlling the arms trade. One of the group 
members who I spoke to told me that 'it just didn't seem like there would be any 
substance if we didn't have an individual and a campaign to direct people to- it 
shows the sort of thing Amnesty do if nothing else' (Peter, interview, December 2011). 
The whole focus of the exhibition was therefore changed by decisions made about 
how to run it at group level. People attending the Belfast party would not have 
recognised, and would probably not have appreciated, the exhibition had they seen it 
in the Hull Historical Centre, however Hull had a very successful joining rate for 
their event. 
This seems to support the opinion that the means of distribution is as important as the 
original site of production, although studies on distributive contexts for media and 
cultural materials are still few in number (see Mahon 2002:460; Ginsberg 1999:309). 
Studies such as Himpele’s on film distribution point to the way in which the 
imagination and control that film distributors exert ultimately plays an important role 
in the way films are received and the meanings which they are given (Himpele 1996). 
Production and reception can therefore be thought of not as separate, but as engaged 
in an on-going dialectic whereby the site of distribution for campaign images is itself 
a site of production. Texts are continually being produced and received. The model of 
production and consumption made popular by studies such as Hall's, which imagines 
a seamless encoding of ideas in the stage of production which are then decoded 
afterwards by the audience (Hall 2001:164), albeit in sometime subversive ways 
(Hall 2001:176), does not fully account for the way that images in this instance, 
indeed whole campaign outputs, are not simply decoded subversively by the 
audience. They are actually re-produced by the audience in new ways, for a 
secondary audience, who in turn input their own production to this process (discussed 
below). Therefore the dichotomy set up between producer and consumer in this 
instance is inaccurate, pointing to a more fluid interpretation of this process, whereby 
media texts are seen as similar to Dornfield's characterisation of them as 'emergent' 
(Dornfield 1998:29) through their reproductions and the consequent slippage between 
production, distribution and consumption.  
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Viewing and Reproducing: Social Media and Images
Local groups therefore reproduce campaigns based on their own criteria, context, and  
intended audiences. This suggests that while Amnesty see themselves as producing 
the campaign, the production or a re-production of the same material in different 
ways can be seen to be undertaken by local groups as well, thus destabilising the 
notion of production as a discreet category in campaign and image life cycle. 
However this process of reproduction does not stop with local group members' 
campaign activities. During the exhibition in Belfast I observed many people taking 
pictures and 'tweeting' them, and in Hull a newspaper article was written about the 
event. The very nature of campaigning is geared around pictures, and pictures are 
easy to reproduce if you have a camera or a computer, or if you are more creative a 
couple of cans of spray paint. In fact images used by Amnesty do not remain under its 
control, and that is in part the response that staff are looking for when they talk about 
campaigns 'going viral'. They want the reproduction of campaigns. They want people 
to click ‘share’ on the pictures they put on Facebook, to tag them on Twitter, and to 
spread their flyers in person and through mass 'papering' projects. Campaigns such as 
the Burma campaign are designed to encourage this through their focus on pictures of 
supporters, and by allowing people to be seen to be doing good by taking pictures of 
themselves taking action (discussed in Chapter 4). However these activities are all 
similar to local groups, yet another reproduction through which campaigns are altered  
from what Amnesty originally planned. 
In a sense then, we cannot draw a line between production and audience. The 
audience are producers of campaigns through their social media activities, at the 
same time as being an audience for their own and other reproductions. Therefore the 
process of imaginative identification taking place between Amnesty and their 
perceived audience, as well as their expectations about audience identification with 
those depicted in the original images, is further complicated by the existence of 
multiple productions and unintended audiences. The reproduction of campaigns by 
these secondary audiences- those encountering reworked versions of materials- 
represent the addition of a further layer of motivation and interpretation that 
campaign images are subjected to. In addition the reproduction thoroughly 
complicated the processes of imaginative identification by throwing into question 
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who exactly audiences are identifying with in terms of how much their identifications 
are with the individuals at risk whom Amnesty chose for campaigns, and in those 
ways AIUK planned, and how much they are identifying with each other or with 
heavily altered versions of the IAR. Of course for the AI @ 50 poster campaign, few 
of the posters featured named individuals, they were rather works of art. However 
this has major implications for photographic images, the terms and conditions of 
which are carefully and legally formalised through contracts with people who agreed 
to their photos being used by Amnesty in certain ways and places. The process of 
reproduction, the inclusion of secondary, unknown, or unintended audiences, means 
that once images are 'out there', staff have little control over them, and by extension 
those who took or are featured in these images have little control over their image 
and their stories. 
During my time at Amnesty there were several disagreements over images which had 
been 'reused' in ways that those featured were unhappy about. The first one featured 
photographs of asylum seekers in a joint publication made by Amnesty and other 
organisations, who after successful applications for asylum wanted their images 
removed from these materials so that they could 'start afresh'. While the legal 
agreement which they had signed stipulated that Amnesty had full rights to images, 
staff agreed to remove the images. Removing them proved highly problematic 
however because once they had been put onto the internet they were impossible to 
track down. The tags on Twitter and Facebook were removed so that the images 
would not be easily discovered, but the images still exist. As well as negating images 
which were tagged with Amnesty's account, images which have been copied and not 
tagged still exist and are impossible to track down. Therefore control over even the 
images is never absolute, let alone control over how people use and interpret them. In 
a well-known case in Burma a woman was tracked down and arrested because her 
picture was being shared on social media as an 'inspiration'. An unintended audience 
in this case was the military who were using activist networks to track down 
protesters. Therefore, because of the processes of re-production which can lead to 
unintended audiences and uses, images are never truly the product of one 
organisation or agenda. 
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Communities of Interest
However I suggest that the process of distribution discussed above which allows 
images and campaigns to be circulated in unintended ways, is potentially over 
estimated by those working in the non-profit industry. While it is clear that in terms 
of control over production and reception there is in fact little centralised consensus, in 
my experience in the field the campaigns and images were subject to processes of 
self-regulation through their circulation within communities of interest. It is in fact 
these communities of interest that circulate campaigns and extend membership, so 
while new audiences are the goal at AIUK, they are not the goal with local groups. 
The above examples from Belfast and Hull show how groups individualise 
campaigns and campaign materials through interpretation and contextual necessity, 
creating very different campaigns from the same original brief and materials. It seems 
to suggest that AIUK's objectives for signing up new members through the AI @ 50 
campaign and using local group knowledge to transmit that campaign had been 
successfully met, and indeed they were by most evaluations of the outcome. All three 
screenings of the exhibition visited seem to be very different from each other in look, 
approach and eventual realisation, however closer discussions with the groups about 
their methods of distribution suggest that there are in fact many similarities in 
approach. This leaves significant gaps in the potential scope of campaigns to circulate 
as widely as AIUK hope when they talk about their hope for campaigns to 'go viral'. 
Throughout the screenings of the exhibitions, new members joined Amnesty, a 
process which usually involves agreeing to subscribe by direct debit payment. The 
members who were signing up at first seemed to be from very disparate communities: 
those at the AIUK screening were typically young professionals, those at Belfast 
students, and those in Hull were largely retired members of the community. However 
a pattern began to emerge while I was signing people up which came out through 
conversations such as the following:
Man: So tell me how do I join Amnesty?
Me: That's great. Do you know much about Amnesty's work and how Amnesty 
membership contributes? 
Man: Oh yes, my brother is very involved with the group here, he's been 
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pestering me for years about joining up, and now that I'm here I think it's about 
bloody time I do.
Me: I have a flyer right here- you just fill in your contact details here, and your 
bank details on the back and give it back to me. 
This man, like many others, had a story about joining up that was not based 
exclusively on Amnesty's work, and he did not hear about Amnesty through posters 
and flyers. Instead he had a personal relationship which motivated him to join: he 
knew someone else involved. I found that many of the 'new joiners' were in fact not 
new to Amnesty at all but had been involved either in the past personally through a 
subscription or local group, or through friends and family members. 
Motivating those 'on the fence' was of course an important and useful goal as far as 
staff were concerned, but the hope that campaigns would reach new audiences, as 
expressed in the audience policy and in staff discussions about 'going viral', were 
especially relevant to the AI@50 campaign because its remit was to increase 
awareness of Amnesty and encourage new membership. People I talked to at AI@50 
events in general were not totally new to Amnesty and did not resemble the 'caring 
not committed' profile discussed in Chapter 5 because they had prior experience of 
Amnesty and were part of a social community for which joining Amnesty was 
'normal'. As one student told me 'all my friends are in Amnesty, I can't get away with 
not joining' implying that there was a social expectation among her friends that she 
join Amnesty. This is of course a very limited analysis of how new members come to 
Amnesty, based on a talking with people at selected group activities, and it in no way 
represents a comprehensive account of the influence and reasons behind joining up 
more generally. What it does suggest however, is that people who I spoke to at these 
events wished at least to appear already part of Amnesty and Amnesty related 
activities, suggesting that the approaches taken by groups that seek to campaign 
within existing activist frameworks are in fact quite appropriate, because members of 
the public attending sought to situate themselves in these frameworks by claiming 
association. 
New members to Amnesty therefore come through particular social connections, and 
are not as new as they seem. Amnesty staff have only the number of members at their 
disposal rather than the face to face information about members’ motivations and  
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paths towards joining. In the AI@50 campaign there were coded joining up leaflets 
which told staff where the leaflet had been picked up - for example the Guardian join 
up leaflets had a specific code. In addition staff make some efforts to categorise 
where leaflets have come from and the reasons for joining up via tick boxes on the 
leaflet itself. However while leaflets ask potential members where they picked them 
up, there is no space for information about why they were attending AI events, or 
what was their deeper motivation for joining. For this reason, staff imagine that 
campaigns spread widely, despite having little information about if they do or not. 
When faced with increased numbers there is an assumption that these numbers are 
largely made up of 'new' members when in fact local group recruitment activities 
such as the AI@50 exhibitions are limited in their scope to recruit members from 
outside of their own social networks. The viral spread of the campaign is therefore 
limited by those who are susceptible to infection and those who are exposed, but 
these limits are hidden from AIUK. 
I would suggest that it is the combination of the hidden nature of much of what 
groups do, and the idea of unity that comes about through things like shared fonts, 
images, and overall objectives that allows campaigns to function successfully. Like 
Tsing's environmentalists, activists in this case need friction to make wide-ranging 
links and appeal possible (Tsing 2005:247). The 'broad common cause' (ibid) was in 
this case the idea of unity, carefully preserved by a level of disconnection between 
those at AIUK, and those working in different groups. This allowed groups to 
function as they needed to, creating appeal in very locally specific ways, seemingly 
limiting the audiences by going through their own channels. In fact the new recruits 
may not have the diverse social backgrounds that AIUK imagined, but they were still 
technically new members, who added to the collective number of people taking 
action for Amnesty. So while it was not an endless viral connection reaching 
everyone, there was expansion in this network of members, even though the 
expansion happened in limited arenas.
Exposure to the AI@50 campaign was limited not only by the networked circulation 
through social groups but also by strategies of distribution which rely heavily on 
these social connections. As well as the motivation to attend and join up coming 
through largely personal connections with AIUK the modes of distribution also 
201
closed off potential routes. This was most clearly the case in the use of 'activist 
networks' to promote local group activities which meant that new attendees came 
from 'related' organisations. Groups speculate on who is likely to want to attend their 
events and issue invitations and publicity based on that. An early event with the 
Edinburgh group I worked with was a pavement stall at the east end of Princes Street 
to collect signatures. This particular area often has stalls set up by activist groups for 
many different causes such as anti-animal testing, the Socialist Worker Party, and 
other groups normally considered left wing. Amnesty had not had a stand there before 
but the group had agreed that this was an appropriate place because 'people know 
about the stalls at the west end so will stop to check it out' (Jean, in conversation, 
May 2010). When I asked if they thought that that might put off people who would 
associate Amnesty with left wing activists I was told 'but that's what we are, we want 
people to make that connection' (Jean, in conversation, May 2010). 
Having been exposed to so much brand training at AIUK, where the focus was on 
moving away from the idea of 'left wing hippies' as staff put it, I was struck by the 
local group’s approach which was not accidentally activating these ideas, but was 
seeking to make associations with other activist groups such as testing on animals, 
and socialism. The same process was at work in the publicity put together by the 
groups for the Poster Power exhibition. When asked where they had advertised, the 
Belfast group told me 'all the usual places' and while initially this sounded quite 
widespread for example posters, emails, and notices in local newsletters, it transpired 
that the places selected for posters were in fact chosen specifically to appeal to their 
idea of 'Amnesty people'. The posters were put up in a church with a large amnesty 
group, in vegetarian restaurants, published in allotment newsletters, and with other 
university societies who are 'concerned with social and political issues' such as 
People and the Planet, Student Action For Refugees, and Oxfam. In the same way 
that staff at Amnesty worked with ideas about what Amnesty people might be like, so 
did local groups, except that these ideas did not entirely match up. 
The process here was not to seek out new audiences but to generate support through 
groups of activists with a very loose association with social issues. While the stall set 
up in Edinburgh was in the very public place of the main shopping street, it was not 
hoping to attract a general public. Local groups seem to circulate campaigns widely, 
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but in fact use tactics that ensure that they stay within certain groups, yet these tactics 
are very successful in generating support. The stall in Edinburgh required people to 
come up and inquire about AI's work in order to gain information about what was 
happening and depended on an interest in looking into the street’s east end activism 
stalls to do that. A seemingly very public event therefore quickly becomes quite a 
narrow one as the audience selects itself and is motivated through pre-existing ideas 
about the space on Princes street and its associations locally. During my time slot on 
the stall I found that many people who came up already knew not only about 
Amnesty's work, but also members of the Edinburgh group through other political 
and activist engagements that they mutually attended. Relying on audience enquiry 
here was combined with expectations about the space to create a bounded audience 
within a relatively unbounded surrounding.
Therefore circulation is not necessarily endless, rather it is organised by the limits in 
social lives and expectations held by those who are active in undertaking it. In 
practice what emerged were practices in local groups that sought these limits through 
choices they made about who to target and how to campaign. While this information 
is of course accessible more widely than these limits suggest- it is possible for anyone 
passing the stall in Edinburgh to visit it- there are social and practical barriers such as 
where advertising happens, and what events take place and where that might make 
this less likely. These are known in sociology as 'communities of interest', that is the 
communities that form around certain activities, objects, and hobbies (Brown & 
Duguid 1991; Uimonen 2001). Communities of interest potentially prevent the viral 
spread of campaign materials, and suggest barriers in the circulation of images. While 
the actual circulation of influence of campaign materials is clearly beyond the scope 
of this project to ascertain, the interesting point is not where their influence starts and 
stops, but rather the active and passive ways local groups seek to funnel this 
influence through their decisions about how to market for AIUK. It is not that 
campaigns categorically do not circulate outside these channels, but rather than 
groups do not want them to. This is counter to the expectations that AIUK have about 
how groups work.
Decisions made by groups that target particular people and avenues through 
preexisting acquaintance are not necessarily limited to campaigning by local groups.  
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Online communities can themselves be immune from the 'virus'. Increasingly there 
are concerns about how the internet creates 'communities' of interest, giving the 
illusion of a World Wide Web when in fact there are severe limits to how information 
actually reaches people on the net through search engines which learn your 
preferences, through targeted advertising, and through the way that closed social 
circles circulate information between themselves (Brown & Duguid 2000:29). These 
concerns can be found too in the way AIUK that campaigns circulate. The social side 
discussed above which prompts people to join in because of friends or expectations 
do not vanish when transferred into the internet. 
Social networking websites are in many ways organised by the networks people 
allow to form around them. Through the 'acceptance' of friends, the 'following' of 
people networks form, and information is spread when people in those networks  
'share' or 'like' things with in their network. Therefore someone who is not a follower 
of Amnesty cannot access or share the information on Amnesty's site. Followers of 
Amnesty on a site can share content with their own followers and so on, but limits 
still exist in the virtual arena such as who you know and include in your network, as 
well as what you choose to interact with. The local group members I knew told me 
that they would happily 'delete' people on Facebook who were saying things that they 
considered racist or inappropriate, suggesting that social networks can be socially 
regulated. Similarly those who 'liked' the pictures circulated by groups were 
inevitably members of the groups and of their friends. 
So while online social networks clearly offer great potential for information to spread 
and move quickly, they are not completely free moving and are regulated in similar 
ways to the face to face practices of Amnesty volunteers and staff, by the formation 
around human rights activities of 'communities of interest' (Brown & Duguid 1991; 
Uimonen 2001). Nash describes the circulation of rights media online: 'Far from 
forming a global public sphere in which rigorous debate over facts and values takes 
place, the internet tends to be made up of cyber bubbles in which contributions of 
like-minded people circulate' (Nash 2010:4). The so-called 'global village' (McLuhen 
& Powers 1989) of the internet is therefore like a real village, with friendships and 
alliances that determine who talks to whom. However a more accurate description 
might be that of a global town, with suburbs and areas that one might never have 
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cause to visit or access to. Communities of interest that exist socially in 'real life' are 
therefore often reflected in the virtual world too, suggesting that dividing the two is 
not helpful in this instance (Agre 1999:3-4; Wilson & Peterson 2002:456). Rather we 
can see particular groups of activists online and in person who encounter and 
experience campaigns.
Limiting Circulation
There exist relatively narrow distributive avenues employed by local groups to 
circulate campaigns, suggesting that the model of free-flowing information that 
AIUK staff hope to achieve is not necessarily realised in practice. This has some 
implications if we consider the local group distribution of campaign materials as 
itself part of a campaign 'network'46. While ANT often describes a relatively free 
flowing network, in practice there are ways to limit this. In The Network Inside Out 
Riles describes the networking process in which Fijian bureaucrats and activists 
participated in preparation for the UN Fourth World Conference on Women (1995) 
(Riles 2001). Riles points out anthropologists studying networks will inevitably 
encounter people who are similarly 'networking' (Riles 2001:68-69). This is true on a 
number of levels in the case of Amnesty campaigns. It is true from a methodological 
point of view in terms of my own research. The type of connections that I talk about 
in this section is by no means a network in the sense that it is used in network 
analysis, where a complete network is charted and mapped (ref). As pointed out 
earlier in this chapter, the network encountered here can be best described as part of a 
network, and is more akin to what Riles describes when she talks about studies of 
networks because it consists of people who are actively seeking involvement in the 
campaigning work of Amnesty. The wider implications and connections that 
campaign images may have are not charted. 
However the limitation that Riles draws our attention to is useful also when 
considering not just the researcher's position, but also the position of those who are 
46 The circulation of materials by local groups does not represent a whole 'network' in the sense the 
term is used in network analysis or ANT. It can however be seen as a small part of a network in that 
it deals with the flow of information through different distributive channels.
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'networking' around campaign images themselves. They too are subject to the 
constraints of encountering other networkers, and this is a potential limit to how they 
understand campaign circulation and who they interact with. Riles describes 
participants who were sometimes reluctant to share information, and used methods 
such as a resistance to translation to withhold information, or the hiding of 
information in filing systems (2001:51). Participants in these networks imagined that 
the 'community' were their audience, but in reality they ended up largely talking to 
themselves, because of the self fulfilling nature of networking (ibid). There are clear 
parallels here between Riles' networks and Amnesty's circulation. In both cases there 
are limits to the spread of information that largely come from tactics employed by 
those within. In both cases the planned 'community' or in Amnesty's case 'audience' is 
not always reached. 
This is a useful observation to apply to the processes of circulation at work through 
local groups. What becomes clear when looking at group activities is that they 
facilitate circulation through connections formed independently of AIUK, and ones 
that in many ways reflect those which Riles describes in Fiji. Like Fijian activits, 
those who are encountered by local groups are also part of a process of networking. 
This networking can be found in the alliances between different 'social issues' groups, 
church involvement, and other 'connections' that local groups see as important to 
make, and it is through the formation of connections of this semi-formal sort that 
circulation of Amnesty images comes to reflect practices described by Riles. In this 
way, networks that form around circulation are examples of the self-fulfilling nature 
of networks. While they exist seemingly to transmit knowledge (about rights), in fact 
are regulated themselves in the passing on of this knowledge. Rather than the 
furthering of rights, information is flowing only in certain channels. 
This is not to suggest that the circulation of campaigns and the social relations that 
facilitate them are sealed. Certainly Amnesty International as an organisation has 
grown in membership steadily since its conception. It is not that circulation and 
participation in Amnesty activities is unable to expand, rather what I am pointing out 
here is that this expansion is not a free flowing movement that can expand in any 
direction. Exposure to campaigns is channelled in certain ways. This channelling is 
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hidden from staff because they only look at numbers, showing an expansion, but 
attention to circulation shows that it is not a blanket expansion. This is contrary to 
what staff aim to do, as discussed in Chapter 5 and earlier in this chapter, because it 
does not attract entirely new audiences to the organisation. However it does allow for 
an increase in the organisation's membership so therefore 'works' in practice. 
Throughout Part II of this thesis there is a common theme running through chapters 
that examines how members of the public are able to respond 'successfully' or 
'unsuccessfully' to campaigns, as measured by AIUK's overall objectives. I 
demonstrate that taking action for human rights through Amnesty campaigns is a 
process that requires some socialisation for people taking part. With this in mind, the 
social relations governing campaign circulation can be seen as channelling 
information to those who possess the socialisation, in terms of knowledge and beliefs, 
in order to take action, and are therefore potentially maximising the numbers and 
commitment of potential activists. This is speculative of course, but the point remains 
that this method is productive, and staff remain happy with the outcome of the work 
of local groups, despite, or because of the gap in knowledge about what is actually 
happening 'on the ground'.
In his discussion about the GM agricultural company Monsanto, Crook describes a 
process whereby Monsanto manage their public image by presenting themselves as  
sections of a chain, dependent on a whole, and as a series of individual employees 
(Crook 2000:10). In doing this, Monsanto manage to offload responsibility as 
something like 'pollen carried on the breeze' (ibid). In this way the network of people 
and issues surrounding GM cropping is limited, 'like rubbing one's hand over the 
barbs of an open pine-cone, flows in one direction are allowed, but flows in the other 
direction are blocked' (ibid). In fact networks can be controlled to flow in certain 
ways, as Amnesty's campaigns show us. While for Crook this was a directional flow, 
in the case of Amnesty it is more of a circular one. However both share a concern 
with, and limiting of, responsibility. In the former this is a desire to offload it, while 
in the latter it is a desire to forge it. However while AIUK staff plan campaigns to 
increase responsibility and care for distant others, campaign circulation practices 
mean that campaigns are not accessible to all. Therefore on the one hand campaigns 
'work' because those who engage with them generally take action, but on the other 
hand they limit the potential for others to participate in the moral economy of rights, 
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so to some degree suggesting potential failures in the system. 
This limiting of the network has further implications for considering networks in 
general. The framework of Latourian actor network theory (ANT) has to some extent 
been employed throughout this chapter to emphasise connections between different 
actors including non-human (primarily images, also conditions and environment) and 
human actors (both activist and not). However I have intentionally avoided wholly 
embracing this approach because I remain unconvinced that all actors in a network 
truly have the same type and scope of agency. Critics of Latour often point to his 
presentation of all actors in a network as equal (Latour 2005:63) as a simplistic 
characterisation that excludes the pre-existing political frameworks that constitute 
power inequality (Whittle & Spicer, 2008:612). While all things in the network 
(objects, people, etc) may be considered actors, it is not sufficiently proven therefore 
that all actors have the same amount of power to act, or are necessarily able to act in 
the same way (Winner 1993:366). In campaign circulation we have images 
transformed through their place in diverse contexts, or networks, but limitations in 
circulation suggest that there exist hierarchies of actors that predate circulation. Most 
specifically we have seen the disproportionate influence of social relations between 
human actors in determining campaign circulation. This suggests that while useful, 
ANT does not provide an adequate framework to account for campaign circulation 
that is limited in certain ways. 
In the chapters that follow I describe in more detail some of the encounters with 
campaigns in which I participated. Over these chapters a level of coherency in 
response is described. The description above that shows Amnesty as being in the 
same 'social field' as its audience through being socially similar (Mukherjee 
2006:599), as discussed in Chapter 5, can be furthered in the light of this chapter to 
suggest that Amnesty and its audience are one and the same. They are part of a 
relatively closed network of activists. The on-going process of production renders 
multiple producers, and Amnesty staff, group members, and 'the public' are in fact all 
audiences of sorts. This is compounded and created by a self-regulating network, 
both within the organisation as discussed in Chapter 5, and also continuing to 
regulate itself 'in public'. This suggests that while campaigns appear very public, 
engagement with those campaigns is in fact quite selective. What transpires is a 
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network that supports rather than extends itself through the very process of 
networking. It is the self-regulation of the network that I would suggest allows the 
development of coherent modes of response. The following chapters show that in 
imaginatively relating, there is a process of learning that is undertaken by those 
involved in rights networks. It is the closed nature of communities that form around 
rights that make this possible, allowing  communities to form that facilitate learning 
how to do rights rightly. 
Conclusions
The AI@50 campaign was planned by staff to attract new members and introduce 
people to the work of Amnesty. The flagship event for the campaign was the 
travelling poster exhibition Poster Power which was displayed by over 20 groups 
around the UK and Ireland. The campaign and the exhibition itself was hoped to 
travel widely and 'go viral' by staff at AIUK. Staff planned its circulation and 
exhibition at AIUK to be among a select group of influential press and local 
celebrities, who would hopefully be able to generate the right 'buzz' about the 
exhibition. It was imagined that once it passed into the hands of local groups to 
exhibit there would be enough interest to allow for big audiences and the spread of 
campaigns into a wider public thus generating new support for Amnesty. 
A close examination of the actual realisation of the Poster Power campaign in 
different contexts suggests that local groups do not passively enact campaign 
objectives as AIUK staff imagine, but rather are active in reproducing and changing 
campaigns to fit local situations and to 'take ownership' of AIUK's campaign 
materials. Through passing from AIUK to their distributors in local groups, 
campaigns change focus, objectives, and materials. Therefore I have suggested that 
distributive contexts are in fact further contexts of production. Further to this, the 
reproduction of campaigns described themselves produce secondary audiences who 
are also implicated in the process of production through the use of things like social 
media. While this is not what staff imagine the campaigns are doing, I have tried to 
show that groups campaign successfully to increase numbers, and that a certain 
degree of disconnection and 'friction' is useful for circulating campaigns.
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I have also suggested that there are limits to the reach and scope of these 
reproductions. In the case of the Poster Power exhibition, screenings of the campaign 
targeted their own audiences and used social and activist networks to promote 
campaigns. This meant that while it appeared to AIUK staff that their campaign had 
reached new audiences through local groups, groups had in fact sought out quite 
closed distributive contexts and focussed on reinforcing existing audiences rather 
than creating new ones. These communities, or networks, are actively sought by local 
groups because they are thought to provide the best way of communicating campaign 
materials, and the outcome of this communication is seen at satisfactory by staff at 
AIUK because numbers of membership do indeed increase. Because of the existence 
of these communities I have proposed that the categories of production, distribution 
and consumption be broken down in order to see Amnesty and their audiences as 
being simultaneously involved in producing and consuming campaigns. 
With this in mind, the next chapter looks at the way in which images work in practice 
when they interact with specific publics at an event in East London. I return to the 
James MacKay images from Chapter 4, this time to examine how responses to the 
images play out when the audience is in person rather than imagined. I hope to show 
that within these communities there are certain socialised approaches to imaginative 
identification and interacting with images, facilitated in part by the limited networks, 
which allow for the formation of cohesive groups that are able to learn from each 
other and foster practices together. 
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Chapter 8: Too Much Empathy
The use of pictures by AIUK which convey an idea of shared humanity are based on 
the hope that the public viewing those images will relate to the images in ways which 
will be transformed into positive action for human rights, as discussed in the first part 
of this thesis. As discussed in the previous chapter however, campaign images are not 
simply encoded with ideas, they work very differently when reproduced in new 
contexts of engagement. The approach imagined by staff which places similarity and 
imagined closeness in a proportional relationship to responsibility can be seen in 
moral philosophy as far back as Hume (1978:226) and rests on the idea that to care 
about others, we must be able to undertake 'imaginative identification' (Foster 
2001:66) and see the world through their eyes (Moyn 2006:399). It was hoped by 
AIUK staff that if this imaginative identification, or empathy in their own words, 
took place then action would naturally follow. However, while imagined 
identification can lead to compassion and intervention, it has also been shown in 
some cases to lead to doubt or hostility (Kelly 2012:755), or has been used to justify 
abuses through highlighting deviance within a group from majority behaviour 
(Crapanzano 2011:175). 
While attending different campaign activities I encountered all manner of responses to 
AIUK campaigns, some of which have been discussed in preceding chapters. On 
some occasions there was outright hostility towards campaigns, but on a few 
occasions a response of inaction was not the result of hostility, but arose through 
identification with images to such a degree that those depicted came under closer 
scrutiny or were deemed not worthy of support. On these occasions, I would suggest, 
it is not a lack of identification which is the block to action but an abundance of it- 
where identification allows for an appreciation of agency leading to critique of that 
person's actions. 
The following example, which occurred at a music festival in London, sees members 
of the public complaining that prisoners of conscience had made a choice to take 
political action that had resulted in imprisonment and therefore were not fully 
deserving of support. This chapter returns to the image of Htein and the plea for 
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Zarganar discussed in Chapter 4, to see how these images were received by members 
of the public. On this occasion these members of the public can be seen to be 
attributing agency to the person depicted in the images in ways which AIUK hoped 
for, by seeing him not as a passive victim but rather as an agent. However this did not 
translate into support for AIUK or the individual; instead it led to a more detailed 
critique of options and motives that may have been available to those depicted. 
Imagined identification therefore does not always lead to a feeling of moral 
responsibility or action on  behalf of those depicted. I use counter examples of 
identification leading to action to suggest that in these cases, images are read inter-
textually alongside  knowledge from other sources of the political context and visual 
practices surrounding prisoners of conscience. However, without a background 
knowledge of Burmese politics and social problems surrounding Zarganar and Htein's 
imprisonment, the 'empowering' pictures produce a backlash in which people depicted 
are seen as too 'like us' to need support. This suggests a connection between difference 
and responsibility which AIUK had not accounted for, as well as further issues in 
reception caused by passive approaches to imagining audience. The assumed link 
between acknowledging humanity and responsibility in this instance is destabilised to 
suggest that empathy alone is not enough to motivate action, but rather empathy is 
informed and governed by what an audience knows or expects and ultimately by a 
decision about how that knowledge affects ideas of responsibility.
The reactions of festival goers suggests that recognising the rights of others is not 
only achieved, as moral philosophers have speculated, through recognising your 
likeness or similarity to distant others, and sympathising or empathising with their 
pain as your own (Hume 1978; Rorty 1999; Smith 2011). Hume is particularly 
associated with this approach to ethics, as discussed in Chapters 3 & 4, and remains 
one of the earliest and best known theories of why we care about others, though 
admittedly by no means the only one. His approach is particularly relevant because of 
the history sketched out in Chapter 3 of this thesis, that sees human rights theorists 
chart rights as part of a philosophical tradition with strong underpinnings in 
enlightenment philosophy. Staff at AIUK can in many ways be seen as working within 
this tradition, and employing a partially Humian model to eliciting support for distant 
others. By basing their campaign design on similarity, and having expectations about 
the type of ethical responsibility this will foster, staff seem to subscribe to 
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enlightenment based notions about how we relate to others, and therefore 
consequently how we recognise others as deserving rights. They particularly align 
themselves to the sentimentalism of Hume, and to a lesser extent Smith, rather than to 
other rationalists approaches to ethics. However as this chapter suggests, the 
connection between recognising similarity and ethical responsibility that Hume 
outlines is played out quite differently in practice. This suggests that even when this 
Enlightenment model is drawn upon, it does not fully account for the complex 
relations that underpin care for distant others, and consequently human rights. 
For Hume, the recognition of the rights of distant others depends on an ability to 
'place ourselves' in their circumstances (Hume 1978:582-603), that is, to consider the 
'hypothetical pain or pleasure of hypothetical associates of the agent' (Mercer 
1972:56). The 'principle of resemblance' explains why we are more concerned for 
those who share our language, manners, or professions (Hume 1978:318). We are 
therefore able to imagine ourselves in the position of another and empathise with them 
in ways which leads to a recognition of their rights. The common element in humanity 
which is so often sought in an ability to feel pain or experience trauma (Douzinas 
2000:354) is not in this case the grounding principle. AIUK have attempted to create 
an appeal to the recognition of the rights of others which does not elicit sympathy, 
with all its controversial political connotations (see Nelson 2004; Arendt 1965). 
Instead, an appeal to empathy based on cultural similarity is the basis on which the 
public are being asked to recognise rights. This is similar to Rorty's sentimental 
education which calls for recognition of the 'little, superficial, similarities such as 
cherishing our parents' which unite people and obligate them (Rorty 1999:77). 
Reactions to this appeal suggest that recognising the rights of others is not a simple, 
natural, or rational component of either similarity or empathising with pain. Members 
of the public who related to pictures in ways productive of action did so by 
imaginatively identifying with those depicted, but in ways which maintained 
difference. This suggests that in this case acknowledgement of difference in an 
important aspect of recognising the rights of others. Maintaining separation of the self 
and other, according to Levinas, is an important step in avoiding the damaging 
totalisation which comes from a recognition solely based in the imagination (Levinas 
1991:52). In his approach, the other comes first precisely because of their otherness to 
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the self (Levinas 1993:116). During this music festival I would suggest that echoes of 
Levinas' approach can be seen in some of the reactions to pictures. Those people who 
maintained difference using contextual knowledge recognised the rights of others, 
while those who imaginatively related, to such a degree that difference was 
obliterated, were unable to acknowledge need or rights in others. Difference is often 
seen as a problem for human rights organisations, however difference in its many 
guises can be mobilised, and can contribute to, the recognition of the rights of others. 
Planning for Summer 
Earlier in this thesis the rationale for choosing images for the Burma summer 
campaign was discussed with reference to James MacKay's portraits of former 
prisoners of conscience and the criteria used for choosing individuals to feature in that 
campaign. In Chapter Four I highlighted the use of 'universal individuals' to try and 
close the gap with distant others, and the importance of using people who staff think 
the public will recognise and care about as 'like us' and therefore worthy of support. In 
Chapter Six this idea is further developed through the idea of dignity and how it 
informs Amnesty's portrayal of human rights victims as physically well, and 'not as 
victims’ but as 'active' and 'empowered agents'. The importance of this approach to 
visualising rights goes to the very core of AIUK staff’s self image and is heavily 
entwined with ethics as well as with an approach to gaining support which does not 
rely on pity. Staff have expectations that pictures which conform to these criteria of 
representation – bodily integrity and familiar universal humanism- which were 
discussed and decided in the office, will naturally provoke reactions from the public 
which will reflect well on this decision making. There is an imaginative identification 
happening on two levels: the relation between Amnesty and their audience discussed 
in Chapter Five, and the anticipated relation between the intended audience and the 
subjects of the pictures selected. It was therefore imagined during planning that the 
public would be able to 'empathise' with the people portrayed in the pictures and relate 
to them as fellow members of a globalised humanity, rather than as victims to be 
pitied and 'saved'. This has been discussed as the difference between mobilising 
compassion which suggests feeling another's pain, and mobilising empathy which 
suggests seeing from another's point of view (Moyn 2006:399-400).
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As alluded to in Chapters 4 and 7, staff imagine audiences to be much like 
themselves, and focus on exposing people to campaigns widely believing that 
people’s inaction is generally a result of lack of interaction with campaigns or rights 
discourse. There was an assumption that imagined empathy, once experienced by 
spectators, would lead to action on behalf of the individual because 'once you know 
the person you're obligated to them' (Rachel, in conversation, May 2011). Therefore 
AIUK staff reflect the wider belief that moral obligation is enhanced by closeness, 
both geographical and cultural, and that by using images which enhance this imagined 
closeness or empathy (as staff label it) they can activate action in spectators. In this 
case the hope was that by presenting pictures of Burmese prisoners of conscience who 
look similar to AIUK's anticipated audience the latter would be able to identify 
imaginatively with these people and therefore take action for Amnesty. However as 
the following example shows, this assumption does not fully capture the complexity 
of identifying with another and realising one's responsibility to that other.
Lovebox
Figure 8a: Lovebox 2010 Poster 
Figure 8b: Amnesty stall at Lovebox featuring placards used by volunteers to gather signatures.
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Lovebox is a small East London music festival held in Victoria Park attracting 10 000 
people every year. The festival was founded by Groove Armada as a club night in 93 
Feat East on Brick Lane, and is known primarily for its dance music acts. AIUK asked 
local groups for volunteers to attend the festival in 2010 and to gather photographs for 
the visual petition for Burma discussed earlier. The volunteers were therefore a 
mixture of people from different local groups, who turned up on the day not knowing 
exactly what they would be doing. This prevented them filtering the campaign 
through their own criteria, as I have suggested local groups are wont to do, meaning 
that the campaign approach was delivered in the style as AIUK had imagined it in the 
office, or very close to that. 
This was the first time that AIUK had a presence at Lovebox, and therefore little was 
known about the audience demographic or how Amnesty would be received in this 
context. However since festival attendance was a regular outlet for campaigns and 
'new audiences' a priority, the local festival was considered an appropriate venue 
because its focus on dance music was a deviation from other festivals that AIUK had 
worked in, for example WOMAD and Glastonbury which have more of a family or 
alternative reputation. The hope was that the festival presence would act as a gateway 
for new members of the public to become involved with AIUK by participating in an 
'easy' action requiring very little time on their behalf, getting their photo taken with a 
prisoner of conscience's name on their hand, and providing an email address for 
follow up with more detailed information at a later date. It was thought by staff that to 
ask too much of people on their first encounter with Amnesty, for example writing a 
letter or being faced with anything 'too extreme', could 'put people off' (Laura, in 
conversation, May 2010),whereas providing photographs which were recognisable 
and 'easy to relate to' would be more likely to attract positive responses (Laura, in 
conversation, May 2010). The email address would be used to 'reel people in' with a 
gradual trickle of information and requests for participation growing in scope and 
hopefully leading to membership and on-going engagement (Valerie, interview, 
September 2010). The action was therefore a small time commitment and designed to 
be appealing to people with little or no knowledge of Amnesty's work because of that. 
 There was a central stall which was manned by a member of AIUK staff or 
volunteers, which was surrounded by James MacKay's pictures printed and mounted 
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onto placards. This was to form a 'hub' which people could approach and then be 
directed to more detailed information. The local group volunteers and I were sent out 
to talk to people in the crowd and give information about AIUK's work on Burma.  
Our main remit was to collect photographs for a visual petition, deliver basic 
information on the campaign, and direct difficult questions or interested members of 
the public to the central stall. We were equipped with an information sheet detailing 
the campaign objectives and some background information. Some of us had one of the 
placards with James' pictures on it, others had a poster or leaflet showing the pictures 
of released prisoners of conscience. The aim was to gather pictures for the visual 
petition, but also to get email addresses of those people which could be used later, 
thereby using the campaign as a way of interesting people in joining Amnesty as well 
as achieving campaign objectives. This was one of the outputs of the campaign action 
devised by Laura and Valerie. 
Having been present during the selection of pictures I knew the expectations which 
AIUK had about responses to these pictures.They hoped that in providing people with 
familiar cultural characteristics, they would be encouraged to recognise the humanity 
of those people and their right to protection from abuses, and more than that, they 
would relate to these people in a way which 'makes you care' (Laura, in conversation, 
March 2010). So I was interested in the ways in which people imaginatively identified 
with the pictures, and if they worked as AIUK hoped, whether they would 'care'. I was 
paired with a local group member from a south London Amnesty group called 
Josephine and together we set out into a buzzing crowd of festival goers to talk to 
them about human rights in Burma. 
'He Chose to Go To Prison'
The briefing at the beginning asked us 'not to get too heavy' but to 'convey the 
urgency' of the situation, so we took a hands off approach, allowing people to come 
and ask us what we were doing and we then gave them information which did not 
dwell as much on the pain and suffering of the prisoners as had previous group 
activities that I had attended. Because we were taking pictures and holding a large 
poster we attracted attention and many people came to talk to us. Most people were 
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interested and happy to have their picture taken by us to be uploaded onto the Flickr 
account and used for the campaign. However there were some people who, after 
finding out what we were campaigning for, took issue or disagreed with what AIUK 
were doing. One of these confrontations was particularly memorable because a group 
of four people, who disagreed with AIUK, not only touched more explicitly on some 
of the issues which others had skirted around, but also drew in other passers-by who 
agreed with them and supported their argument. I therefore consider it in some way 
representative of a minor trend in campaign responses. All comments and discussions 
took place in conversation over the 16th-18th July 2010 at Lovebox. The real names 
of members of the public have been used where requested, otherwise they have been 
changed. 
Initially, this group seemed quite interested in AIUK's work and unlike some members 
of the public, they did not approach us with a hostile attitude. One person who 
introduced himself as Paul said he had seen Amnesty at 'a bunch of festivals' and 
wondered 'what it was all about', but after we had explained the situation in Burma 
and specifically why we were taking action for Zarganar, he seemed if anything less 
inclined to take action. His concerns, as he expressed them, suggested that like some 
members of the local groups he did not consider Burmese prisoners to be in a bad 
enough situation to need help: 'look at him he's an artist, he has that huge studio, I'd 
be happy if I had that'. While the image is not actually of Zarganar himself but of 
Htein, another artist in Burma, it was unclear how much Paul took this into account, 
and there was significant conflation between himself, Htein and Zarganar, despite 
regular explanations from Josie. This implies that the identification that Paul made 
was even more imagined, as it was based on a hybrid of two men. The implication 
seemed to be that things were not that bad if people could practise art and live in 
conditions which were recognisable or comparable to our own. This was re-enforced 
by comments which likened the situation in Burma to Paul's own life here and judged 
the situation in Burma to be not sufficiently 'bad' to require intervention: 'it doesn't 
look so bad in Burma, so what there are some rules, there are loads of things that 
happen here which I didn't vote for and I still have to do them'. This suggests that for 
Paul, identification with Zarganar and Htein was working against AIUK. He 
recognised what he saw in the picture as too similar to his own life to be truly in need 
of change. I spoke to him alone later to ask for permission to use his comments and he 
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told me that he was an artist himself specialising in illustration, so he said that he 
knew 'what artists can be like' telling me that artists are always causing a stir to get 
attention for their work, and attributed this to both Htein and Zarganar. He also 
several times made comparisons between himself and his lack of studio space, to the 
image and the studio, and their shared plight as artists, putting himself in the same 
frame as Burmese artists. Recognition and identification were therefore a barrier to 
intervention in this case, and Paul's comments seem to support concerns that people 
need to be 'shocked' into action. Rather than increasing moral responsibility for the 
person depicted, the recognisable tropes and similarity made Paul question his 
responsibility for this person who appeared to have many of the same lifestyle 
elements as himself. In short, the relation of helper and victim had been destabilised 
because Paul did not see himself as being in a particularly privileged position. 
These sentiments were not unusual, and during various group activities I encountered 
many people who did not rate situations as dire enough to warrant action. One man 
said to me, 'look at it, that guy has a pencil, he can't be that badly off’, in reference to 
campaign materials. However, what Paul's discussion highlights is the role of relating 
to people in forming these judgements. As well as creating closeness, relating to 
people can create scepticism about their need because if someone is 'like us' then it is 
unclear where the imperative to intervene lies, and responsibility in such cases is 
unclear. 
As well as destabilising the relation requiring help, relating and acknowledging 
someone as similar has historical precedence as necessary for certain types of 
violence interventions, suggesting that similarity does not naturally lead to 'empathy' 
in the way that AIUK staff believe. In his recent account of the Harkis, Algerians who 
fought with the French in the Algerian War from 1954-1962, Crapanzano paints a 
picture of retaliations against Harkis who remained in Algeria as dependent on the 
categorization of them as traitors (Crapanzano 2011:74-75). Harkis returning to 
Algeria were subjected to torture, abuses, and slaughter (ibid:83), that was contingent 
on their being Algerian, and therefore traitors who deserve punishment (ibid:175). In 
this case it is not a lack of similarity, or a lack of recognition of humanity that causes a 
break down in empathy. It is the acknowledgment of similarity that makes the 
transgression all the worse. The awareness of another’s actions and choices are under 
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review and categorised as wrong. 
Commenting on Zarganar's status as a prisoner of conscience, Paul said, 'well if it's 
illegal he knew what he was doing, he chose to go to prison, now he's got to live with 
it'. Of course Paul's claim about Zarganar's choice in protesting is linked to his 
assessment of the situation in Burma as not 'so bad', because that allows for in action 
to be a viable option. It is also a departure from ideas of compassion fatigue because it 
suggests that people living with human rights violations are not seen as passive 
victims, which is so often a concern (see Benthall 1993). The repeated return to 
Zarganar's choice in how he approached living under Junta rule led to a discussion 
between the assembled onlookers and Paul about what Zarganar's options were: either  
'a quiet life, protest under the radar' or taking a stand out of necessity. Some people 
thought he should just leave the country and others suggested that there were 'laws 
and that' that could be appealed to at an international level. There were diverse 
opinions on this issue and it is not whether people agree or disagree with Zarganar's 
stance that is significant but rather the matter of agency of the person depicted. Paul's 
easy relation to the picture was based on this identification, much as AIUK staff had 
planned, but the jump between identification and taking action assumed by staff is not 
the only outcome of this relation. Instead, imaginative relating means looking at a 
person as having choices, potentially making mistakes and ultimately being 
responsible for their actions and the repercussions of these actions. Paul's reaction was 
similar to others that I experienced at Amnesty activities where members of the 
public, and sometimes even local groups, were able to pass judgement on a person 
and deem them less worthy of intervention than people they related less to. 
During a local group meeting, a girl I had befriended expressed to me her private 
opinion that Amnesty, and the local group specifically, is 'too keen to help Hamas'. 
This opinion is not unusual. Amnesty have often been criticised for their attempt at an 
even-handed approach to negotiations in disputed regions in the middle east. However 
her opinion was the more surprising because unlike most of the critics of the AI 
position on this issue that I had encountered, she was a practising Muslim from an 
Arab country, and during past conversations with me had expressed feelings of 
kinship with other Muslims she met here and abroad. She told me in interview that:
'...yes I want a free state of Palestine, without a doubt, but I do not like 
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the way Hamas go about it. You might think there is no other option but 
there is too much sympathy here in this university for these methods. 
There are lots of other routes to peace.' (Zena, interview, February 2011)
Her implication during the interview was that people in the group were too keen to 
forgive actions because they did not really understand and could 'romanticise' Hamas, 
whereas she believed herself to have a real vested interest in the situation and a 'real 
understanding of what these people are and what they are doing' (Zena, interview, 
February 2011). While her relation in this case is not mediated through visuals, it 
suggests that relating to people does not immediately lead to supporting them. In this 
case her judgement was far  harsher than that of the rest of the group despite, or 
perhaps because of, her relation to the people in question. Her suggestion that it is 
easier to forgive a stranger than someone you know seems to be reflected to some 
degree in Paul's reaction to the Burma campaign. As the conversation went on and he 
drew more and more parallels between himself Zaraganar, and Htein, he began to 
question what he would do in a similar situation. This follow through of empathy may 
seem obvious, but to AIUK staff it never occurred to them that people would react in 
this way. The above reaction suggests that while identifying with people has the 
potential to create sympathy or compassion, is also has the potential to do the 
opposite, to allow for a more complex view of a person and situation which then 
invites scrutiny. The view from close up allow for more details than the broad brush 
strokes seen from afar.
Relating to pictures in ways which recognise people depicted as 'like us', allows 
members of the public to recognise also the agency of those people, and therefore to 
question their actions. In a recent ethnography of the assessment of torture for asylum 
purposes, Kelly suggests one way of understanding these processes of identification. 
The difficulty of defining and proving torture can lead to judgements about the 
character of a witness and their likelihood of having experienced torture (Kelly 
2012a:763). Kelly argues that this is enabled by relating to witnesses and 
acknowledging the rationality of fabricating claims, thus implicitly appealing to their 
agency. Empathy in this case leads to doubt (ibid: 764). While Kelly's work is based 
on making legal determinations based on a person's behaviour and language, the 
process he describes of 'imaginative identification' (ibid: 754) can be seen as similar 
to that relation which is activated by images. The relation in the case of Zarganar and 
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Htein can be even more imaginative, because rather than having a person at their 
disposal, Paul and other spectators have their relation mediated through pictures, with 
their own set of signals and tropes, and which allow for no response from those 
depicted. Viewers of images are free to let their imaginative relation run wild. For 
Paul and other spectators of human rights campaigns, a mistrust of honesty is not at 
stake, but an acceptance of the agency of others comes with concerns about their 
choices and a judgement on their situation.
From Empathy to Action
If Paul provided an example of when accepting agency can cause problems for AIUK 
campaigns, there were no shortage of examples of the 'right' sort of response to this 
activity, one in which relating to images led to action and engagement with the 
campaign. As discussed by staff in the planning stages, there was a hope that 'the 
human element' would make rights issues more pressing and close the distance 
between people, a distance which has always been associated with stifling the need 
for action. In the following example we see this process at work in much the way 
AIUK imagine it. That is people feel a need to take action because they relate to the 
people in the images and think 'I just think, that could be me, my husband, my 
daughter' (member of the public, Lovebox, July 2010). The following is an example 
of taking part in the same action as was used at Lovebox, where members of the 
public expressed empathy in support of action. In this case, members of the public 
demonstrated the sort of response imagined by Amnesty staff when devising the 
action. When people responded in this way there was often a prior interest in or 
knowledge of Burma and human rights which was used discursively to frame empathy 
and make sense of the pictures. This suggests that while doubt and scrutiny are always  
a possibility, if they are foregrounded by a knowledge of difference then they are 
more likely to lead to action in the way that AIUK hope.
After the experience with Paul, which was one of a few less positive interactions, 
Josie suggested that 'no one is interested in what we have to say, they just want to 
party' (Josie, in conversation, July 2010). In fact this was not the case. Throughout the 
afternoon a number of people approached us and asked to be involved. Some of these 
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interactions were brief, with people hardly seeming to want to talk to us, but 
apparently being keen to have their picture taken and to be seen to be doing something 
'good'. In many cases people took their own pictures to tweet or upload, seeming to 
support the idea discussed in Chapter 4 that doing good is also about being seen to be 
good. But many Lovebox attendees were keen to ask questions about the pictures and 
the work which AIUK was doing in the area. In these cases there was almost always a 
background knowledge of Burma. 
Cathy and Rose approached us with the opening statement, 'so what are you doing 
about the awful oppression in Burma?' (at Lovebox, in conversation, July 2010). They 
went on to discuss between themselves and with us the situation in Burma in relation 
to the placards we were holding. When shown Htein, Cathy likened herself to him in 
much the same way that Paul had and AIUK had hoped, by responding to his 
occupation as an artist saying, 'It could just as easily be any one of us if we weren't so 
lucky to live here'. Though not an artist herself, Cathy related to him using instances in 
her own life where she had caused controversy as a DJ and related to the 'repression 
of expression'. She and Rose both biographised Htein's story, making links as Josie 
spoke to things they knew and had experienced, such as times when they had 
undertaken protests and civil disobedience against the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Rose said:
'it's so important to be able to change things politically and express your 
opinions, we were involved in protesting against the war – imagine we'd 
been stopped from doing that and arrested...He was right to try to stand 
up to them, anything we can do to help we should'.
Here Rose makes links between herself and Htein which acknowledges his agency in 
protesting through his art. Her approach was like many others who came to speak to 
us in making a link between themselves and these distant others in the photographs 
through shared experiences and activities. Many times people would ask ‘what if it 
were me? Or how would I feel if it was someone I knew?’ thus discursively closing the 
gap between themselves and people in Burma. 
Rather than questioning prisoners' actions, Rose and Cathy suggest that decisions to 
protest against the Burmese regime through art or comedy is the very reason that we 
should support them. The difference in opinion about an appropriate response is not 
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based on a lack or abundance of empathy. In the case of Paul, Rose and Cathy, 
imaginatively identifying was not a problem for them, however changing empathy 
into action is not a necessary result of that experience, as Paul shows. Instead of 
encouraging support, Paul's relation to prisoners was the cause of his opinion that they 
were not deserving. While Paul was coming to the issues as a self-confessed 'newbie', 
Cathy and Rose had a good knowledge of Burmese politics and history which was 
informing their discussion. From their opening line, asking what we were doing about 
Burma, to references to specific incidents which had been reported in the news, Cathy 
and Rose based their relation in expectations about the suffering and discomfort of 
Zarganar and others living under Junta rule in Burma. Comments such as 'I heard 
from the UN report that men were being kept in cages meant for dogs and beaten 
daily' suggested that behind the imagined identification was a knowledge of difference 
in circumstance, and that while they were able to protest without fear of reprisals, this 
was not the case in Burma. Rather than the imagined identification alone, most 
comments made by these young women which related ‘us’ and ‘them’ did so through 
the medium of how alike we were in so many ways but how different in 
circumstances. For example, in their comment that 'They're just ordinary people 
mostly I bet, just guys going about their business but they can't because of the country 
they live in, and so they have to do something' there was a comparative difference, 
rather than anything else, which drove the perceived need to take action. These two 
different responses are informed by different ideas about where responsibility lies 
rather than different degrees of imaginative relating. While Paul had the same degree 
of imaginative relation as Cathy and Rose, he lacked a contextualising knowledge 
which transformed the nature of the relation into one of action on behalf of the 
individual depicted.
Muted Engagement
For AIUK staff preparing this campaign, the assumption was made that identification 
can lead to compassionate action. There is an assumption inherent in human rights 
discourse that recognising humanity produces a wider field of responsibility and 
protection. However as Kelly suggests, this same process of recognition can also lead 
to doubt (Kelly 2012:755). When this relation is mediated through photographs, there 
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